By William R. Polk
Source:https://consortiumnews.com/2017/09/05/on-the-brink-of-nuclear-war/
Source:https://consortiumnews.com/2017/09/05/on-the-brink-of-nuclear-war/
The U.S. and North Korea are on the
brink of hostilities that if begun would almost certainly lead to a nuclear
exchange. This is the expressed judgment of most competent observers. They
differ over the causes of this confrontation and over the size, range and
impact of the weapons that would be fired, but no one can doubt that even a
“limited” nuclear exchange would have horrifying effects throughout much of the
world including North America.
A Korean girl carries her brother on her back, trudging past a
stalled M-26 tank, at Haengju, Korea., June 9, 1951. (U.S. military photo)
So how did we get to this point, what
are we now doing and what could be done to avoid what would almost certainly be
the disastrous consequences of even a “limited” nuclear war?
The media is replete with accounts of
the latest pronouncements and events, but both in my personal experience in the
closest we ever came to a nuclear disaster, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and from
studying many other “flash points,” I have learned that failure to appreciate
the background and sequence of events makes one incapable of understanding the
present and so is apt to lead to self-defeating actions. With this warning in
mind, I will recount in Part 1 how we and the Koreans got to where we are. Then
in Part 2, I will address how we might go to war, what that would mean and what
we can do to stay alive.
Throughout most of its history, Korea
regarded China as its teacher. It borrowed from China Confucianism, its
concepts of law, its canons of art and its method of writing. For these, it
usually paid tribute to the Chinese emperor.
With Japan, relations were different.
Armed with the then weapon of mass destruction, the musket, Japan invaded Korea
in 1592 and occupied it with more than a quarter of a million soldiers. The
Koreans, armed only with bows and arrows, were beaten into submission. But,
because of events in Japan, and particularly the decision to give up the gun,
the Japanese withdrew in less than a decade and left Korea on its own.
Nominally unified under one kingdom,
Korean society was already divided between the Puk-in or “people of the
North” and the Nam-in or “people of the South.” How significant this
division was in practical politics is unclear, but apparently it played a role
in thwarting attempts at reform and in keeping the country isolated from
outside influences. It also weakened the country and facilitated the second
intrusion of the Japanese. In search of iron ore for their nascent industry,
they “opened” the country in 1876. Hot on the Japanese trail came the Americans
who established diplomatic relations with the Korean court in 1882.
American missionaries, most of whom
doubled as merchants, followed the flag. Christianity often came in the guise
of commerce. Missionary-merchants lived apart from Koreans in segregated
American-style towns, much as the British had done in India earlier in the
century. They seldom met with the natives except to trade. Unlike their
counterparts in the Middle East, the Americans were not noted for “good works.”
They spent more time selling goods than teaching English, repairing bodies or
proselytizing; so while Koreans admired their wares all but a few clung to
Confucian ways.
China’s Protection
It was to China rather than to
America that Koreans turned for protection against the Japanese “rising sun.”
As they grew more powerful and began their outward thrust, the Japanese moved
to end the Korean relationship to China. In 1894, the Japanese invaded Korea,
captured its king and installed a “friendly” government. Then, as a sort of
byproduct of their 1904-1905 war with Russia, the Japanese seized control, and,
in accord with the policies of all Western governments, they took up “the White
Man’s burden.” American politicians and statesmen, led by Theodore Roosevelt,
found it both inevitable and beneficial that Japan turned Korea into a colony.
For the next 35 years, the Japanese ruled Korea much as the British ruled India
and the French ruled Algeria.
A map of the Korean Peninsula showing the 38th Parallel where the
DMZ was established in 1953. (Wikipedia)
If the Japanese were brutal, as they
certainly were, and exploitive, as they also were, so were the other colonial
powers. And, like other colonial peoples, as they gradually became politically
sensitive, the Koreans began to react. Over time, they saw the Japanese
intruders not as the carriers of the “white man’s burden” but as themselves the
burden. Some Koreans reacted by fleeing.
Best known among them was Syngman
Rhee. Converted to Christianity by American missionaries, he went to the West.
After a torturous career as an exile, he was allowed by the American military
authorities at the end of the Second World War to become (South) Korea’s first
president.
But most of those who fled the
Japanese found havens in Russian-influenced Manchuria. The best known of these
“Eastern” exiles, Kim Il-sung, became an anti-Japanese guerrilla and joined the
Communist Party. At the same time Syngman Rhee arrived in the
American-controlled South, Kim Il-sung became the leader of the
Soviet-supported North. There he founded the ruling “dynasty” of which his
grandson Kim Jong-un is the current leader.
During the 35 years of Japanese
occupation, no one in the West paid much attention to Syngman Rhee or his hopes
for the future of Korea, but the Soviet government was more attentive to Kim
Il-Sung. While distant Britain, France and America played no active role, the
near-by Soviet Union, with a long frontier with Japanese-held territory, had to
concern itself with Korea.
It was not so much from strategy or
the perception of danger that Western policy (and Soviet acquiescence to it)
evolved. Driven in part by sentiment, America forced a change in the tone of
relations with the colonial world during the Second World War and, driven by
the need to appease America, Britain and France acquiesced. It was the tide of
war, rather than any preconceived plan, that swept Korea into the widely
scattered and ill-defined group of “emerging” nations.
As heir to the dreams of Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed that colonial peoples deserved to be
free. Korea was to benefit from the great liberation of the Second World War.
So it was that on December 1, 1943, the United States, Britain and (then
Nationalist) China agreed at the Cairo Conference to apply the revolutionary
words of the 1941 Atlantic Charter: “Mindful of the enslavement of the people
of Korea,” Roosevelt and a reluctant Churchill proclaimed, they “are determined
that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”
At the April-June 1945 San Francisco
conference, where the United Nations was founded, Korea got little attention,
but a vague arrangement was envisaged in which Korea would be put under a
four-power (American, British, Chinese and Soviet) trusteeship. This policy was
later affirmed at the Potsdam Conference on July 26, 1945, and was agreed to by
the Soviet Union on August 8 when it declared war on Japan. Two days later
Russian troops fanned out over the northern area. It was not until almost a
month later, on September 8, that the first contingents of the U.S. Army
arrived.
Aftermath of War
Up to that point, most Koreans could
do little to effect their own liberation: those inside Korea were either in
prison, lived in terror that they soon would be arrested or collaborated with
the Japanese. The few who had reached havens in the West, like Syngman Rhee,
found that while they were allowed to speak, no one with the power to help them
listened to their voices. They were to be liberated but not helped to liberate
themselves. It was only the small groups of Korean exiles in Soviet-controlled
areas who actually fought their Japanese tormentors. Thus it was that the
Communist-led Korean guerrilla movement began to play a role similar to
insurgencies in Indochina, the Philippines and Indonesia.
As they prepared to invade Korea,
neither the Americans nor the Russians evinced any notion of the difference
between the Puk-in or “people of the North” and the Nam-in or
“people of the South.” They were initially concerned, as least in their
agreements with one another as they had been in Germany, by the need to prevent
the collision of their advancing armed forces. The Japanese, however, treated
the two zones that had been created by this ad hoc military decision
separately.
As a Soviet army advanced, the
Japanese realized that they could not resist, but they destroyed as much of the
infrastructure of the north as they could while fleeing to the south. On
reaching the south, both the soldiers and the civil servants cooperated at
least initially with the incoming American forces. Their divergent actions
suited both the Russians and the Americans — the Russians were intent on
driving out the Japanese while the Americans were already beginning the process
of forgiving them. What happened in this confused period set much of the shape
of Korea down to the present day.
The Russians appear to have had a
long-range policy toward Korea and the Communist-led insurgent force to implement
it, but it was only slowly, and reluctantly, that the Americans developed a
coherent plan for “their” Korea and found natives who could implement it. What
happened was partly ideological and partly circumstantial. It is useful and
perhaps important to emphasize the main points:
The first point is that the initial
steps of what became the Cold War had already been taken and were quickly
reinforced. Although the Yalta Conference included the agreement that Japan
would be forced to surrender to all the allies, not just to the United
States and China, President Truman set out a different American policy without
consulting Stalin.
Buoyed by the success of the test of
the atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, he decided that America would set the terms
of the Pacific war unilaterally; Stalin reacted by speeding up his army’s
attack on Japanese-held Korea and Manchuria. He was intent on creating “facts
on the ground.” Thus it was that the events of July and August 1945 anchored
the policies – and the interpretations of the war – of each great power. They
shaped today’s Korea.
Arguments ever since have focused on
the justifications for the policies of each Power. For many years, Americans
have argued that it was the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on
August 6 and 9, not the threat or actuality of the Soviet invasion, that forced
the Japanese to surrender.
Spoils of War
In the official American view, it was
America that won the war in the Pacific. Island by island from Guadalcanal,
American soldiers had marched, sailed and flown toward the final island, Japan.
From nearby islands and from aircraft carriers, American planes bombed and burned
its cities and factories. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the final blows in a
long, painful and costly process.
The mushroom cloud from the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima,
Japan, on Aug. 6, 1945.
Truman held that the Russians
appeared only after the Japanese were defeated. Thus, he felt justified – and
empowered – to act alone on Japan. So when General Douglas MacArthur arranged
the ceremony of surrender on September 2, he sidelined the Russians. The
procedure took place on an American battleship under an American flag. A decade
was to pass before the USSR formally ended its war with Japan.
The second crucial point is what was
happening on the peninsula of Korea. There a powerful Russian army was present
in the North and an American army was in control of the South. The decisions of
Cairo, San Francisco and Potsdam were as far from Korea as the high-flown
sentiments of the statesmen were from the realities, dangers and opportunities
on the scene. What America and the Soviet Union did on the ground was crucial
for an understanding of Korea today.
As the Dutch set about doing in
Indonesia, the French were doing in Indochina and the Americans were
doing in the Philippines, the American military authorities in their part of
Korea pushed aside the nationalist leaders (whom the Japanese had just released
from prison) and insisted on retaining all power in their own (military)
government. They knew almost nothing about (but were inherently suspicious of)
the anti-Japanese Koreans who set themselves up as the “People’s Republic.” On
behalf of the U.S., General John Hodge rejected the self-proclaimed national
government and declared that the military government was the only authority in
the American-controlled zone.
Hodge also announced that the
“existing Japanese administration would continue in office temporarily to
facilitate the occupation” just as the Dutch in Indonesia continued to use
Japanese troops to control the Indonesian public. But the Americans quickly
realized how unpopular this arrangement was and by January 1946 they had
dismantled the Japanese regime.
In the ensuing chaos dozens of groups
with real but often vague differences formed themselves into parties and began
to demand a role in Korean affairs. This development alarmed the American
military governor. Hodge’s objective, understandably, was order and security.
The local politicians appeared unable to offer either, and in those years, the
American military government imprisoned tens of thousands of political
activists.
Cold War in Vitro
Although not so evident in the public
announcements, the Americans were already motivated by fear of the Russians and
their actual or possible local sympathizers and Communists. Here again, Korea
reminds one of Indochina, the Philippines and Indonesia. Wartime allies became
peacetime enemies. At least in vitro, the Cold War had already begun.
At just the right moment, virtually
as a deux ex machina, Syngman Rhee appeared on the scene. Reliably and
vocally anti-Communist, American-oriented, and, although far out of touch with
Korean affairs, ethnically Korean, he was just what the American authorities
wanted. He gathered the rightist groups into a virtual government that was to
grow into an actual government under the U.S. aegis.
Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities
faced no similar political or administrative problems. They had available the
prototype of a Korean government. This government-to-become already had a
history: thousands of Koreans had fled to Manchuria to escape Japanese
rule and, when Japan carried the war to them by forming the puppet state they
called Manchukuo in 1932, some of the refugees banded together to launch a
guerrilla war. The Communist Party inspired and assumed leadership of this
insurgency. Then as all insurgents – from Tito to Ho Chi-minh to Sukarno – did,
they proclaimed themselves a government-in-exile.
The Korean group was ready, when the
Soviet invasion made it possible, to become the nucleus of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The USSR recognized it as the sole
government of (all) Korea in September 1948. And, despite its crude and often
brutal method of rule, it acquired a patina of legitimacy by its years of armed
struggle against the Japanese.
Both the USSR and the U.S. viewed
Korea as their outposts. They first tried to work out a deal to divide
authority among themselves. But they admitted failure on December 2, 1945. The
Russians appeared to expect the failure and hardly reacted, but the Americans
sought the help of the United Nations in formalizing their position in Korea.
At their behest, the U.N. formed the “Temporary Commission on Korea.” It was
supposed to operate in all of Korea, but the Russians regarded it as an
American operation and excluded it from the North. After a laborious campaign,
it managed to supervise elections but only in the south, in May 1948.
The elections resulted in the
formation on August 15 of a government led by Syngman Rhee. In response, a
month later on September 9, the former guerrilla leader, Communist and Soviet
ally Kim Il-sung, proclaimed the state of North Korea. Thus, the ad hoc
arrangement to prevent the collision of two armies morphed into two states.
The USSR had a long history with Kim
Il-sung and the leadership of the North. It had discreetly supported the
guerrilla movement in Manchukuo (aka Manchuria) and presumably had vetted the
Communist leadership through the purges of the 1930s and closely observed them
during the war. The survivors were, by Soviet criteria, reliable men. So it was
possible for the Russians to take a low profile in North Korean affairs. Unlike
the Americans, they felt able to withdraw their army in 1946. Meanwhile, of
course, their attention was focused on the much more massive tide of the
revolution in China. Korea must have seemed something of a sideshow.
The position of the United States was
different in almost every aspect. First, there was no long-standing,
pro-American or ideologically democratic cadre in the South.
The Rise of Rhee
The leading figure, as I have
mentioned, was Syngman Rhee. While Kim Il-sung was a dedicated Communist, Rhee
was certainly not a believer in democracy. But ideology aside, Rhee was deeply
influenced by contacts with Americans. Missionaries saved his eyesight (after
smallpox), gave him a basic Western-style education, employed him and converted
him to Christianity. Probably also influenced by them, as a young man he had
involved himself in protests against Korean backwardness, corruption and
failure to resist Japanese colonialism. His activities landed him in prison
when he was 22 years of age. After four years of what appears to have been a
severe regime, he was released and in 1904 made his way into exile in America.
South Korean leader Syngman Rhee
Remarkably for a young man of no
particular distinction – although he was proud of a distant relationship to the
Korean royal family – he was at least received if not listened to by President
Theodore Roosevelt. Ceremonial or perfunctory meetings with other American
leaders followed over the years. The American leaders with whom he met did not
consider Korea of much importance and even if they had so considered it, Rhee
had nothing to offer them. So I infer that his 40-year wanderings from one
university to the next (BA in George Washington University, MA in Harvard and
PhD in Princeton) and work in the YMCA and other organizations were a litany of
frustrations.
It was America’s entry into the war
in 1941 that gave Rhee the opportunity he had long sought: he convinced
President Franklin Roosevelt to espouse at least nominally the cause of Korean
independence. Roosevelt’s kind words probably would have little effect — as
Rhee apparently realized. To give them substance, he worked closely with the
OSS (the ancestor of the CIA) and developed contacts with the American military
chiefs. Two months after the Japanese surrender in 1945, he was flown back to
Korea at the order of General Douglas MacArthur.
Establishing himself in Seoul, he led
groups of right-wing Koreans to oppose every attempt at cooperation with the
Soviet Union and particularly focused on opposition to the creation of a state
of North Korea. For those more familiar with European history, he might be
considered to have aspired to the role played in Germany by Konrad Adenauer. To
play a similar role, Rhee made himself “America’s man.” But he was not able to
do what Adenauer could do in Germany nor could he provide for America: an
ideologically controlled society and the makings of a unified state like Kim
Il-sung was able to give the Soviet Union. But, backed by the American military
government and overtly using democratic forms, Rhee was elected on a suspicious
return of 92.3 percent of the vote to be president of the newly proclaimed
Republic of Korea.
Rhee’s weakness relative to Kim had
two effects: the first was that while Soviet forces could be withdrawn from the
North in 1946, America felt unable to withdraw its forces from the South. They
have remained ever since. And the second effect was that while Rhee tried to
impose upon his society an authoritarian regime, similar to the one imposed on
the North, he was unable to do so effectively and at acceptable cost.
The administration he partly
inherited was largely dependent upon men who had served the Japanese as
soldiers and police. He was tarred with their brush. It put aside the positive
call of nationalism for the negative warning of anti-Communism. Instead of
leadership, it relied on repression. Indeed, it engaged in a brutal repression,
which resembled that of North Korea but which, unlike the North Korean tyranny,
was widely publicized. Resentment in South Korea against Rhee and his regime
soon grew to the level of a virtual insurgency. Rhee may have been the darling
of America but he was unloved in Korea. That was the situation when the Korean
War began.
Resumption of War
The Korean War technically began on
June 25, 1950, but of course the process began before the first shots were
fired. Both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-sung were determined to reunite Korea, each
on his own terms. Rhee had publicly spoken on the “need” to invade the North to
reunify the peninsula; the Communist government didn’t need to make public
pronouncements, but events on the ground must have convinced Kim Il-sung that
the war had already begun. Along the dividing line, according to one American
scholar of Korea, Professor John Merrill, large numbers of Koreans had already
been wounded or killed before the “war” began.
In this July 1950 U.S. Army file photograph once classified “top
secret,” South Korean soldiers walk among some of the thousands of South Korean
political prisoners shot at Taejon, South Korea, early in the Korean War. (AP
Photo/National Archives, Major Abbott/U.S. Army, File)
The event that appears to have
precipitated the full-scale war was the declaration by Syngman Rhee’s
government of the independence of the South. If allowed to stand, that action
as Kim Il-sung clearly understood, would have prevented unification. He
regarded it as an act of war. He was ready for war. He had used his years in
power to build one of the largest armies in the world whereas the army of the
South had been bled by the Southern rulers.
Kim Il-sung must have known in detail
the corruption, disorganization and weakness of Rhee’s administration. As the
English journalist and commentator on Korea Max Hastings reported, Rhee’s
entourage was engaged in a massive theft of public resources and revenues.
Money intended by the foreign donors to build a modern state was siphoned off
to foreign bank accounts; “ghost soldiers,” the military equivalent of Gogol’s Dead
Souls, who existed only on army records, were paid salaries which the
senior officers pocketed while the relatively few actual soldiers went unpaid
and even unclothed, unarmed and unfed. Bluntly put, Rhee offered Kim an
opportunity he could not refuse.
We now know, but then did not, that
Stalin was not in favor of the attack by the North and agreed to it only if
China, by then a fellow Communist-led state, took responsibility. What
“responsibility” really meant was not clear, but it proved sufficient to tip
Kim Il-sung into action. He ordered his army to invade the South. Quickly
crossing the demarcation line, his soldiers pushed south. Far better
disciplined and motivated, they took Seoul within three days, on June 28.
Syngman Rhee proclaimed a fight to
the death but, in fact, he and his inner circle had already fled. They were
quickly followed by thousands of soldiers of the Southern army. Many of those
who did not flee, defected to the North.
Organized by the United States, the
United Nations Security Council – taking advantage of the absence of the Soviet
delegation – voted on June 27, just before the fall of Seoul, to create a force
to protect the South. Some 21 countries led by the United States furnished
about three million soldiers to defend the South. They were countries like
Thailand, South Vietnam and Turkey with their own problems of insurgency, but
most of the fighting was done by American forces. They were driven south and
nearly off the Korean peninsula by Kim Il-sung’s army. The American troops were
ill-equipped and nearly always outnumbered. The fighting was bitter and
casualties were high. By late August, they held only a tenth of what had been
the Republic of Korea, just the southern province around the city of Pusan.
The Chinese Prepare
Wisely analyzing the actual imbalance
of the American-backed southern forces and the apparently victorious forces
commanded by Kim Il-sung, the Chinese statesman Zhou Enlai ordered his military
staff to guess what the Americans could be expected to do: negotiate, withdraw
or try to break out of their foothold at Pusan. The staff reported that the
Americans would certainly mobilize their superior potential power to
counterattack.
Seriously wounded North Korean soldiers lie where they fell and
wait for medical attention by Navy hospital corpsmen accompanying the Marines
in their advance. September 15, 1950. (Photo by Sgt. Frank Kerr, USMC)
To guard against intrusion into
China, Zhou convinced his colleagues to move military forces up to the
Chinese-Korean frontier and convinced the Soviet government to give the North
Koreans air support. What was remarkable was that Zhou’s staff exactly
predicted what the Americans would do and where they would do it. Led by
General Douglas MacArthur, the Americans made a skillful and bold
counterattack. Landing at Inchon on September 15, they cut the bulk of the
Northern army off from their bases. The operation was a brilliant military
success.
But, like many brilliant military
actions, it developed a life of its own. MacArthur, backed by American
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General George Marshall — and ordered by
President Truman — decided to move north to implement Syngman Rhee’s program to
unify Korea. Beginning on September 25, American forces recaptured Seoul,
virtually destroyed the surrounded North Korean army and on October 1 crossed the
38th parallel. With little to stop them, they then pushed ahead
toward the Yalu river on the Chinese frontier. That move frightened both the
Soviet and Chinese governments which feared that the wave of victory would
carry the American into their territories. Stalin held back, refusing to commit
Soviet forces, but he reminded the Chinese of their “responsibility” for Korea.
In response, the Chinese hit on a
novel ploy. They sent a huge armed force, some 300,000 men to stop the
Americans but, to avoid at least formally and directly a clash with America,
they categorized it as an irregular group of volunteers — the “Chinese People’s
Volunteer Army.” Beginning on October 25. the lightly armed Chinese virtually
annihilated what remained of the South Korean army and drove the Americans out
of North Korea.
Astonished by the collapse of what
had seemed a definitive victory, President Truman declared a national
emergency, and General MacArthur urged the use of 50 nuclear bombs to stop the
Chinese. What would have happened then is a matter of speculation, but what did
happen was that MacArthur was replaced by General Matthew Ridgeway who restored
the balance of conventional forces. Drearily, the war rolled on.
During this period and for the next
two years, the American air force carried out massive bombing sorties. Some of
the bombing was meant to destroy the Chinese and North Korean ability to keep
fighting, but Korea is a small territory and what began as “surgical strikes”
grew into carpet-bombing. (Such bombing would be considered a war crime as of the
1977 Protocol I of
the Geneva
Conventions).
The attacks were enormous. About
635,000 tons of high explosives and chemical weapons were dropped – that was
far more than was used against the Japanese in the Second World War. As
historian Bruce Cumings has pointed out, the U.S. Air Force found that “three
years of ‘rain and ruin’” had inflicted greater damage on Korean cities “than
German and Japanese cities firebombed during World War II.” The North Korean
capital Pyongyang was razed and General Curtis LeMay thought American bombings
caused the deaths of about 20 percent — one in five — North Koreans.
Carpet-Bombing the North
LeMay’s figure, horrifying as it is,
needs to be borne in mind today. Start with the probability that it is
understated. Canadian economist Michel Chossudovsky has written that LeMay’s
estimate of 20 percent should be revised to nearly 33 percent or roughly one
Korean in three killed. He goes on to point to a remarkable comparison: in the
Second World War, the British had lost less than 1 percent of their population,
France lost 1.35 percent, China lost 1.89 percent and the U.S. only a third of
1 percent. Put another way, Korea proportionally suffered roughly 30 times
as many people killed in 37 months of American carpet-bombing as these other
countries lost in all the years of the Second World War.
U.S. Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay
In all, 8 million to 9 million
Koreans were killed. Whole families were wiped out and practically no families
alive in Korea today are without close relatives who perished. Virtually every
building in the North was destroyed. What General LeMay said in another context
– “bombing them back to the Stone Age” – was literally effected in Korea. The
only survivors were those who holed up in caves and tunnels.
Memories of those horrible days,
weeks and months of fear, pain and death seared the memories of the survivors,
and according to most observers they constitute the underlying mindset of
hatred and fear so evident among North Koreans today. They will condition
whatever negotiations America attempts with the North.
Finally, after protracted battles on
the ground and daily or hourly assaults from the sky, the North Koreans agreed
to negotiate a ceasefire. Actually achieving it took two years.
The most significant points in the
agreement were that (first) there would be two Koreas divided by a
demilitarized zone essentially on what had been the line drawn along the 38th
parallel to keep the invading Soviet and American armies from colliding and
(second) article 13(d) of the agreement specified that no new weapons other
than replacements would be introduced on the peninsula. That meant that all
parties agreed not to introduce nuclear and other “advanced” weapons.
What needs to be remembered in order
to understand future events is that, in effect, the ceasefire created not two
but three Koreas: North, South, and the American military bases.
The North set about recovering from
devastation. It had to dig out from under the rubble and it chose to
continue to be a garrison state. It was certainly a dictatorship, like the
Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam and Indonesia, but close observers thought
that the regime was supported by the people. Most observers found that the
memory of the war, and particularly of the constant bombing, created a sense of
embattlement that unified the country against the Americans and the regime of
the South. Kim Il-sung was able to stifle such dissent as arose. He did so
brutally. No one can judge for certain, but there is reason to believe that a
sense of embattled patriotism remains alive today.
South’s Military Dictatorships
The South was much less harmed by the
war than the North and, with large injections of aid and investment from Japan
and America, it started on the road to a remarkable prosperity. Perhaps in part
because of these two factors – relatively little damage from the war and
growing prosperity – its politics was volatile.
To contain it and stay in power,
Syngman Rhee’s government imposed martial law, altered the constitution, rigged
elections, opened fire on demonstrators and even executed leaders of the
opposing party. We rightly deplore the oppression of the North, but humanitarian
rights investigations showed little difference between the Communist/Confucian
North and the Capitalist/Christian South. Syngman Rhee’s tactics were not less
brutal than those of Kim Il-sung.
Employing them, Rhee managed another
electoral victory in 1952 and a third in 1960. He won the 1960 election with a
favorable vote officially registered to be 90 percent. Not surprisingly, he was
accused of fraud. The student organizations regarded his manipulation as the
“last straw” and, having no other recourse, took to the streets. Just ahead of
a mob converging on his palace — much like the last day of the government of
South Vietnam a few years later — he was hustled out of Seoul by the CIA to an
exile in Honolulu.
The third Korea, the American
“Korea,” would have been only notional except for the facts that it occupied a
part of the South (the southern perimeter of the demilitarized zone and various
bases elsewhere), had ultimate control of the military forces of the South (it
was authorized to take command of them in the event of war) and, as the British
had done in Egypt, Iraq and India, it “guided” the native government it had
fostered. Its military forces guaranteed the independence of the South and at
least initially, the United States paid about half the costs of the government
and sustained its economy.
At the same time, the United States
sought to weaken the North by imposing embargos. It kept the North on edge by
carrying what the North regarded as threatening maneuvers on its frontier and,
from time to time, as President Bill Clinton did in 1994 (and President Donald
Trump is now doing), threatened a devastating preemptive strike. The Defense
Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also developed OPLN 5015, one of a
succession of secret plans whose intent, in the words of commentator Michael
Peck, was “to destroy North Korea.”
And, in light of America’s worry
about nuclear weapons in Korea, we have to confront the fact that it was
America that introduced them. In June 1957, the U.S. informed the North Koreans
that it would no longer abide by Paragraph 13(d) of the armistice agreement
that forbade the introduction of new weapons. A few months later, in January
1958, it set up nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Moscow and Peking.
The U.S. kept them there until 1991. It wanted to reintroduce them in 2013 but
the then South Korean Prime Minister Chung Hong-won refused.
As I will later mention, South Korea
joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975, and North Korea joined in
1985. But South Korea covertly violated it from 1982 to 2000 and North Korea
first violated the provisions in 1993 and then withdrew from it in 2003. North
Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test in 2006.
There is little moral high ground for
any one of the “three Koreas.”
South Korean leader Park Chung Hee
New elections were held in the South
and what was known as the Second Republic was created in 1960 under what had
been the opposition party. It let loose the pent-up anger over the tyranny and
corruption of Syngman Rhee’s government and moved to purge the army and
security forces. Some 4,000 men lost their jobs and many were indicted for
crimes. Fearing for their jobs and their lives, they found a savior in General
Park Chung-hee who led the military to a coup d’état on May 16, 1961.
General Park was best known for
having fought the guerrillas led by Kim Il-sung as an officer in the Japanese
“pacification force” in Manchukuo. During that period of his life, he even
replaced his Korean name with a Japanese name. As president, he courted Japan.
Restoring diplomatic relations, he also promoted the massive Japanese
investment that jump-started Korean economic development. With America he was
even more forthcoming. In return for aid, and possibly because of his close
involvement with the American military – he studied at the Command and General
Staff school at Fort Sill – he sent a quarter of a million South Korean troops
to fight under American command in Vietnam.
Not less oppressive than Rhee’s
government, Park’s government was a dictatorship. To protect his rule, he
replaced civilian officials by military officers. Additionally, he formed a
secret government within the formal government; known as the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency, it operated like the Gestapo. It routinely arrested,
imprisoned and tortured Koreans suspected of opposition. And, in October 1972,
Park rewrote the constitution to give himself virtual perpetual power. He remained
in office for 16 years. In response to oppression and despite the atmosphere of
fear, large-scale protests broke out against his rule. It was not, however, a
public uprising that ended his rule: his chief of intelligence assassinated him
in 1979.
An attempt to return to civilian rule
was blocked within a week by a new military coup d’état. The protests that
followed were quickly put down and thousands more were arrested. A confused
scramble for power then ensued out of which in 1987 a Sixth Republic was
announced and one of the members of the previous military junta became
president.
The new president Roh Tae-woo
undertook a policy of conciliation with the North and under the warming of
relations both North and South joined the U.N. in September 1991. They also
agreed to denuclearization of the peninsula. But, as often happens, the easing
of suppressive rule caused the “reformer” to fall. Roh and another former
president were arrested, tried and sentenced to prison for a variety of crimes
— but not for their role in anti-democratic politics. Koreans remained little
motivated by more than the overt forms of democracy.
Relations between the North and the
South over the next few years bounced from finger on the trigger to hand
outstretched. The final attempt to bring order to the South came when Park
Geun-hye was elected in 2013, She was the daughter of General Park Chung-hee
who, as we have seen, had seized power in a coup d’état 1963 and was president
of South Korea for 16 years. Park Geun-hye, was the first women to become head
of a state in east Asia. A true daughter of her father, she ruled with an iron
hand, but like other members of the ruling group, she far overplayed her hand
and was convicted of malfeasance and forced out of office in March 2017.
The Kim Dynasty
Meanwhile in the North, as Communist
Party head, Prime Minister from 1948 to 1972 and president from 1972 to his
death in 1994, Kim Il-sung ruled North Korea for nearly half a century. His
policy for his nation was a sort of throw-back to the ancient Korean ideal of
isolation. Known as juche, it emphasized self-reliance. The North was
essentially an agrarian society and, unlike the South, which from the 1980s
welcomed foreign investment and aid, it remained closed. Initially, this policy
worked well: up to the end of the 1970s, North Korea was relatively richer than
the South, but then the South raced ahead with what amounted to an industrial
revolution.
North Korean leader Kim Il-sung
Surprisingly, Kim Il-sung shared with
Syngman Rhee a Protestant Christian youth; indeed, Kim said that his
grandfather was a Presbyterian minister. But the more important influence on
his life was the brutal Japanese occupation. Such information as we have is
shaped by official pronouncements and amount to a paean. But, probably, like
many of the Asian nationalists, as a very young man he took part in
demonstrations against the occupying power. According to the official account,
by the time he was 17, he had spent time in a Japanese prison.
At 19, in 1931, he joined the Chinese
Communist Party and a few years later became a member of its Manchurian
fighting group. Hunted down by the Japanese and such of their Korean
collaborators as Park Chung-hee, Kim crossed into Russian territory and was
inducted into the Soviet army in which he served until the end of the Second
World War. Then, as the Americans did with Syngman Rhee, the Russians installed
him as head of the provisional government.
From the first days of his coming to
power, Kim Il-sung focused on the acquisition of military power. Understandably
from his own experience, he emphasized training it in informal tactics, but as
the Soviet Union began to provide heavy equipment, he pushed his officers into
conventional military training under Russian drillmasters. By the time he had
decided to invade South Korea, the army was massive, armed on a European
standard and well organized. Almost every adult Korean man was or had been
serving in it.
The army had virtually become the
state. This allocation of resources, as the Korean War made clear, resulted in
a powerful striking force but a weakened economy. It also caused Kim’s Chinese
supporters to decide to push him aside. How he survived his temporary demotion
is not known, but in the aftermath of the ceasefire, he was again seen to be
firmly in control of the Communist Party and the North Korean state.
The North Korean state, as we have
seen, had virtually ceased to exist under the bombing attack. Kim could hope
for little help to rebuild it from abroad and sought even less. His policy of
self-reliance and militarization were imposed on the country. On the Soviet
model of the 1930s, he launched a draconian five-year plan in which virtually
all economic resources were nationalized. In the much-publicized Sino-Soviet
split, he first sided with the Chinese but, disturbed by the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, he swung back to closer relations with the Soviet Union.
In effect, the two neighboring powers
had to be his poles. His policy of independence was influential but could not
be decisive. To underpin his rule and presumably in part to build the sense of
independence of his people, he developed an elaborate personality cult. That
propaganda cult survived him. When he died in 1994 at 82 years of age, his body
was preserved in a glass case where it became the object of something like a
pilgrimage.
Unusual for a Communist regime, Kim
Il-sung was followed by his son Kim Jong-Il. Kim Jong-Il continued most of his
father’s policies, which toward the end of his life, had moved haltingly toward
a partial accommodation with South Korea and the United States. He was faced
with a devastating drought in 2001 and sequential famine that was said to have
starved some 3 million people. Perhaps seeking to disguise the impact of this
famine, he abrogated the armistice and sent troops into the demilitarized zone.
However, intermittent moves including creating a partly extra-territorialized
industrial enclave for foreign trade, were made to better relations with the
South.
Then, in January 2002, President
George Bush made his “Axis of Evil Speech” in which he demonized North Korea.
Thereafter, North Korea withdrew from the 1992 agreement with the South to ban
nuclear weapons and announced that it had enough weapons-grade plutonium to make
about 5 or 6 nuclear weapons. Although he was probably incapacitated by a
stroke in August 2008, his condition was hidden as long as possible while
preparations were made for succession. He died in December 2011 and was
followed by his son Kim Jong-un.
With this thumbnail sketch of events
up to the coming to power of Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, I will turn in Part
2 of this essay to the dangerous situation in which our governments – and all
of us individually – find ourselves today.
************************************************************************
In
the first part
of this essay, I gave my interpretation of the background of the current
confrontation in Korea. I argued that, while the past is the mother of the present,
it has several fathers. What I remember is not necessarily what you remember;
so, in this sense, the present also shapes or reshapes the past.
A nuclear test detonation carried out in Nevada on April 18, 1953.
In
my experience as a policy planner, I found that only by taking note of the
perception of events as they are differently held by the participants could one
understand or deal with present actions and ideas. I have tried to sketch out
views of the past as we, the North Koreans and the South Koreans, differently
view them in Part 1
of this essay.
Now
I want to undertake a refinement of the record I have laid out. I want first to
show how our perception, the interpretation we place on the events that swirl
past us, adds a new and formative element to them. Whether consciously or not,
we tend to put events into a pattern. So the pattern itself becomes part of the
problem we face in trying to understand events. Staking out a path – an
interpretation or a theory of what random bits and pieces mean or how they will
be interpreted and acted upon by others — is a complex and contentious task.
Getting
it wrong can lead us astray or even be very dangerous. So the interpreter, the
strategist, must always be tested to see if his interpretation makes sense and
the path he lays out is the one we want to travel. I will make this explicit
below.
My
experience in what was certainly the most dangerous situation America ever
experienced, the Cuban Missile Crisis, led me to believe that at least in a
crisis how we think about events and what we remember of the past often
determines our actions and may be the deciding difference between life and
death. So here I will begin with the mindset that underlay American policy for
the last half century.
Anyone
who reads the press or watches TV is beset with countless scraps of
information. In my experience in government service, the deluge of information
was almost paralyzing. Some of my colleagues joked that the way to defeat our
adversaries was to give them access to what passed over our desks every day. It
would immobilize them as it sometimes immobilized us.
How
to separate from the flow the merely interesting from the important and how to
relate one event to others were demanding tasks. Making them useful has been
undertaken by strategists time after time over the last several thousand years.
Machiavelli is the best known among us, but he was far from the first. [I have
dealt with these issues in detail in Neighbors and Strangers: The
Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1997).]
Theory of Deterrence
The
latest and arguably the most persuasive recent attempt to develop a sort of
framework or matrix to bring some sense of order and some ability to understand
events has been the theory of deterrence. While “just a theory,” it set
American policy toward the Soviet Union in the Cold War. It was developed to
understand and deal with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, but it will
determine much of what America tries to do with North Korea today.
President John F. Kennedy addressing the nation regarding the
October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
To
simplify and summarize, Cold War strategists led by such men as Henry
Kissinger, Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie believed that ultimately
relationships among nations were mathematical. Deterrence thus meant gathering
the elements that could be added up by both sides. If country “A” had
overwhelming power, country “B” would be deterred in its own interest from
actions that were detrimental to them. Failure to “do the sums” correctly in
the “game of nations” was to “misplay.”
Emotion
and even politics had no role; in the real world. It was realpolitik that
governed. Put another way, the weak would add up their capabilities and
would necessarily give way to the strong to avoid being destroyed.
The
great Greek historian Thucydides long ago set the tone: “Right, as the world
goes,” he wrote, “is only in question between equals in power; the strong do
what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Only by acting in this
mindset would the national interests, the real interests, of each
country be preserved and peace among nations be achieved.
Deterrence
worked reasonably well up to and including the Cuban Missile Crisis. But during
that crisis, as some of the theory’s critics had long held, a potentially fatal
flaw became evident.
The
flaw is that “national interest” – what can be added up or quantified as the
assets and what gives it its strength — is not necessarily always coincident
with “interest of government.” That is, governments may not always be guided by
a rational calculation of national interest. There are times when leaders
cannot afford, even if they precisely add up the figures, to act according to
such slow-moving impulses as national interest. They may be subject to quite
different and more urgent impulses. They may be emotional or otherwise be
irrational, fearful of their lives or worried that they would lose their
positions, or they may be driven by public opinion or by the different
calculations of such other centers of power as the military. Being guided by
the abstract calculation of national interest may then be impossible.
Let
me illustrate this from my experience in the Cuban Missile Crisis, then in a
war game the Department of Defense (DOD) organized to reexamine the Missile
Crisis and finally in a meeting in Moscow with my Russian counterparts.
In
the Missile Crisis, both President Kennedy (certainly) and Chairman Khrushchev
(probably) were under almost unbearable pressure not only in trying to figure
out how to deal with the events but also from the warnings, importuning and
urging of their colleagues, rivals, supporters and from their military
commanders. Whether either leader was in danger of overthrow of his regime or
assassination is still unknown, but both were at least potentially at risk
because the stakes were, literally, the fate of the world and opinions on how
to deal with the possibility of ruinous war were strongly held.
Obviously,
the loss to both of their nations in the event of a nuclear exchange would have
been catastrophic so the national interest of both was clear: it was to avoid
war. But how to avoid it was disputatious. And it was not nations that were
making decisions; it was the leaders, and their interests were only in part
coincident with national interest.
We
were lucky that at least Kennedy realized this dilemma and took steps to
protect himself. What he did is not well understood so I will briefly summarize
the main points. First, he identified General Lyman Lemnitzer, then chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as the main hawk. Lemnitzer was pushing him
toward a nuclear war and had shown his hand by presenting a “black” plan
(“Operation Northwoods”) to be carried out by the JCS to trigger war with Cuba.
[Curiously,
“Operation Northwoods” is hardly known even today. It was described by the
eminent scholar on intelligence James Bamford in Body of Secrets (New
York: Doubleday, 2001), 82 ff, as the “launching [of] a secret and bloody war
of terrorism against their own country in order to trick the American public
into supporting an-ill-conceived war they intended to launch against Cuba.”
Provocations were to be manufactured: hijacking of aircraft, murders and the
explosion of the rocket that was carrying astronaut John Glenn into space.
Lemnitzer lied to Congress, denying the plan’s existence, and had many of
documents destroyed. Although he was dismissed as chairman of the JCS by
Kennedy, the organization he formed within the JCS continued to plan covert
actions. It would have been surprising if Kennedy did not worry about a
possible attempt on his government.]
Fearing a Coup d’Etat
Apparently
realizing that the plan could easily have been turned into a coup d’état,
Kennedy removed Lemnitzer as far from Washington as he could (to Europe to be
the NATO commander). Kennedy also assembled a group of elder statesmen, most of
whom had served under the Eisenhower and Truman administrations in positions
senior to the current military commanders and were identified as conservatives
— far from Kennedy’s image as a liberal.
President John F. Kennedy meeting with Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev on June 3, 1961, in Vienna. (State Department photo)
Ostensibly,
he sought their advice, but in practice what he sought was their approval of
his decisions. He also was careful to instruct the public in his speech on the
Monday, the first public acknowledgement of the crisis, that he was firmly in
control and was determined to protect American interests.
Then,
in the solution to the crisis, removing the American missiles from Turkey, he
pretended that their removal was not a price he had to pay to end the crisis.
Thus, in several ways, he neutralized potential critics, at least during the
crucial time of the Crisis. But, not long afterwards, he was assassinated by
persons, forces, or interests about whom and whose motivation there is still
much controversy. At minimum, we know that powerful people, including
Lemnitzer, thought Kennedy had sold out national interest in pursuit of the
interest of his administration.
At
the same time in Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev probably risked his life by accepting
the humiliation imposed on his regime by the forced withdrawal of Russian
missiles from Cuba. Apparently, for of course we do not know, he felt less
immediate danger than Kennedy because the Soviet system had always distrusted
and guarded against its military commanders. A Lemnitzer there would probably
have been “disappeared,” not just sent into a polite exile. And hovering beside
each of the senior officers of the Soviet army was a political commissar who
was responsible to the civilian administration – that is, to the Communist
Party leadership – for the officer’s every move, every contact, almost every
thought. The military did what the civil leadership told it to do.
I
presume Khrushchev believed that he had his colleagues with him, but that
cannot have been very reassuring given the record of the Politburo. And, when
he died, Khrushchev or at least his reputation paid a price: he was refused the
supreme accolade of Soviet leadership; he was not buried with other Soviet
heroes in the Kremlin Wall. That we know; what we cannot know is whether or not
he thought he was, or actually was, in danger of being overthrown.
What
is clear is that he was strong enough – and faced with no blatant or
destructive action by America – that he was able to surmount the “interest of
government” to protect “national interest.” In short, he was not backed into a
corner.
Were
it not for the strength and bravery of both men, we might not have survived the
Missile Crisis. Obviously, we cannot always be so served. Sometimes, we are apt
to be dependent on weaker, more timorous and less steady men. This is not an
abstract issue, and it has come back to haunt us in the Korean confrontation as
it surely will in other confrontations. Understanding it may be a matter of our
survival. That was not just my view but was also was even then the nagging
worry of the DOD.
Thus,
in the aftermath of the crisis, the DOD sought reassurance that deterrence had
worked and would continue to work. That is, it sought to test the theory that
leaders would add up the sums and be governed by what they found rather than by
political, emotional or other criteria.
A Nuclear War Game
To
this end, the DOD commissioned the conflict strategist Thomas Schelling to
design and run a politico-military war game to push the experience of the
Missile Crisis to the extreme, that is to find out what the Russians would they
do if they were dealt a severe, painful and humiliating nuclear blow?
A scene from “Dr. Strangelove,” in which the bomber pilot (played
by actor Slim Pickens) rides a nuclear bomb to its target in the Soviet Union.
Schelling’s
game pitted two small teams of senior, fully-briefed U.S. government officers
against one another in the Pentagon. Red Team represented the USSR and Blue
Team the U.S. Each was provided with all the information Khrushchev would have
had. Shortly after assembling, we were told that Blue team destroyed a Red Team
city with a nuclear weapon. What would Red Team do?
Since
it was far weaker than the United States, by the deterrence theory it would
cave in and not retaliate.
To
Schelling’s exasperation, the game proved the opposite. It showed that action
only in part depended on a rational calculation of national interest but
rather in circumstances of crisis, would be governed by the political imperatives
faced by the government. I have discussed this in detail elsewhere, but in
brief, the members of Red Team, who were among the most experienced and gifted
men from the State Department, the White House, the CIA and the DOD, chaired by
the very conservative admiral who was Chief of Naval Operations, decided unanimously
that Red Team had no option but to go to general war as fast and as powerfully
as it could.
Shelling
stopped the game, saying that we had “misplayed” and that if we were right he
would have to give up the theory of deterrence. We laid out the reasons for our
decision.
That
decision was taken on two grounds: the first was that acquiescence was not
politically possible. No government, Russian or American or other, could accept
the humiliation of the loss of a city and survive the fury of those who felt
betrayed. Even if at ruinous cost, it would strike back. This is a lesson
apparently still unlearned.
Indeed,
it could cause the death of each person reading this essay if applied in real
life in a nuclear first strike as I will shortly make clear in discussing the
Korean crisis.
The
second basis for the decision was that, despite Kissinger, Schelling and other
“limited nuclear war” advocates, there is no such thing as limited nuclear war
in the real world. A nuclear strike would inevitably lead to retaliation,
nuclear if possible, and that retaliation would lead to counter-retaliation.
In
the war game, Red Team realized that if Mr. Khrushchev were to retaliate for
America’s destruction of Baku by incinerating St. Louis, it would have posed a
challenge, regardless of who was at fault or what the odds of success were,
that Kennedy could not have ducked. He would certainly have been overthrown and
almost certainly assassinated if he had not responded. He almost certainly
would have destroyed a second Russian city.
Tit-for-tat
had no stopping point. Each response would lead to the next and quickly to
general war. So Red Team went immediately to the best of its bad options:
hitting back immediately with everything it had: in short, we opted for general
war.
Fortunately
that scenario was not tested. In the real Cuban Missile Crisis, no city was
incinerated. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev was pushed beyond “calculation.”
But it was a very close call. My own hunch, from having been one of the 25 or
so civilians closely involved in the real-life crisis, is that Kennedy and his
team could not have held firm much longer than the Thursday or Friday of that
terrible week.
The
implications are clear – and terrifying – but neither Shelling nor other Cold
Warriors have accepted them. We are still today approaching the conflict in
Korea with the mindset that our war game showed was fatally flawed.
The
last test of the result of the war game came when I lectured on strategic
planning and participated in a seminar on the Missile Crisis with the members
of the then principal advisory group to the Politburo, the Institute of World
Economy and International Affairs of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In a word,
my opposite numbers there agreed with the analysis I have just laid out: Khrushchev
could not have accepted an American nuclear attack. He would have responded
even though he realized that the overwhelming advantage – the “numbers” – were
against him.
They
also agreed that in practical terms there was no such thing as limited nuclear
war. A “limited” nuclear strike would be, inevitably, the first step in a
general war.
Lacking Wise Leaders
I
will speculate below on how the actual events of the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the result of the war game might apply to the current conflict in Korea. Here
let me anticipate by saying that we have no reason to believe that the men who
will decide the issue are of the caliber of Kennedy and Khrushchev.
President Donald Trump, speaking in Warsaw, Poland, on July 6,
2017. (Screen shot from Whitehouse.gov)
Both
Kennedy and Khrushchev were strong, pragmatic, experienced and well supported
men. In today’s conflict between the United States and North Korea, neither
Donald Trump nor Kim Jong Un evince similar attributes. Some critics even
question their sanity. But, they will make the decisions, so I focus on them,
their motivations and their capacities. I begin with Mr. Trump.
I
have never met Mr. Trump and our backgrounds are very different so I am driven
to two, admittedly incomplete and questionable, ways of understanding him. The
first of these is his own description of his thought process and way of acting.
The three characteristics that seem to me most germane to foreign affairs and
particularly to the confrontation in Korea are these:
–On
November 12, 2015, Mr. Trump declared, “I love war.” In fact, as the record
showed, he went to considerable trouble to deny himself the pleasures of going
into harm’s way during the Vietnam War. And, now, should he decide to take
America to war, he would not put his own life in danger.
In
my time in Washington, such “war-lovers from afar“ were often referred to as
“chicken-hawks.” They loved to talk about war and to urge others to get into
it, but, like Mr. Trump, they never volunteered for action and never, in their
pronouncements, dwelt on the horror of actual combat. For them war was another
TV episode where the good guys got a bit dusted up but always won.
Mr.
Trump presumably meant by the word “war” something very different from real war
since he explained, “I’m good at war. I’ve had a lot of wars on my own. I’m
really good at war. I love war, in a certain way but only when we win.”
For
Mr. Trump, as his actions show, every business deal was a sort of war. He
conducted it as what military strategists call a zero-sum game: the winner took
all and the loser got nothing. There was little or no negotiation. “Attack” was
the operational mode and his opponent would be driven to defeat by the threat
of financial ruin. This was the “certain way” he called his many “wars on my
own.”
The
record bears him out. He overwhelmed rivals with lawsuits against which they
had to defend themselves at ruinous cost, convinced them that if they did not
acquiesce he would destroy them and was unrelenting. He was very good at it. He
made his fortune in this form of “war.” He seems to believe that he can apply
his experience in business to international affairs. But nations are not so likely
to go out of business as the rivals he met in real estate transactions and some
of them are armed with nuclear weapons.
–On
several occasions, Mr. Trump set out his understanding of the role of nuclear
weapons. In 2015, as a candidate, he was quoted as saying, “For me, nuclear is
just the power, the devastation is very important to me.” But I find no
evidence that he realizes what “devastation” really means. It is one thing to
drive a business rival into bankruptcy and quite another to oversee the burning
to death of hundreds of thousands or millions of people and relegating still
more to homelessness and starvation in a ruined environment.
One
supposes that he is aware of what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but they
are misleading. Modern nuclear weapons are far more powerful: a one megaton
weapon, for example, is about 50 times as powerful as the weapon that destroyed
Hiroshima. Those of us who dealt with the threat of nuclear war in the Cuban
Missile Crisis were aware of the effects of such “standard” weapons.
I
see no evidence that Mr. Trump knows what a nuclear war would actually do.
Indeed, he is quoted as saying, “what is the point of having nuclear weapons if
you don’t use them?” He will find advisers who will tell him that they must be
used. The ghost of General Lemnitzer hovers near the Oval Office.
Proud of Unpredictability
–Mr.
Trump prides himself on unpredictability. Unpredictability was his business
strategy. As he told an interviewer from CBS on January 1, 2016, “You want to
be unpredictable … And somebody recently said — I made a great business deal.
And the person on the other side was interviewed by a newspaper. And how did
Trump do this? And they said, he`s so unpredictable. And I didn`t know if he
meant it positively or negative. It turned out he meant it positively.”
Graphic for “The Celebrity Apprentice” when it was starring Donald
Trump.
Another
time Trump said on TV “I want to be unpredictable.” The record shows his use of
the ploy, but perhaps it is more than just a ploy. Perhaps it is a
manifestation of his personality, so I want to probe its meaning.
Years
ago, I was informed that the CIA maintained a staff of psychoanalysts to
profile foreign leaders. If the office still exists, the doctors presumably do
not practice their arts on American officials, and certainly not on the
President. As part of their professional code, psychiatrists are not supposed
to diagnose anyone they have not personally examined, and I doubt that anyone
will be able to get Mr. Trump to lie down on the coach.
But,
as psychiatrists Peter Kramer and Sally Satel have pointed out, Mr. Trump has
shown himself to be “impulsive, erratic, belligerent and vengeful” so “many experts
believe that Mr. Trump has a narcissistic personality disorder.” Reacting to
having such a leader with his hand on the nuclear trigger, Maryland Congressman
Jamie Raskin introduced a bill to establish an “Oversight Commission on
Presidential Capacity” (H.R. 1987) as authorized by the 25th Amendment to the Constitution. It has not been acted upon and
it allows the President latitude to “pardon” himself.
Since
his actions and the efforts of others do not offer much insight, I suggest his
actions lend themselves to a perhaps instructive analogy, the game of
“chicken.”
–In
“chicken,” two drivers aim their speeding cars at one another. The one who
flinches, turns aside, or (as Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it to me during
the Cuban Missile Crisis) “blinks,” is the chicken. The winner is the driver
who convinces the loser that he is irrational, deaf to all appeals and blind to
danger. He cannot get out of the way.
In
Mr. Trump’s strategy of war, the irrational man wins because he cannot be
reached with any warning, argument or advice. Knowing this, the other man loses
precisely because he is rational. Three things follow from this analogy. They
seem evident in Mr. Trump’s approach to the issues or war or peace:
The
first is that irrationality, ironically becomes a rational strategy. If one can
convince his opponents that he is cannot be reasoned with, he wins. This has
worked for years in business for Mr. Trump. I see no reason to believe that he
will give it up.
The
second is that the driver of the car does not need information or advice. They
are irrelevant or even detrimental to his strategy. So, we see that Mr. Trump
pays no attention to the professionals who man the 16 agencies set up by
previous administrations to provide information or intelligence.
One
example where his professed plan of action flies in the face of the
intelligence appreciation is Iran. As the former deputy director of the CIA
David Cohen found “disconcerting,” Mr. Trump has repeatedly said that Iran was
not abiding by the terms of the Iranian-American deal on nuclear weapons before
“finding the intelligence to back it up.” But that is inherent in Trump’s
strategy of confrontation. He surely knows – but does not care — that the
entire intelligence community holds that Iran has abided by the deal.
In
Trump’s mind, intelligence analysts are “back seat drivers” and should keep
quiet. By questioning his blindness, they suggest to the driver of the other
car that Mr. Trump might swerve aside. Thus, they threaten to destroy the
irrationality that is the essence of his strategy.
And,
third, what Mr. Trump, the “driver” of the car in the “chicken” confrontation,
does need is absolute loyalty. Those who sit beside him must never question how
he is driving. Any hint of their trying to dissuade his actions threatens to
destroy his strategy. So, as we see almost daily, at any hint of disagreement,
he pushes his copilots out of the car. Indeed, at least one hardly even got
into the “car” before being pushed out the door.
His
actions both in business and in the presidency illustrate these points. He
takes pride in irrational actions, shifting from one position to another, even
its opposite, on what appears to be a whim. He disdains advice even from the
intelligence services and also from presumably loyal members of his inner
circle. What he demands is absolute loyalty.
Finally,
it seems to me that Mr. Trump has understood, far better than most of us, that
the public likes to be entertained. It is bored by consistency. It doesn’t pay
much attention to explanation or analysis. And as the financially successful
record of the TV industry and the sorry record of the book publishing industry
show, the public wants entertainment. Mr. Trump caters to popular taste: every
episode is new; every remark, simple; every threat, dramatic; and, perhaps most
powerfully of all, he echoes angers, disappointments, hurts, desires that many
of his supporters also feel.
This
mode of operation worked for Trump in the business world. His image of
ruthlessness, determination and even irrationality caused some of the biggest
potential rivals to get out of his way and many others to accept his terms
rather than risk a collision. It is not Trump or his mode of operation that has
changed but the context in which he operates. Citibank with which he clashed
did not have nuclear weapons; North Korea does. So how does Kim Jong Un measure
up?
Measuring Kim Jong Un
Kim
Jong Un is the third generation of the North Korean leadership. That position
is almost beyond the comprehension of modern Westerners. Ruling dynasties went
out of fashion in the First World War. But perhaps consideration of “dynasty”
can be made to yield useful insights. One who tried to learn what dynastic
succession could tell us was the great medieval North African philosopher of
history, Ibn Khaldun.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Observing
Berber and Arab societies, Ibn Khaldun found that the first dynasty, sweeping
in from the desert, was made up of men who were rough and vigorous; their sons
still remembered times of struggle and retained their hardihood, but the third
generation grew use to ease and settled into luxury. Its leaders kept power by
relying on outside forces. The fourth generation lost it all.
The
fit to Korea is far from exact, but it is provocative. Kim Il-sung was a
guerrilla warrior, not unlike the warring tribal leaders with whom Ibn Khaldun
dealt. Sweeping in from Siberia he took power (admittedly with Soviet help),
ruled for nearly half a century and established the dynasty; in the second
generation, his son Kim Jong-Il came seamlessly to power on his death in 1994.
While he shared little of his father’s war-like experiences, he seems to have
been a hard man, as Ibn Khaldun expected. But he gives just a hint of the
growth of the enjoyment of the new environment. The luxury he enjoyed was exactly
what Ibn Khaldun would have predicted. He took as his mistress a beautiful
dancer. From this union came Kim Jong Un, the personification of the third
dynasty.
Young
Kim Jong Un grew up in what was, in Korean terms, the lap of luxury and as a
child was allowed to play the child’s game of soldiers. His soldiers, however,
were not toys; they were real. There is no certain information, but it is
believed that he was made a senior officer in the North Korean army when he was
just a child. When he was 12 years old, his father sent him to a private school
in Switzerland. Being provided with a personal chef to cook Korean dishes as
well as a tutor and a driver/bodyguard, he does not seem to have really been
“in” Europe.
He
was taken out of the Swiss school when he was 15 and put into a public school
in Korea. Those few who knew him have commented that he was intensely
patriotic. At his father’s choice, although he was not the elder son, he was
singled out as the successor, the man of the third generation.
Despite
this unusual background he seems remarkably like an ordinary American
schoolboy: he loved sports, particularly basketball, spent a lot of time
watching movies and was an indifferent student. This is just about all know
about his background. He did not emerge in public until about the time his
father was dying.
In
2009, he is thought to have married a beautiful young women who has been
variously described as a singer in a popular music group, a cheerleader in a
sports event and a doctoral candidate in a Korean university. When his father
finally died in 2011, the 32-year-old Kim Jong-un became North Korea’s leader.
But on assuming power, he showed himself a more ruthless, determined and
absolute ruler than Ibn Khaldun would have predicted.
Almost
immediately, he purged his father’s top general among other senior officials,
and allegedly he ordered or tolerated the murder of his elder brother whom he
must have seen as a potential rival. More generally, he proved himself skillful
in organizing the bitter memories of the Korean War among his people to support
his regime.
To
explain in part the inconsistency of what he did and what was expected of the
third generation, I suggest that that he must have constantly had before him
lesson of Saddam Husain who lacked nuclear weapons, could not defend himself
and was hanged. Watching these events as a young man, Kim Jong Un must have
been convinced that he could not afford to give himself up to luxury. As his
opponents charge, he may have many vices but sloth is not one of them.
Policy Options
From
this sketchy background of the two men whose hands are on the nuclear trigger,
I turn to what their choices are. That is, what is the range of policies they
must be considering or enacting to accomplish what they say are their
objectives.
A map of the Korean Peninsula showing the 38th Parallel where the
DMZ was established in 1953. (Wikipedia)
As
I understand his objectives, the ruler of North Korea is determined to protect
his regime (and of course his own life) and believes he can do so only if he
has the capacity to deliver a blow sufficiently painful to any attacker that
would deter him.
As
Siegfried Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory who
has visited North Korea seven times and toured its nuclear facilities, has
written (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 7 August 2017), Kim Jong Un
“is determined to develop an effective deterrent to keep the United States
out.” His answer is a missile-carried nuclear weapon.
Contrariwise,
President Trump’s announced objective (which in general echoes that of previous
administrations) is to get the North Korean government to stop its development
of both nuclear weapons and missiles. He has, theoretically, a range of
policies to effect his objective.
Taking
back my former role as a policy planner, I would divide the possible courses of
American action, the cost of each and its likelihood of being accomplished as
follows:
–The
first possible policy is what could be called “bluster and threat without armed
action.” This is what President Trump is doing today. His outbursts apparently
go over well with his loyal supporters but his words have not apparently at
least so far affected Kim Jong Un.
However
his words have delivered the worst possible result: it has increased North
Korean fear of U.S. invasion, has increased Kim Jong Un’s determination
to develop a deliverable nuclear weapons capability and has probably stoked the
war fever of the Koreans.
Thomas
Schelling, with whom I disagreed on other issues, got this one right. As he
wrote in The Strategy of Conflict, “madmen, like small children, can
often not be controlled by threats” and “if he is not to react like a trapped
lion, [an opponent] must be left some tolerable recourse. We have come to
realize that a threat of all-out retaliation gives the enemy every incentive,
in the event he should choose not to heed the threat, to initiate his
transgression with an all-out strike on us; it eliminates lesser courses of
action and forces him to choose between extremes.”
In
making that choice, Kim Jong Un hears President Trump. threatening “fire and
fury, the likes of which this world has never seen before.” (Kim responded with
the threat to bomb America’s air base on Guam island “to teach the U.S. a
severe lesson.”)
Mr.
Trump said America was “locked and loaded” and its “patience is over.” And, in
addition to remarks on the internet and to audiences all over America, he
authorized a simulated war exercise (known as Foal Eagle 2017) by some 300,000
troops armed with live ammunition in and around South Korea which, of course,
the government of the North regarded as provocative. But the U.S. did not alert
its troops in South Korea nor its aircraft on Guam nor its ships at sea that an
outbreak of hostilities was imminent. In short, the threat appeared all talk
but no action.
Sen.
John McCain, a man with some experience in combat, commented that President
Trump’s recent fiery rhetoric on North Korea would only ratchet up the heat for
a possible confrontation but nothing else.
As
the conservative political commentator Anthony Cordesman wrote on August 5,
2017, “One would hope that the North Korean ‘crisis’ is moving away from
bluster and counter bluster … [since] gross overreaction and issuing empty
threats discredits the U.S. in terms of allies support and is not a meaningful
bargaining tool in dealing with fellow blusterers like Kim Jong Un.”
Conclusion:
the likelihood of this line of action accomplishing the stated objective of
American policy is near zero, but the costs are twofold: first, the threat of
intervention forces the North Korean government to accelerate its acquisition
of the very weapons America wishes it to relinquish and serves to keep its
armed forces on alert lest the Americans convert threat to attack or stumble
into war; the second cost is that such a policy undercuts the image Americans
wish to project as the upholders of peace and stability even if not always of
democracy and independence.
The Limited Strike Option
–The
second possible policy would be to attack selected targets, including members
of North Korea’s government, with Special Forces and/or drones. Employment of
such tactics even in less organized societies, such as Somalia, Libya, Iraq and
Afghanistan, have created chaos but have not produced what their advocates
predicted.
Near the ceasefire line between North and South Korea, President
Barack Obama uses binoculars to view the DMZ from Camp Bonifas, March 25, 2012.
(Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
North
Korea is a regimented state with a high level of “security” comparable to
China. In the 1960s, I once was ordered to find out what the CIA might be able
to do with this or a similar option to slow down Chinese nuclear development.
The CIA was then sending agents into China from secret bases on Quemoy and
Matsu. I asked what they found out. The responsible CIA officer replied that he
did not know because none ever returned. That experience would probably be
repeated in Korea.
Conclusion:
the likelihood of such action accomplishing the stated objective of American
policy is near zero, but the cost could be catastrophic: An American attack,
even if denied and covert, almost certainly would trigger a North Korean
response that might provoke an American counterstroke that could escalate to
nuclear war.
–The
third possible policy would be to encourage North Korea’s neighbors to attempt
to coerce it to disarm and/or to scale back its military policy. Such a policy
could aim to get China to control the North Koreans and possibly then encourage
or allow Japan and/or South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons and so,
themselves, pose a threat to North Korea and indirectly to Chinese interests.
Mr.
Trump has several times called on the Chinese to effect the American policy on
North Korea and has expressed his disappointment that they have not done so.
When their own interests were at stake, the Chinese did impose sanctions and
cut back on the import of Korean coal, iron ore and seafood. But China can
hardly be expected to lend itself to be a tool of American policy. It too has
memories of the Korean War and of attempts to weaken or overthrow it. Today, it
also sees the U.S. as its rival in the Pacific. So, it is unlikely that Mr.
Trump’s saying that “they do Nothing for us with North Korea, just talk. We
will no longer allow this to continue” — will win Chinese support.
If
not the Chinese, what about the Japanese? As I have pointed out in Part 1 of
this essay, Japan is tarred by the nearly half century of its brutal regime in
Korea. Korean “comfort women,” sexual slaves, are still seeking compensation
for the misery inflicted on them and their plight is standard fare in Korean
media.
Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, who has been pushing for Japanese rearmament and is known
for his hard line on North Korea, is not a good choice to convince North Korea
to cooperate with America. Encouraging militarism in Japan will raise bitter
memories all over East Asia.
Moreover,
were Japan to rearm itself with nuclear weapons or were South Korea to be given
them, as Mr. Cordesman thinks Mr. Trump may feel forced to do, the overall and
long-range objectives of the United States would be severely damaged: the “cure
would be worse than the malady.”
We
don’t need more nuclear weapons powers; the political history of South Korea
gives little assurance of a “responsible” nuclear policy; and there is no
reason to believe that a nuclear-armed South Korea or a nuclear-armed Japan
would be more successful than a nuclear-armed America.
Worse,
if South Korea and Japan were to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, such
action might set off a scramble by other nations to acquire them. The world was
already deadly dangerous when only two states had nuclear weapons; the danger
of use by design or accident was multiplied when five more states acquired them
and if the number keeps on growing accidental or deliberate use will become
almost inevitable.
To
spread weapons further is against America’s national interest although some of
President Trump’s advisers apparently discount the danger and believe enhanced
nuclear power at home and selective spread aboard is to the interest both of
the nation and of his administration.
Conclusion:
the likelihood of getting others to successfully accomplish American objectives
vis-à-vis North Korea is near zero. Faced with nuclear-armed South Korea and
Japan, North Korea would logically accelerate rather than cut back its weapons
program. China has its own policies and is unlikely to serve as an American
proxy. Moreover, the costs of giving South Korea and Japan nuclear weapons is
potentially enormous.
The Nuclear Option
–The
fourth theoretical policy option would be an American or American-led
“coalition” attack on North Korea similar to our two attacks on Iraq and our
attack on Afghanistan. America could hit the country with almost any level of
destruction it chose from total annihilation to targeted demolition. Knowing
that they could not prevent attacks, the North Koreans have adopted a policy
that sounds very like America’s Cold War strategy against the Soviet Union,
mutual assured destruction or MAD. What would this amount to in the Korean
conflict?
North Korean missile launch on March 6, 2017.
The
cost of war to North Korea would be almost unimaginable. If nuclear weapons
were used, much of North Korea would be rendered unlivable for a generation or
more. General Douglas MacArthur had wanted to use the nuclear bomb during the
first Korean War in the early 1950s, but even with only conventional weapons
used in that conflict, the Koreans suffered casualties, reportedly, of about
one in each three persons.
If
the U.S. used nuclear weapons this time, millions, perhaps as many as 8 million
to 12 million, would be killed and many of the rest of the 26 million
inhabitants would be wounded or afflicted with radiation sickness. Once
initiated, the attack would have done this damage in minutes or hours. So how
would the North Koreans respond?
Their
government would order them to retaliate. That is what they are constantly
being trained to do. As the Korean War demonstrated, the North Koreans are
determined fighters. It would be foolish to expect them to surrender.
The
North Korean army is said to be the fourth largest in the world, roughly 1
million men, and is backed up by an active reserve about 5-6 times that many
from a potential enrollment of about 10 million. This force is equipped with
perhaps 10,000 tanks and self-propelled cannon.
The
numbers are impressive but, as in chess, it is position that counts in war. The
North is believed to have about 12,000 cannon and roughly 2,300 rockets within
range of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Seoul has a population of somewhat
more than 10 million people and, in the event of an American attack on North
Korea, the North Koreans have said they would obliterate it.
As
David Wood wrote on April 18, 2017, “In a matter of minutes, these heavy,
low-tech weapons could begin the destruction of the South Korean capital with
blizzards of glass shards, collapsed buildings and massive casualties that
would decimate this vibrant U.S. ally and send shock waves through the global
economy.”
In
addition to the South Koreans who would suffer and die, there are about 30,000
US troops in the armistice zone. They, and the hundreds of thousands of
dependents, supporters and families of the troops living in Seoul, are hostages
to U.S. policy. They also would suffer terrible casualties.
Could
the North Koreans carry out such massive counterstrikes? There seems little or
no doubt that they could, even if they were subjected to massive first strikes
even with nuclear weapons. The North Koreans learned from the first Korean War
to use mobile, hard to detect or target, launchers and to go underground to
prepared firing points.
Probably
many of the North Korean weapons would be destroyed, but there are so many that
the surviving pieces could inflict massive casualties. Almost incredible
photos, from North Korean television, published in The Sun on April 26,
2017, showed demonstration by hundreds of North Korean artillery pieces and
rocket launchers firing into the sea. In the event of war, they would be firing
into Seoul.
Then
there are the missiles. Japan generally and U.S. bases in Japan and on the
island of Guam are within the range of North Korean mid-range rockets. And
Alaska and the U.S. West Coast are either already or soon will be within range.
Would North Korea use them as a counterstrike? On August 7, as Business
Insider reported, “North Korea issued a stark warning to the US: If
you attack us, we will retaliate with nuclear weapons.”
Judging
from my experience in the Cuban Missile Crisis, I am sure that we would have
done so. It is unlikely that Kim Jong Un would do less than John F. Kennedy.
Losing Los Angeles
If
in reply to an American attack, the North Koreans struck the United States what
would be the result? Loren Thompson speculated in the August 30, 2017 issue of Forbes
on “What a Single North Korean Nuclear Warhead Could Do To Los Angeles.” He
picked Los Angeles because it is or soon will be in range of North Korean
missiles and would be an obvious choice against which to threaten retaliation.
With a population of more than 13 million, it is the second largest city in
America.
Illustration by Chesley Bonestell of nuclear bombs detonating over
New York City, entitled “Hiroshima U.S.A.” Colliers, Aug. 5, 1950.
As
I write this, North Korea appears to have demonstrated a somewhat less powerful
thermonuclear weapon, about seven times the power of the bomb that obliterated
Hiroshima, but Thompson speculates on the result of Los Angeles being hit by a
bomb that North Korea presumably will soon have, about 33 times as powerful as
the Hiroshima bomb.
Hit
by it, all structures, no matter how securely built with reinforced concrete,
within a radius of half a mile from ground zero “would be either totally
destroyed or rendered permanently unusable.” The enormous pressure created by
the fireball would heavily damage the adjoining circle of 2½ to 3 miles.
Virtually all civic facilities (electrical grids, water mains, transport
facilities, etc.) would be rendered inoperative and civil services (fire
departments, police, hospitals, schools) would be destroyed or severely
damaged.
A
cloud of radioactive materials would be spread over a far larger area. And
perhaps as many as a million people would have been burned to death immediately
with many more grievously wounded and unable to get help. And that would be
only in the first hours or days. In the following days, the wounded, often
suffering from burns, hungry, thirsty, terrified and desperate, would
limp out of the core area into the suburbs and surrounding towns, overwhelming
their facilities.
Los
Angeles would be only one target. North Korea would have nothing to lose by
using all of its missiles and bombs. Some might go astray or malfunction, but
some might hit San Francisco, Seattle, perhaps Denver and more remotely St.
Louis, Dallas and perhaps Chicago. If one reached New York, the damage would be
far greater than in Los Angeles.
Conclusion: As
Steven Bannon, President Trump’s former “Chief Strategist” is quoted as saying,
“There’s no military solution [to North Korea’s nuclear threats], forget
it. Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten
million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional
weapons, I don’t know what you’re talking about, there’s no military solution
here, they got us.”
That
may explain why he was fired. And retired Lt. General James Clapper, who as the
former Director of National Intelligence was not in danger of losing his job,
told CNN, we must “accept the fact that they are a nuclear power.”
An
attack on North Korea, while almost certainly devastating to North Korea, would
be prohibitively expensive for America. Moreover, while it would temporarily
prevent North Korea from posing a nuclear threat, it would create another area
of chaos, like those created in Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Afghanistan. Attacking
North Korea is not a rational policy choice.
Trying to Talk
–The
remaining policy option is negotiation. What would be negotiable and what not?
What would be the modalities? What would constitute success and what would be the
result of failure? How could a result be made believable and how could it be
enforced?
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres (left) addresses the
Security Council ministerial-level meeting on the nuclear weapon and ballistic
missile programs of North Korea. At right is U.S. Secretary of State Rex W.
Tillerson, Behind Tillerson is U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley. (UN
Photo/Eskinder Debebe)
I
think we must begin by recognizing that it would be irrational for North Korea
to give up missiles and nuclear weapons. Despite the horror with which I view
nuclear weapons, they are very attractive to small nations. They level the
playing field. A Texas saying from my youth sums it up: Mr. Colt’s invention of
the cowboy’s pistol “made all men equal.” The nuclear weapon is pistol writ
large. It is the ultimate defense.
For
Kim Yong Un to give up his nuclear weapons, while we keep ours and have
announced that we intend to overthrow his regime, would be tantamount to his
committing suicide. He may be evil, as many believe, but there is no reason to
believe that he is a fool.
Could
not America offer in the course of negotiations a series of graduated steps in
which over time a slow-down and ultimate elimination of missiles and nuclear
weapons could be traded for ending of sanctions and increased aid? The answer,
I think, is “yes, but.” The “but” is that Kim Yong Un would almost certainly
insist on three things: the first is that he would not give up all his
weapons and so would insist that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear power;
the second is that he not be humiliated in the negotiated cut; and the third is
that some formula be worked out to guarantee the deal. I have dealt with the
first two issues above; I turn now to the third, how to guarantee the
agreement.
The
Bush administration invasion of Iraq in 2001 showed that America could create
excuses to void any commitment it might make and provide excuses for any action
it wished to take. The current push by the Trump administration to renege on
the treaty made with Iran and written into American law by the Senate must
convince the North Koreans that a treaty with America is just a scrap of paper.
He must be convinced that America cannot be trusted.
But,
if China and Russia were prepared to guarantee the deal and Japan and South
Korea acquiesced to it and also gave up their option to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, that could be the first step in a phased
series of steps that might be productive. At the same time, America would have
to give up its ineffective sanctions, stop such provocative acts as the massive
war game on the frontier and the barrage of threats and undertake a sort of
Marshall Plan to lift North Korea out of poverty and hunger.
Conclusion: I
am convinced that it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to get Kim
Jong Un or any conceivable successor to give up deliverable nuclear weapons.
Thus, there can be no “success,” as described in current policy statements by
the Trump administration. But, arrangements can be created – by enlisting China
and Russia as partners in negotiations and by renouncing threats and such
damaging (and ineffective) policies as sanctions – to gradually create an
atmosphere in which North Korea can be accepted as a partner in the nuclear
“club.”
Failure
to move in this direction will leave us, at best, in the limbo of fear and the
possibility of stumbling into war. This is obviously a gambit that may fail.
What is clear, however, is that none of the alternatives has worked or is
likely to work. To embark on this path will require a degree of statesmanship,
which we may not have.
How to Do It
If
the United States government should decide to try this option, I think the
following steps will have to be taken to start negotiations:
First,
the U.S. government must accept the fact that North Korea is a nuclear power;
Second,
it must commit itself formally and irrevocably to a no-first-strike policy.
That was the policy envisaged by the Founding Fathers when they denied the
chief executive the power to initiate aggressive war;
Third,
it must remove sanctions on North Korea and begin to offer in a phased pattern
aid to mitigate the current (and potentially future) famines caused by droughts
and crop failures; helping North Korea to move toward prosperity, and reducing
fear; and
Fourth,
stop issuing threats and drop the unproductive and provocative war games on the
DMZ.
Will,
or even can, any American administration move in this direction? I think the
answer will depend in large part on the education of the government leaders and
the public among both of whom the level of ignorance of the real costs of war,
especially nuclear war, is politically crippling.
As
I have suggested, Mr. Trump has shown no comprehension of the costs of war in a
nuclear context. Nor has the general public. The pictures of children on Guam
being told not to look at the flash of the fireball reminds one of the
ridiculous advice to school children in America in the Cold War to take refuge
under their desks.
The
reality of a modern war must be explained and taught. I do not know if Korean
children are so taught, but their parents or grandparents knew it firsthand.
This generation of Americans has never seen war up-close in America although
some of their fathers saw it in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, memories fade and Americans today do not want to be informed of
the danger of a new war. Escapism is one of the great dangers we face.
In
the American tradition, the President is the nation’s teacher. We must insist
he perform that task or we could pay the supreme price of falling off the edge
into the dark void of nuclear war.