Iranian election of last week was
analyzed by many observers as a calculated “coup d’état” against the right-wing
elements of the regime led by Khamenei. If Iranian revolution of 1979 was a
continuation of the “Constitution Revolution” and “Nationalization Uprising”,
this election was definitely continuation (or as a result of) the rigging of 2009
presidential election by Khamenei and Ahamadi-Nejad. Events following Iranian election of four
years ago and the large crowd exhibiting unbridled anger in streets of all, if
not majority of the, cities around the world reflected the importance of achieving
popular demands by demonstration of force in the streets, rather than reliance
on demagogues, politicians, intellectuals, and party heads. Populism, or force
of crowd, and continuation of struggle without fear of losses in pursuit of
democracy, seems to be the only way a victimized nation can change a tyrannical
government. The more aggressive and vicious the government is, the more the
struggle becomes fearless. Of course, the despot knows this as well, and at
some point the struggle turns into a “daring contest”. Regimes which serve
foreign governments, such as most of the governments in the eastern hemisphere,
foresee a future destination in the case of abdication (at least that is what
they hope). Their power can be broken easier than the ones who are detested by
both internal and external nations. This has been the destiny of Gadhafi and Assad,
which is well understood by Iranian leader and his benefactors. Jimmy Carter in
a collection of some of his presidential notes (White House Diary; Farrar,
Straus and Giroux; Copyright 2010 by Jimmy Carter) wrote: “The CIA gave me an analysis of the economic and political problems
of Iran. The Shah has asked for advice on how to handle the trend toward
democracy and liberalized society. He has alienated powerful groups: the
right-wing religious leaders, who don’t want any changes; the radical left,
some of whom are communists; and the new middle class in Iran, who are now
wealthy but have no voice in the government.” (P. 255) “The Shah expressed deep
concern about whether to set up an interim government, a military government,
or perhaps even to abdicate. We encouraged him to hang firm and count on our
backing.” (P. 257) “Hang firm and count on our backing” was the advice that did not
go through to the Shah. Even in the events of the 1953 coup, the CIA had to act
independent of the Shah in order to succeed. Khamenei and his thugs know that
their existence depends on a continued and relentless oppression, and any
advantage to people would guarantee their downfall. The events of proceeding
years in Egypt and in Tunisia had such outcome. Mobilization of people behind a
leader, who may not be their ultimate choice, but the one who would save the
day, is another choice. This was achieved in Iranian election of last week.
People learned by experience of four years ago with Mousavi and Karoobi’s
elections, although these two did not learn from the coup of 1953 against Mossadegh,
in utilizing their mass support’s great power.
There could be another element playing a
crucial role in the way Iranian election of 2013 surprised everyone (except
those involved in ensuring Rohani’s victory of course); a book authored by Ervand
Abrahamian about a historical event of almost 60 years ago! The subtitle of the
book reads: “1953,
The CIA, and the roots of modern U.S. - Iran relationship.” Abrahamian explains the purpose of this book: “The aim of the present book is to challenge on two separate
grounds the conventional wisdom established by previous works. First, it
questions the conventional notion that the British negotiated in good faith,
the United States made serious attempts to act as an honest broker, and
Mossadeq failed to reach a compromise because of his intransigence…Second, this
book questions the conventional wisdom that places the coup squarely and
solidly within the context of the Cold War…” (P. 2&3) The timing of this book coincides with
the mounting pressure on the regime in Iran, internally as well as externally,
in an election year that may decide the destiny of Islamic Republic. The timing
is also crucial as some elements of the regime are engaged in battling and backbiting, an ample
opportunity for people to impose their own will, whether through an uprising or
via changes of top figures. Detail descriptions of the plot behind the coup of
1953, may have alerted Iranian voters of the signs of another plot, in yet
again destroying Iranian dreams of democracy and self-determination. What
happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria; when the
struggle against the dictator gave superpowers an opportunity to derail the
course of uprising (to benefit themselves and their corporate allies) was a rude
awakening. When a vulnerable nation revolts against the despot, the danger is
not only within the boundaries, but also abroad! “THE COUP” is a text book to
learn and ‘not to fall in a deep well, while climbing out of a small pit’ as
the Persian expression goes!
Abrahamian describes briefly major
players in the Coup; such as Lancelot Pyman, Norman Darbyshire, from UK; Loy
Henderson, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Cottam, Donald Newton Wilber, from USA;
and of course a few dozen Iranians assisting with the coup; such as Kashani,
Zahedi, Makki, and Baqai. A historical background of the foreign involvement in
Iranian industrial affairs is explained next. A British company extracting
Iranian natural resources, based on an agreement with a previous monarch, is
benefiting the British government, while exploiting Iranian natural resources: “By the time World War II ended, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company-
which had changed its name in 1935 to conform to the government decree
substituting Iran for Persia- was vital to the British Empire in more ways than
one.” (P.11) The
author offers more documents in support of the above point: “An internal AIOC memo shows that in 1949 alone, the company
[Anglo-Iranian Oil Company] paid the British government £22.8 million in taxes,
distributed £7.1 million in dividends to shareholders, and put £18.4 million in
reserve, but gave Iran only £13.5 million in royalties.” (P. 15)
Reza Shah’s (Iranian emperor)
relationship with British Empire was controversial, to say the least: “Despite these stances, many Iranians continued to see Reza Shah as
a British ‘agent.’ They did so in part because British military officers had
financed his 1921 coup; and in part because the new oil concession signed in
1933 after the much-taunted cancellation turned out to be highly favorable to
the AIOC. Iran agreed not to renege or unilaterally change the new agreement.
It also extended the concession for another thirty-two years- from 1961 to
1993.” (P. 28) As it is the case with American military buildup around the world, the most
effective tool of the empire in bringing weaker nations into
submission is their military might: “Some suspected he [Reza Shah] had been
intimidated by tacit as well as explicit threats- British had moved battleships
into the Gulf, toyed with secessionist movements among Arab tribes, and
threatened to take ‘all such measures as the situation may demand.’ Some
insinuated that secret funds had been channeled into his private bank account
in London [regarding Reza Shah’s concession of 1933 explained in the previous
paragraph].” (P. 29)
The new king succeeding the exiled Reza Shah depended heavily on people's approval of him , as well as Western Governments’ support at the beginning of his reign. He
elected Mossadegh, a popular political figure, as his prime minister. From the
very beginning, Mossadegh pursued nationalization of Iranian mineral resources.
The young monarch did not heed to this idea in the fear of upsetting a great power,
until he was forced to do so after a popular uprising: “The Shah put his signature to the nationalization law on May 1-
fully aware of the symbolic significance of the day [1952]. In a May Day radio
address to the nation, Mossadeq declared that on account of his age and health
he never imagined he would one day become the country’s prime minister. Hailing
May Day as the world’s ‘labor festival,’ he described workers ‘as dear to him
as his own children’ and beseeched them to be calm, orderly, and not abuse
press freedoms. In follow-up speeches, he argued that nationalization would
take the wind out of communist propaganda, and that $120 million a year in oil
revenues would improve economic conditions and thus alleviate social
discontent.” (P. 77)
Whenever his demands were not met, Mossadegh asked people for
support. When he asked the Shah to allow him to select his own war minister and
the Shah did not accept, he resigned, which culminated another uprising: “’In the course of the recent events, I have come to realize that I
need a trustworthy war minister to be able to bring to a successful conclusion
the national struggle launched by the Iranian people. Since His majesty has
refused my request, I will resign to permit someone who enjoys royal confidence
to form a new government and implement His Majesty’s policies. In the present
situation, the struggle started by the Iranian people cannot be brought to a
victorious conclusion.’ The pitch proved to be a resounding success. It
produced what has gone down in Iranian history as Siyeh-e Tir (30th
Tir)(21st July) - or simply the July Uprising.” (P. 138)
Watching it with hawkish eyes, George
Middleton, the British Charge in Tehran, reported to London: “Mossadeq had scored a double-victory. Middleton, in his
end-of-year report, wrote: ‘On the following day [the day after the riots-
author’s note] the Majles inevitably voted for Dr. Mussadiq.' At the same time
the verdict of the International Court, which had been announced on July 21,
became known in Tehran. Its decision that it was incompetent to consider the
oil dispute was naturally interpreted as a complete endorsement of Persia’s
case and crowned Dr. Mussadiq’s triumph. The Shah capitulated to his demand,
confirmed him as Prime Minister, appointed him Minister of War, and accepted
his nominee as Chief of Staff. The Majles now voted Mussadiq full powers for
six months to enact a ‘programme of reform.’ Middleton added that ‘Musaddiq has
so flattered the mob as the source of his power that he has, I fear, made it
impossible for a successor to oust him by normal constitutional methods.’” (P.
141&142)
Of course
the coup would not succeed without the treacherous alliances of some religious
and political figures: “Robin Zehner reported cryptically: ‘Perron gave an impassioned
defense of the Shah’s ‘astute’ policy. He claimed that the Shah had succeeded
in detaching Kashani, Makki, and Baqai from Musaddiq and that thanks to the
Shah the National Front had practically ceased to exist…’ In a separate report,
he added that the ‘two rascally sons of kashani’- Mustafa and Abu Maali- had
opened an office with ostensible purpose of facilitating commercial
transactions but with the real aim of smuggling in contraband. He estimated
their illegal transactions had within a few weeks cleared more than two million
rials. He also reported that Kashani was privately looking around for further
funds.” (P. 155 & 156)
To convince themselves and other bystanders of their treason, those
who were bought by foreign intelligent agencies started making disparaging
remarks and slandering Mossadegh’s character: “He [Kashani] and his colleagues accused Mossadeq both of enflaming
‘class warfare’ and of collaborating with the ‘ruling class’… Describing
women’s true place to be at home, Kashani exclaimed ‘he could not understand
what men had done wrong that they deserved to have their women vote.’… Makki
equated Mossadeq with Hitler. Baqai described him as ‘worse than Hitler.’ Not
surprisingly, Majles sessions often broke up with fistfights… Baqai was shocked
to discover that his former intellectual colleagues had been Marxists. Khalel
Maleki was equally shocked to discover Baqai had been ‘corrupt’ in more ways
than one. The Toilers Party became one of the most vocal groups against
Mossadeq. The Third Force remained, together with the Iran Party, one of
Mossadeq’s most staunch supporters- even though it vociferously opposed his
toleration of the Tudeh. Khalel Maleki assured Mossadeq, ‘We will follow you
all the way even to the gates of hell.’ Not wanting to put all eggs in one
basket, the CIA funneled money to both Baqai and Khalel Maleki. Jalali of the
Boscoe Brothers continued to attend meetings of the Third Force. This investment
paid off on the actual day of the coup.” (P. 166&167)
Having more friends than foes, Mossadegh
was notified and the coup was diverted. US ambassador who had been outside of Iran
during the coup, rushed back and upon hearing of the failure of the coup,
realized that the only way for the coup to succeed was to remove the foundation
of Mossadegh’s supporters; the people. Mossadegh, who had been under tremendous
pressure from every corner, fell into Henderson’s trap and discounted his
powerbase: “Ambrose, relying on Henderson’s private
papers, writes that the ambassador on his return to Tehran had ‘demanded an
immediate audience’ with Mossadeq, had vigorously ‘protested the mob attacks’ on
Westerners, and had threatened to evacuate all Americans if the streets were
not cleaned. Mossadeq- according to Henderson- had ‘lost his nerve’ picked up
the phone, and ordered his chief of police to ‘restore order in the streets.’
This, he concludes, was the ‘old man’s fatal mistake.’ Mossadeq fell for the
bait. He issued a formal ban on all demonstrations.” (P.189&190) Mossadegh’s fatal mistake could still be
amended, except his lack of tolerance for blood, violence and chaos: “During the chaotic day, National Front militants had pleaded with
Mossadeq to form a National Force, call supporters into the streets, and, if
necessary, distribute arms. Similarly, the Tudeh- after an emergency executive
committee meeting- had sent a delegation to his home beseeching him to do the
same. Kianuri again phoned with information that Imperial Guards were being
trucked into the city... Shayegan, and other National Front leaders later told
interviewers that Mossadeq had been reluctant to act because he belonged to an
‘old style of politics’ and abhorred the thought of a bloody civil war. He also
feared that such strife could bring foreign intervention and partition off the
country- as in 1907.” (P. 196&197) After the success of the coup, Western media
and Western-controlled media broadcast a different story, a story that was
believed by almost everyone but Iranian people: “G.K. Reddy, a socialist deputy in the Indian parliament, wrote a
series of articles on the coup for the Times of India…Foreign Office
recommended the articles for in-house reading…Reddy gave a blow-by-blow account
of the pertinent events- the ‘mysterious visits’ of Princess Ashraf and General
Schwarzkopf; the public rebuffs given by Eisenhower and Dulles; the United
States siding with the UK over the issue of ‘fair compensation’; the close
contacts between Army officers and American military advisers; the
long-standing ties between the British and the tribes (he claimed most of the
‘troublesome tribal chiefs were on the British payroll’); the growing liaison
between the palace and the American embassy; the Tudeh’s forestalling of the
coup; the rushed return of Henderson and his questioning of Mossadeq’s
legitimacy; and, finally, the tanks brought to clear the streets but used to
carry out the coup.” (P. 199) “These weighty analyses managed to avoid
unseemly topics such as the CIA or M16…The whole sorry story tended to widen
the gap on how Iranians and Westerners saw not only the coup but also the
history of Iran’s relations with the West.” (P. 203) With the conclusion of the story, the
author begins an analysis of effect of the coup on Iranian people in the past
60 years, and its role in the relationship of the US with other countries of the
world: “In the years to come, the CIA carried out
strikingly similar coups in Guatemala, Indonesia, and Chile. Some resulted in
mass killings on a genocidal scale. The killing fields of Guatemala and
Indonesia could well match the best known horrors of the twentieth century.
Conversely, it led many to suspect that the United States was planning coups
here, there, and everywhere. Whenever governments- whether in the Congo,
Brazil, Argentina, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, or Pakistan-were overthrown
by their military, suspicion automatically fell on the CIA.” (P.205)
Scrutinizing the relationship between the US and Iran, one must study the history of each country separately, and then,
in relation with each other. A trail of blood can be found throughout the
history of both nations, and that is where similarities shaping these two
countries begin, and where it ends! One could say that independence of every
nation culminates as the outcome of many bloody struggles for self-determination.
America achieved its sovereignty between the years of occupation of natives’
lands and years of forcefully acquiring and seizing other nations’ natural
resources, under the slogan of freedom and democracy. Iranian people have had
some glimpses of freedom and democracy in their long history of blood and
destruction by other nations, tribes, and nomads. Every time they rose up
against a dictator or a despot government, another tyrant rose up. This has
been with or without the aid of other governments. The aim of this book was
briefed at the beginning by the author. In the final pages, we understand the
relationship of such 60 years old event with the US-Iran political climate of
the day: “Such suspicions came in handy. In November
1979… Khomeini’s entourage exhorted college students to break into the American
embassy compound on the pretext that the CIA was plotting a repeat performance
of 1953 from the very grounds… Americans who knew little of the events of 1953
were mystified; Iranians were not. Similarly, on March 5, 1981, when more than
100,000 gathered at Tehran University to commemorate Mossadeq’s death and call
for the establishment of a democratic rather than an Islamic republic, Hojjat
al-Islam Ali Khamenei- Khomeini’s future successor- declared ominously: ‘We are
not liberals, like Allende, willing to be snuffed out by the CIA.’… The 1953
crisis also came in handy during the long-drawn-out standoff between the United
States and Iran over the nuclear program… Throughout the standoff, the regime
implicitly and explicitly referred back to 1951-53.” (P. 225)
And, we finally realize the importance
of this book right before an election that would decide destiny of Iranian
people for the next four years, or for future generations: “The paranoid style reached a new peak in 2009. When more than two
million took to the streets to protest the rigging of the presidential
elections, the regime’s automatic reaction was to hold show trials and accuse
opposition leaders of plotting a ‘velvet revolution’ in the style of the
‘colored’ ones that had recently swept through Eastern Europe. They were
accused of working in cahoots not only with the CIA and M16 but also with an
elaborate international web, including the BBC, the Voice of America, Columbia
University, Harvard University, the Hoover Institution, the Ford Foundation,
PEN, Freedom House, Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, and, of
course, the omnipresent and ominous Soros Foundation. They were also accused of
being led astray from Islam by the pernicious ideas of Max Weber, Talcott
Parsons, Richard Rorty, and, most dangerous of all, Jungen Habermas. Regimes
that tremble before Weber and Habermas have much to fear. This would have
appealed to Mossadeq’s sense of humor. He would have been further amused by the
knowledge that the United States now had to deal with the likes of Khomeini and
Khamenei.” (P.226)
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The Coup: 2013 by Ervand Abrahamian; The New
Press, New York
