Iranian election of last week was
analyzed by many observers as a calculated “coup d’état” against the right-wing
elements of the regime led by Khamenei. If Iranian revolution of 1979 was a
continuation of the “Constitution Revolution” and “Nationalization Uprising”,
this election was definitely continuation (or as a result of) the rigging of 2009
presidential election by Khamenei and Ahamadi-Nejad. Events following Iranian election of four
years ago and the large crowd exhibiting unbridled anger in streets of all, if
not majority of the, cities around the world reflected the importance of achieving
popular demands by demonstration of force in the streets, rather than reliance
on demagogues, politicians, intellectuals, and party heads. Populism, or force
of crowd, and continuation of struggle without fear of losses in pursuit of
democracy, seems to be the only way a victimized nation can change a tyrannical
government. The more aggressive and vicious the government is, the more the
struggle becomes fearless. Of course, the despot knows this as well, and at
some point the struggle turns into a “daring contest”. Regimes which serve
foreign governments, such as most of the governments in the eastern hemisphere,
foresee a future destination in the case of abdication (at least that is what
they hope). Their power can be broken easier than the ones who are detested by
both internal and external nations. This has been the destiny of Gadhafi and Assad,
which is well understood by Iranian leader and his benefactors. Jimmy Carter in
a collection of some of his presidential notes (White House Diary; Farrar,
Straus and Giroux; Copyright 2010 by Jimmy Carter) wrote: “The CIA gave me an analysis of the economic and political problems
of Iran. The Shah has asked for advice on how to handle the trend toward
democracy and liberalized society. He has alienated powerful groups: the
right-wing religious leaders, who don’t want any changes; the radical left,
some of whom are communists; and the new middle class in Iran, who are now
wealthy but have no voice in the government.” (P. 255) “The Shah expressed deep
concern about whether to set up an interim government, a military government,
or perhaps even to abdicate. We encouraged him to hang firm and count on our
backing.” (P. 257) “Hang firm and count on our backing” was the advice that did not
go through to the Shah. Even in the events of the 1953 coup, the CIA had to act
independent of the Shah in order to succeed. Khamenei and his thugs know that
their existence depends on a continued and relentless oppression, and any
advantage to people would guarantee their downfall. The events of proceeding
years in Egypt and in Tunisia had such outcome. Mobilization of people behind a
leader, who may not be their ultimate choice, but the one who would save the
day, is another choice. This was achieved in Iranian election of last week.
People learned by experience of four years ago with Mousavi and Karoobi’s
elections, although these two did not learn from the coup of 1953 against Mossadegh,
in utilizing their mass support’s great power.
