Deepak Tripathi
The overthrow of
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, marking the end of more than 50 years of the Assad
dynasty (1971 – 2024), is a dramatic event in the Middle East. It is difficult
to make definite short- and long-term predictions in the wake of such a
momentous event. But it deserves a brief comment about what may lie ahead.
In a country of
25 million with almost 75 percent Sunnis and only about 15 percent Alawite Shia
Muslims, the Assad regime of the Alawite minority was sustained over half a
century by brutal repression. Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, was a
significant Arab leader along with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Muammar
Gaddafi of Libya. Together, they were close allies of the Soviet Union, and
formed the anti-Western front in the Arab world. Syria’s Assad dynasty, above
all, was particularly shaky. It ruled with an iron fist, creating both fear and
resistance which exploded into full-scale civil war in the early 2010s.
Other Arab
regimes and much of the world found the Assads awkward to deal with. Once the
Soviet Union had disintegrated, the United States sought the overthrow of the
Syrian ruling order. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the Obama
administration openly declared that “Assad must go.” However, the Islamic State
at the time posed a greater threat to regional and Western interests. And
America’s drive to remove the Assad dynasty failed, because the opposition was
disunited, and it was convenient for the US-led Western powers to let the
Syrian military fight ISIS.
Significant
changes have, however, occurred in the geopolitics of the Middle East since
October 7, 2023. With America’s backing, the Israeli military now dominates the
region. Israeli war tactics in Gaza, where at least 45,000 Palestinians are
known to have been killed, have been widely condemned by international courts,
NGOs, human rights organizations, and activists. However, no country or agency
can take enforcement action in the face of the American veto in the UN Security
Council. Hamas and other Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank have been
severely weakened, as well as the Shia militia Hezbollah in Lebanon. In
Israel’s multi-front war in the region, Iran, Yemen, and Syria have all been
hit. And to protect Israel from enemy missiles, American warships, and
air-defense batteries are deployed in the region.
The outgoing US
president, Joe Biden, is a longtime close friend of Prime Minister Netanyahu
and an ally of Israel. Biden is counting his final days in the White House. The
President and his officials often speak about the Middle East, but hardly
anything meaningful for mediation. The incoming president, Donald Trump, awaits
his inauguration on January 20, 2025. Trump is even more aggressive. When it
comes to America’s policy in Middle East, there is little difference between
Democratic and Republican administrations.
In this
perplexing scenario, how can the United States policy be explained? The
American experience in previous conflicts offers some clues. The lessons of the
Vietnam War ending in America’s withdrawal in the twentieth century were
repeated in the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first
century. Washington has developed great aversion to sending American troops to
fight wars in distant lands as a consequence of the loss of American lives and
moral capital in those conflicts. Having learned those lessons, America’s new
military doctrine is about deploying Israel to fight for itself, and for the
United States using the latest American weapons. This doctrine makes Israel
both an ally and a proxy of the United States to keep the Middle East in
control.
In the latest
events in Syria, America’s foe has been overthrown. Syrians celebrate in the
streets of Damascus. Crowds take down statues and murals associated with the
deposed ruling dynasty. Government buildings are set on fire. The erstwhile
rebels who have won the war against the dictatorship are in charge. The victors
belonging to the Sunni Islamist movement, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Organization
for the Liberation of the Levant), are a mix of various armed factions led by
Islamist commanders. HTS has roots in al Qaeda, which the United States regards
as a terrorist group. Will Syria after Assad see stability? Or will the country
become another Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya? Such questions may be answered as
events unfold.
Sefa Secen
The brutal 54-year reign of the
Assad family in Syria looks to be over.
In a matter of days, opposition
forces took the major city of Aleppo before advancing southward into other
government-controlled areas of Hama, Homs and finally, on Dec 7, 2024, the
capital, Damascus.
The offensive was all the more
astonishing given that the 13-year civil war had largely been in a stalemate
since a 2020 ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey.
Reports suggest President Bashar
al-Assad has resigned and left the country. But what has he left behind and
what happens next?
As an expert on Middle East
security, I believe the opposition forces’ ability to maintain unity will be
critical in the transition to a post-Assad Syria. Since the civil war started
in 2011, the many opposition factions in Syria have been fractured by ideological
differences and the interests of external backers – and that remains true
despite their current victory.
Meanwhile, the rapid change of
fortunes in Syria’s civil war poses serious questions for those countries that
have backed one side or the other in the conflict. For Iran and Russia, the
fall of their ally Assad will damage regional aspirations. For the backers of
elements of the opposition – notably Turkey but also the U.S., both of which
maintain a military presence in Syria – there will be challenges, too.
Fears of a ‘catastrophic success’
Iran, the U.S., Russia and Turkey
have been crucial players throughout Syria’s civil war.
The recent opposition offensive came
as Assad’s three key allies — Russia, Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah — were
stretched thin. Russia’s focus on Ukraine and Iran’s setbacks from Israeli
strikes have limited their ability to provide Assad robust support, while
Hezbollah appeared hesitant to commit additional fighters, as it had done
previously.
Then, on Dec. 2, as opposition
forces were on the move, Russia began withdrawing naval assets from its
strategic Mediterranean base at Tartus, Syria. This erosion of external backing
substantially undermined Assad’s capacity to regroup and mount an effective
counteroffensive.
The U.S. will no doubt welcome this
diminished Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. But concern in Washington
has already been aired over a scenario of “catastrophic success” in which Assad
is replaced by an Islamist group that many in the West see as terrorists.
It was members of the Islamist group
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that spearheaded much of the opposition gains in Syria,
fighting alongside the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.
And while Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has
not directly targeted the U.S. troops stationed in the northeast – which is
under the control of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces – instability and the
potential for clashes between opposition factions and U.S. allies could
increase the risks for the 900 Syria-based American personnel.
A fragmented landscape
The fact that different opposition
groups have taken control of various once-government-held areas points to a
crucial fact: Syria is de facto partitioned. The northwest is controlled by the
Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. The
northeast is under the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the
United States.
Despite a shared goal of ousting
Assad and the joint offensive on Aleppo, conflicts between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
and the Syrian National Army are frequent. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Abu
Mohammad al-Golani aims to assert control over opposition-held areas, including
those currently managed by the Syrian National Army.
And the Syrian National Army and
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintain complex, often conflicting relationships with the
Syrian Democratic Forces, shaped by ideological, territorial and strategic
differences. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army frequently engages in
direct clashes with the Syrian Defense Forces, which Turkey views as a
terrorist organization and an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party it has
been fighting in southern Turkey for more than four decades.
The opposition’s internal
fragmentation may weaken its ability to bring stability to Syria in the long
run.
Adjustment problems
Assad’s fall will have major
implications for those countries that have a stake in the region.
Iran’s grand strategy of preserving
the “Shia Crescent” — connecting Tehran to Beirut through Baghdad and Damascus
and in the process countering Sunni Islamist factions — has failed.
For Washington, Assad’s departure
doesn’t necessarily fit any hoped-for outcome.
The U.S. has prioritized balancing,
containing and potentially diminishing Russian and Iranian influence in Syria.
But until recently that did not mean the removal of Assad. The Biden
administration had even hinted in early December that it would be prepared to
lift sanctions on Syria if Assad severed ties with Iran and Hezbollah.
There was also talk of Assad’s
government allying with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. But as city
after city fell to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish-backed Syrian National
Army, it became increasingly unlikely that the Kurdish group would align with
the weakening Assad forces – especially as Kurdish forces themselves made
significant territorial gains.
Syrian Democratic Forces will need
to adapt in response to the fall of Assad. This will be doubly true if, as many
anticipate and President-elect Donald Trump has hinted at, the U.S. withdraws
from Syria.
Currently, the 900 U.S. troops are
in eastern Syria, alongside a military base in Al-Tanf, located near the Iraqi
and Jordanian borders.
Should American forces withdraw, the
Syrian Democratic Forces and the autonomous region it administers — known as
the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria — would need to negotiate
their autonomy with both different factions of the opposition and Syrian
neighbor Turkey.
A Kurdish and Islamist alliance?
The precarious role of Syrian
Democratic Forces in the transition to the post-Assad era could make for a
significant foreign policy headache for the U.S.
Given Turkey’s history of military
incursions and campaigns against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern
cities like Afrin and Kobani, the Kurdish group may need to align with some
factions of the opposition, likely Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, should the U.S.
eventually withdraw.
Of late, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has
largely avoided antagonizing the Syrian Democratic Forces. Indeed, Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham’s efforts to rebrand and moderate itself are notable, especially given
its origins as a Salafist group with ties to al-Qaida.
By adopting a range of policies like
issuing an amnesty for Syrian army personnel, facilitating evacuation
agreements and using the language of building an ethnically and religiously
diverse governance structure, the Islamist group has attempted to soften its
hardline image and gain favor – or at least neutrality – from international
stakeholders, like the U.S.
Yet skepticism about Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham’s ultimate objectives persists.
Strategic calculations for Turkey
Turkey’s position on Syria now is
equally complex. Turkey is home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees — the largest
refugee-hosting country globally. A prolonged economic downturn and rising
anti-refugee sentiment had pressured Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to
signal a willingness to engage with Assad prior to the opposition offensive.
Turkey’s hope was that normalized
relations with Syria would help facilitate refugee return and address concerns
about a potential Kurdish state in northeastern Syria.
But Assad dismissed such overtures,
and intensified airstrikes on Idlib – triggering new waves of displacement near
the Turkish border.
Turkey’s Syria policy is also
closely linked to its renewed peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.
These talks reportedly include discussions about the potential release of
imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader Abdullah Öcalan – whose influence
runs deep in Kurdish-led regions in northern Syria.
The chance for a new Syria
The apparent end of Assad’s rule
after half a century of brutal oppression signifies a pivotal moment for Syria
– offering an opportunity to rebuild the nation on foundations of inclusivity,
pluralism and stability.
Achieving this vision depends on the
opposition factions’ ability to navigate the immense challenges of transition.
This includes fostering unity among diverse groups, addressing grievances from
years of conflict and establishing governance structures that reflect Syria’s
ethnic, religious and political diversity. That will be no easy task.
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