April
17, 2024
Analyst Or Fialkov said falsifying numbers creates inaccurate
perceptions among the army and people in Israel
Israeli
military expert Or Fialkov said on 17 April that authorities gave false
information about the rate of interception of Iranian drones and missiles
during Tehran’s operation against Israel over the weekend.
Israel
had claimed on 14 April following Iran’s Operation True Promise that 99 percent
of the projectiles fired during the operation were intercepted.
“The
interception percentage of the missiles is about 84 percent, a very high
percentage but not comparable to the numbers that the IDF provided, which gave
the feeling that there had been an absolute interception of all Iranian
threats,” Fialkov told Hebrew newspaper Maariv in an interview released
Wednesday.
“When
they publish crazy success rates (99 percent) and create a [false] state of
perfection, it can cause complacency in the citizens as well as in the
military,” the Israeli researcher added.
He
also said that an Iranian attack on settlements would have resulted in
“significantly higher casualties.”
Iran
chose to target military sites instead. Following the Iranian operation, Tel
Aviv admitted that the Nevatim airbase in southern Israel was damaged in the
attack. Iran’s Armed Forces said the Nevatim base was the site from which
Israeli jets took off to attack the Iranian consulate in Damascus.
Tehran
also targeted intelligence sites in the Jabal al-Sheikh mountains between Syria
and Israeli territory, which “provided the intelligence for the Israeli
airstrike on Iran’s diplomatic mission in Damascus,” Iranian army chief Major
General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri said on Sunday.
Authorities
in Iran also said that their operation was purposefully limited and measured,
and aimed to send a strong message that Tehran is capable of much more.
Several
Iranian officials have vowed a much harsher attack if Israel escalates the
situation with a response.
"This
operation showed that our armed forces are ready," Iranian President
Ebrahim Raisi said in a speech on 17 April, adding that Operation True Promise
“brought down the glory of the Zionist regime.”
"The
slightest act of aggression" by Israel will lead to "a fierce and
severe response," he warned.
Was
Tehran’s ‘symbolic’ attack on the Jewish state a victory or a defeat for the
future?
The
night of April 13-14 was another round of ‘shock therapy’ for the world as Iran
launched a direct attack on Israeli territory. This followed an unjustified
strike by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the Iranian consulate in Damascus,
which resulted in the deaths of 11 diplomats and two high-ranking generals of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Initially, Israel denied
responsibility, but later indirectly admitted to targeting the building under
the belief that it served as a military base coordinating Hamas operations.
This act clearly violated the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, which
protect diplomatic missions. Typically, such an infringement would lead to the
severance of diplomatic ties, but since Iran and Israel have had no such
relations and have been on the brink of conflict for decades, Israel’s abrupt
move can be interpreted as a declaration of war. Faced with this provocation,
Iran was put in a very tight spot and felt compelled to act.
Almost
two weeks of suspense followed as the world waited for Iran’s response, which
seemed logically inevitable. Pundits and analysts mostly considered two obvious
options that Iran could use: either give a mirror response and hit Israeli
territory or one of its diplomatic offices in the region, or use its proxy
forces, which are as much of a problem for Israel as Iran itself. But Tehran
decided to take a third course, both launching a direct attack and using its
allies in the region. This attack made history as it was Iran’s first direct
assault on Israel. Among other things, it was the most massive drone attack on
record, estimated to have involved more than 200 UAVs, as well as 150 cruise
missiles, 110 Shahab-3, Sajil-2 and Kheibar surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles, and seven Fattah-2 hypersonic cruise missiles. The strikes were
launched from multiple locations including Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the
part of Yemen controlled by the Ansar Allah Houthi group.
At
2 a.m., air raid sirens echoed throughout Israel. Panicked citizens flooded the
streets, rushing to find shelter as explosions rocked Jerusalem, the port of
Haifa, a military base in the Negev desert, and an air force base near Be’er
Sheva. The IDF urged residents of Dimona, near a nuclear facility, to remain
close to bomb shelters, and news feeds were filled with increasingly alarming
messages. The barrage overwhelmed Israel’s renowned Iron Dome defense system,
with the sheer volume of incoming drones and missiles proving too much to
handle. In response, the air forces of the United Kingdom, the United States,
Israel, and Jordan scrambled to intercept the projectiles. In a desperate
countermeasure, Israel jammed all GPS signals to disrupt the guidance systems
of the Iranian missiles and drones. Tehran promptly declared that its targets
were strictly military bases, airfields, and government installations.
One
step from all-out war?
As
the attack unfolded, US President Joe Biden publicly stated that he had spoken
with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “to reaffirm America’s ironclad
commitment to the security of Israel.” All European capitals echoed the
sentiment. Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin, while confirming his president’s
resolve to support the Jewish state, added that Washington is not seeking
conflict with Tehran. These words are unlikely to be welcomed in West
Jerusalem. Netanyahu made several statements in light of Iran’s counterattack,
first noting that everything was intercepted and blocked, referring to the
success of the missile defense system. He then vowed that Iran will be held
accountable for its actions. Israeli military reports claimed that almost 99%
of the missiles and UAVs launched by Iran were shot down, but many military
experts both in the West and in the Global South doubted this statement,
relying on footage published in the media.
At
the same time, sources of several influential American publications report that
Washington is making every effort to dissuade Israel from directly striking
Iran in order to “end this cycle of escalation.” Remarkably, but two days after
the incident, Netanyahu made less belligerent statements, noting that the
Jewish state would respond to Iran’s attack “wisely and without emotions.” Of
course, this doesn’t necessarily mean that Israel will retaliate directly
asymmetrically, but rhetoric in this matter is also important, and it is
possible that Netanyahu will try not to drag the entire region, and
subsequently the world, into the abyss of catastrophe. Especially considering
that Israel is not an American puppet, and therefore Washington cannot
guarantee that Netanyahu will sit idly by. Hence, the independent actions of
the Israeli prime minister will carry significant weight.
Against
this backdrop, the opinion of the former Israeli defense and foreign minister,
Avigdor Lieberman, now an opposition figure, appears quite notable. Lieberman
stated that Israel was only able to repel the Iranian attack thanks to US
assistance, specifically through the capabilities of American intelligence and
early interception. Based on this, Lieberman believes that Israel should seek
maximum coordination with Washington regarding a retaliatory strike against
Iran. According to him, by doing so, the US “will acknowledge that Israel has
no alternative but to retaliate against Iran for its attack.” CNN’s sources
report that Israel has even decided to postpone the operation in Rafah in Gaza,
which it had been planning for several months, due to the situation with Iran.
Now, Israeli authorities are focused on responding to the attack, resulting in
the active phase of the operation being postponed for at least several days. In
simpler terms, Israel is now in the position that Iran had been in all those
days since the strike on the consulate in Damascus until the events of the
night of April 14.
In
turn, Iran’s IRGC issued a statement just minutes after the operation ended,
noting that it was practically a ‘final warning,’ and in the event of a reverse
reaction from Israel, Tehran would respond with more powerful actions. Iranian
Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian stated that the Islamic Republic does
not desire an escalation of tension in the Middle East but acts in defense of
its national security and interests. Additionally, according to the Iranian
foreign minister, Tehran took into account the inaction of the UN Security
Council regarding Israel’s use of force against the Iranian consulate in
Damascus, as well as the irresponsible behavior of the US, Britain, and France.
A
new place for a new Iran
Iran’s
counterattack posed a challenge not only to Israel but to the entire West.
Tehran acted on the premise that it wouldn’t allow itself to be slighted. It
needed to ‘save face,’ not disappoint its allies and sympathizers, and prove to
the entire region that it rightfully belongs among the region’s leaders.
Moreover, the events can be seen as a change in Tehran’s tactics. Whereas
previously Iranians built their ‘relations’ with Israel on the basis of
‘strategic patience,’ trying to avoid direct conflict with the Jewish state by
all means, the situation has now undergone a radical change.
The
hardliners from among the clerics surrounding Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, who advocate a tougher position on Israel and the West, have
described the tactic of ‘strategic patience’ as a sign of weakness and called
for more decisive action. Senior IRGC commanders, on the other hand, took a
more pragmatic approach, arguing that Iran was not yet ready to make drastic
moves. In the end, instead of emotion and hot-headedness, it was pragmatism
that prevailed, combined with an understanding of a new reality – something
that the West may not have planned for, at all.
Hence,
one might ask: Could all of this have been an attempt to demonstrate to Israel
and to the entire collective West that the balance of power in the Middle East
has shifted? After all, the name given by Iran to its operation was ‘True
Promise’ (or ‘Honest Promise’). Every word and phrase spoken by the Iranians
should be examined quite meticulously, through a philosophical lens. In fact,
everything seems to indicate that Tehran is now moving from rhetoric to action;
if, previously, Iran was called a ‘paper tiger’ by the global community, now
the attitude towards it has somewhat changed. Tehran can now boast to the rest
of the region about its commitment, saying that “unlike you, we walked the
talk.”
There
are players in the Middle East who might not be happy with such behavior,
especially those that have chosen to remain neutral or to wait out the crisis.
We are talking, primarily, about Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. In a polite but
somewhat abstract statement, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called for
restraint to prevent any further escalation that “threatens the stability of
the region and the safety of its population,” which, in effect, signals that
the countries of the union (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, and Saudi
Arabia) are unwilling to make a clear choice and possibly still hope for
normalization of relations with Israel once the conflict in the Gaza is
resolved. Türkiye holds a similar stance, although it should be noted that
Ankara condemned Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate, warned that it would
close its airspace to military aircraft in case of a US attack on Iran (in
that, Türkiye was immediately joined by Kuwait and Qatar), and attempted to
take on the role of peacemaker. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan made a series of harsh comments about Israel, thus killing any prospect
of becoming a mediator and bringing the opposing sides to the negotiating
table.
That
said, neither Israel nor Iran is interested in such a scenario. Tehran has
chosen a tough but consistent line of policy towards Israel: no deals with the
Jewish state until Palestine is free and until Jerusalem is divided into two
parts. There is nothing new about Tehran’s position, though – it is all stated
clearly in the UN resolution from 1947. Ironically, when voting at the UN in
1947, Iran, ruled at the time by the ‘pro-Western’ Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi,
voted against this type of solution, arguing that over the long term it would
lead to mass deportation of Palestinians from their very own lands, preventing
them from visiting their holy sites. In fact, Tehran believed that the
newly-founded state of Israel would not stop there and would continue to expand
at the expense of its neighboring states. Simply put, Tehran never did betray
the core of its own position on the issue; although, seeing the inaction of the
Arab states, Pahlavi Iran was gradually building relations with Tel Aviv –
without ignoring the problem of Palestine.
Given
all this context, the most intriguing question now is how the countries of the
region, namely the Arab world, will react to Iran’s actions – after all, the
attitude towards modern Tehran is quite mixed. Iran has been able to bolster
its hand by using proxy organizations, which are now moving against Israel to
defend the interests of Palestine. Judging by their neutral reactions – and
quite unsurprisingly, in fact – none of the Arab leaders is interested in a
strong Iran. They are interested in Iran existing as a moderate state allied
with the West, with which they themselves cooperate. However, if Iran joins Russia and China and,
as part of this troika, becomes an actor in the great world politics, the
Middle East will face some big changes.
Does
Israel have the answer?
Despite
the IRGC’s counterattacks, Iran continues to maintain its position that nobody
needs a war, and it’s not interested in one by any means. As for its strikes so
far, Iran considers them quite successful; they succeeded in making a point and
delivering ‘a clear message’ to the entire West that Tehran is no longer
confining itself to verbal statements and that, in general, things are going to
get very real. Furthermore, any potential response from Israel will now justify
similar operations by Iran, which may become harsher and harsher every time.
Besides, the moral victory also belongs to Iran. Tehran had held the situation
in suspense all along, and the world witnessed strikes on military bases in the
north of Israel and saw them take damage. Iran’s strike, albeit a token one,
has happened. The Islamic Republic is beginning to act like the flagship power
in the region.
In
this case, Israel hardly needs a direct war with the Islamic Republic,
especially with the Hamas issue not settled yet, Gaza still not demilitarized,
hostages yet to be rescued, and Western allies offering nothing in terms of
support but nice statements and condemnations. In the meanwhile, there are
rather serious reasons to believe that Israel may not be able to keep its
temper and strike, just for self-consolation. Expecting a response strike from
Iran, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said, several days prior to the
counterattack, that if Iran strikes from its territory, then Israel will attack
in response. That means the Israelis could go further and continue their
attacks. Yes, Netanyahu has changed his tone somewhat and tries to show now
that he doesn’t want a big war. He, however, may be under pressure from the
security wing, members of which yearn for revenge and want to blow off steam on
Iran, which they think created the situation Israel has been in since October
7, 2023. If Israel does strike back, attacking Iranian territories and killing
people, the situation will spin out of control and there will be no stopping
the Iranians.
The
goal of Iran’s counterattack against Israel was not to unleash a big war. This
action can be seen differently: as a PR effort, a propaganda schtick, or
muscle-flexing. Some may say that Iran failed to retaliate fully, as its attack
didn’t achieve anything equal to the two generals and 11 diplomats that
Israel’s strike had killed. The message of the counterstrike, however, was not
only to take revenge for Iran’s dead. Tehran deliberately didn’t strike targets
in major Israeli cities. Its strikes on Israel were limited, mostly targeting
the occupied Golani Heights, which legally belong to Syria, and military
installations in Negev desert, in order to avoid escalation and prevent further
provocations on Israel’s part. Besides, Iran has proved that it can penetrate
Israel’s air defenses and that Israel is not that well protected.
Therefore,
Iran’s goal was to change the rules of the game in the region and, by and
large, it succeeded. Tehran’s counterattack put paid to any talk of Iran not
putting its money where its mouth is and brought the conflict between the two
countries to a whole new level. This half-measure cannot be seen as a defeat,
but it’s not exactly a victory either. Besides, Israel is not going to sit
idle. The Jewish state will start reviewing its actions and correcting
mistakes; after all, matters of its own security are the utmost priority for
Israel.
Loir
Sternfeld
April
16, 2024
Had
Iran wanted to seriously escalate its conflict with Israel, its response to the
Damascus embassy bombing would have looked very different.
In partnership with
Iran’s dramatic attack on Israel on April 13
was no bolt from the blue. It had been building for years, in response to
Israel’s increasingly brazen attacks on Iranian targets across the region —
from weapons depots used by Iran’s regional allies to the Islamic Republic’s
own nuclear scientists and senior military officials. After October 7, these
attacks accelerated further, culminating in Israel’s April 1 bombing of the
Iranian Embassy compound in Damascus that killed several senior Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers.
While
Israel’s leaders patted themselves on the back for another successful
operation, the world looked on in bewilderment, knowing that this time Israel
has crossed all red lines. Under countless international agreements, embassies
have an inviolable right to protection. When this right is violated, conflicts
and wars quickly escalate.
The
past 50 years provide no shortage of examples of this. The takeover of the
American Embassy in Tehran and the ensuing hostage crisis in November 1979 led
to the severing of relations between Iran and the United States. The attempted
assassination of Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London in 1982 was one of
the catalysts of the First Lebanon War. The bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires in 1992 exposed Hezbollah, as well as Iran, to harsh sanctions.
Therefore,
from the moment Israel attacked the Iranian Embassy in Damascus two weeks ago,
most analysts were expecting a response. The one that followed was remarkably
restrained.
By
all estimates, Iran was not seeking a regional escalation. Immediately after
Israel’s April 1 attack, Tehran opened a direct channel of communication with
the United States, reportedly telling the Americans that if they compelled
Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza, Iran would refrain from retaliating at
all. When it became clear that this was not on the table, an Iranian military
response soon followed: late Saturday night, Iran declared the beginning of its
attack by launching around 170 drones, which would take several hours to reach
Israel. Thus, in effect, Iran alerted Israel and its allies with plenty of
advance warning, allowing the vast majority of the drones — along with the
missiles that followed — to be intercepted.
Had
Iran sought to catch Israel by surprise, it could have unleashed the ballistic
missiles that were deployed in the final phase of the attack, whose flight time
is 10-12 minutes, without any warning. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
these missiles were aimed at Israeli military bases — that is, Iran refrained
from targeting civilian population centers. Only one person was seriously
wounded as a result of the attack: a 7-year-old girl from an unrecognized
Bedouin village, who was injured by a fragment of a missile that was
intercepted by the Iron Dome (unrecognized villages, home to over 100,000 Arab
Bedouin citizens in the Negev/Naqab desert, are not provided with shelters,
leaving them completely exposed to rockets and falling shrapnel). Immediately
afterward, Iran announced that as far as it was concerned, the issue was
settled, unless Israel insisted on retaliating further.
In
January, I wrote for Local Call (+972’s Hebrew partner site) about Iran’s
moderating role in the war, despite its bellicose rhetoric. I still believe
that Iran refrained from entering the war, restrained Hezbollah, and did not
provide the logistical or military umbrella that Hamas expected after its
October 7 attack. According to Israeli intelligence estimates, Hezbollah is
equipped with hundreds of thousands of missiles that can reach Haifa and cities
south of it; if Iran had an interest in inflaming the region, it would have
coordinated the attack from Lebanon too, rather than alerting the world to the
drone attack hours in advance of their arrival.
Of
course, there are many crimes for which to hold Iran accountable — primarily
its murderous policies toward the Iranian people, treatment of dissidents, mass
executions in the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protest, and more.
Internationally, too, the Iranian regime has contributed to instability in the
region and beyond: its proxy wars with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen, its
support for and close cooperation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, its newfound love
for Putin’s Russia, and the worrying progress of its nuclear project since the
collapse of the JCPOA.
The
Islamic Republic cannot get a free pass for these actions, and the
international community must hold it to account while working to mitigate the
sources of regional tension. Recent Iranian agreements with Saudi Arabia and
the UAE point to how these conflicts can be de-escalated, and further
concentrated diplomatic efforts in this vein are essential. Still, so long as
Israel’s assault on Gaza continues, there remains a risk that the region could
explode.
The
right thing for Israel to do now is to end this terrible war — in Gaza, and
with Iran. We must reach an agreement to return the hostages who are still
alive, bury our dead, allow the Gazans to bury their dead, and start thinking
about new directions in order to ensure the security of all the region’s
residents. That would require Israel’s government to do something that almost
no Israeli government has done for decades: put our safety above the
settlements and the desire to live forever by the sword. Jordan’s involvement
in intercepting Iran’s missiles provides a glimpse of what that alternative
future could look like.
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