اندیشمند بزرگترین احساسش عشق است و هر عملش با خرد

Monday, December 9, 2024

The Fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad: What it Means

Deepak Tripathi
The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, marking the end of more than 50 years of the Assad dynasty (1971 – 2024), is a dramatic event in the Middle East. It is difficult to make definite short- and long-term predictions in the wake of such a momentous event. But it deserves a brief comment about what may lie ahead.
 
In a country of 25 million with almost 75 percent Sunnis and only about 15 percent Alawite Shia Muslims, the Assad regime of the Alawite minority was sustained over half a century by brutal repression. Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, was a significant Arab leader along with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Together, they were close allies of the Soviet Union, and formed the anti-Western front in the Arab world. Syria’s Assad dynasty, above all, was particularly shaky. It ruled with an iron fist, creating both fear and resistance which exploded into full-scale civil war in the early 2010s.
Other Arab regimes and much of the world found the Assads awkward to deal with. Once the Soviet Union had disintegrated, the United States sought the overthrow of the Syrian ruling order. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the Obama administration openly declared that “Assad must go.” However, the Islamic State at the time posed a greater threat to regional and Western interests. And America’s drive to remove the Assad dynasty failed, because the opposition was disunited, and it was convenient for the US-led Western powers to let the Syrian military fight ISIS.
Significant changes have, however, occurred in the geopolitics of the Middle East since October 7, 2023. With America’s backing, the Israeli military now dominates the region. Israeli war tactics in Gaza, where at least 45,000 Palestinians are known to have been killed, have been widely condemned by international courts, NGOs, human rights organizations, and activists. However, no country or agency can take enforcement action in the face of the American veto in the UN Security Council. Hamas and other Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank have been severely weakened, as well as the Shia militia Hezbollah in Lebanon. In Israel’s multi-front war in the region, Iran, Yemen, and Syria have all been hit. And to protect Israel from enemy missiles, American warships, and air-defense batteries are deployed in the region.
The outgoing US president, Joe Biden, is a longtime close friend of Prime Minister Netanyahu and an ally of Israel. Biden is counting his final days in the White House. The President and his officials often speak about the Middle East, but hardly anything meaningful for mediation. The incoming president, Donald Trump, awaits his inauguration on January 20, 2025. Trump is even more aggressive. When it comes to America’s policy in Middle East, there is little difference between Democratic and Republican administrations.
In this perplexing scenario, how can the United States policy be explained? The American experience in previous conflicts offers some clues. The lessons of the Vietnam War ending in America’s withdrawal in the twentieth century were repeated in the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq in the twenty-first century. Washington has developed great aversion to sending American troops to fight wars in distant lands as a consequence of the loss of American lives and moral capital in those conflicts. Having learned those lessons, America’s new military doctrine is about deploying Israel to fight for itself, and for the United States using the latest American weapons. This doctrine makes Israel both an ally and a proxy of the United States to keep the Middle East in control.
In the latest events in Syria, America’s foe has been overthrown. Syrians celebrate in the streets of Damascus. Crowds take down statues and murals associated with the deposed ruling dynasty. Government buildings are set on fire. The erstwhile rebels who have won the war against the dictatorship are in charge. The victors belonging to the Sunni Islamist movement, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant), are a mix of various armed factions led by Islamist commanders. HTS has roots in al Qaeda, which the United States regards as a terrorist group. Will Syria after Assad see stability? Or will the country become another Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya? Such questions may be answered as events unfold.
 
Sefa Secen
The brutal 54-year reign of the Assad family in Syria looks to be over.
In a matter of days, opposition forces took the major city of Aleppo before advancing southward into other government-controlled areas of Hama, Homs and finally, on Dec 7, 2024, the capital, Damascus.
The offensive was all the more astonishing given that the 13-year civil war had largely been in a stalemate since a 2020 ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey.
Reports suggest President Bashar al-Assad has resigned and left the country. But what has he left behind and what happens next?
As an expert on Middle East security, I believe the opposition forces’ ability to maintain unity will be critical in the transition to a post-Assad Syria. Since the civil war started in 2011, the many opposition factions in Syria have been fractured by ideological differences and the interests of external backers – and that remains true despite their current victory.
Meanwhile, the rapid change of fortunes in Syria’s civil war poses serious questions for those countries that have backed one side or the other in the conflict. For Iran and Russia, the fall of their ally Assad will damage regional aspirations. For the backers of elements of the opposition – notably Turkey but also the U.S., both of which maintain a military presence in Syria – there will be challenges, too.
Fears of a ‘catastrophic success’
Iran, the U.S., Russia and Turkey have been crucial players throughout Syria’s civil war.
The recent opposition offensive came as Assad’s three key allies — Russia, Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah — were stretched thin. Russia’s focus on Ukraine and Iran’s setbacks from Israeli strikes have limited their ability to provide Assad robust support, while Hezbollah appeared hesitant to commit additional fighters, as it had done previously.
Then, on Dec. 2, as opposition forces were on the move, Russia began withdrawing naval assets from its strategic Mediterranean base at Tartus, Syria. This erosion of external backing substantially undermined Assad’s capacity to regroup and mount an effective counteroffensive.
The U.S. will no doubt welcome this diminished Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. But concern in Washington has already been aired over a scenario of “catastrophic success” in which Assad is replaced by an Islamist group that many in the West see as terrorists.
It was members of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that spearheaded much of the opposition gains in Syria, fighting alongside the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army.
And while Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has not directly targeted the U.S. troops stationed in the northeast – which is under the control of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces – instability and the potential for clashes between opposition factions and U.S. allies could increase the risks for the 900 Syria-based American personnel.
A fragmented landscape
The fact that different opposition groups have taken control of various once-government-held areas points to a crucial fact: Syria is de facto partitioned. The northwest is controlled by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. The northeast is under the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the United States.
Despite a shared goal of ousting Assad and the joint offensive on Aleppo, conflicts between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian National Army are frequent. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Abu Mohammad al-Golani aims to assert control over opposition-held areas, including those currently managed by the Syrian National Army.
And the Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintain complex, often conflicting relationships with the Syrian Democratic Forces, shaped by ideological, territorial and strategic differences. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army frequently engages in direct clashes with the Syrian Defense Forces, which Turkey views as a terrorist organization and an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party it has been fighting in southern Turkey for more than four decades.
The opposition’s internal fragmentation may weaken its ability to bring stability to Syria in the long run.
Adjustment problems
Assad’s fall will have major implications for those countries that have a stake in the region.
Iran’s grand strategy of preserving the “Shia Crescent” — connecting Tehran to Beirut through Baghdad and Damascus and in the process countering Sunni Islamist factions — has failed.
For Washington, Assad’s departure doesn’t necessarily fit any hoped-for outcome.
The U.S. has prioritized balancing, containing and potentially diminishing Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. But until recently that did not mean the removal of Assad. The Biden administration had even hinted in early December that it would be prepared to lift sanctions on Syria if Assad severed ties with Iran and Hezbollah.
There was also talk of Assad’s government allying with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. But as city after city fell to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, it became increasingly unlikely that the Kurdish group would align with the weakening Assad forces – especially as Kurdish forces themselves made significant territorial gains.
Syrian Democratic Forces will need to adapt in response to the fall of Assad. This will be doubly true if, as many anticipate and President-elect Donald Trump has hinted at, the U.S. withdraws from Syria.
Currently, the 900 U.S. troops are in eastern Syria, alongside a military base in Al-Tanf, located near the Iraqi and Jordanian borders.
Should American forces withdraw, the Syrian Democratic Forces and the autonomous region it administers — known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria — would need to negotiate their autonomy with both different factions of the opposition and Syrian neighbor Turkey.
A Kurdish and Islamist alliance?
The precarious role of Syrian Democratic Forces in the transition to the post-Assad era could make for a significant foreign policy headache for the U.S.
Given Turkey’s history of military incursions and campaigns against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern cities like Afrin and Kobani, the Kurdish group may need to align with some factions of the opposition, likely Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, should the U.S. eventually withdraw.
Of late, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has largely avoided antagonizing the Syrian Democratic Forces. Indeed, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s efforts to rebrand and moderate itself are notable, especially given its origins as a Salafist group with ties to al-Qaida.
By adopting a range of policies like issuing an amnesty for Syrian army personnel, facilitating evacuation agreements and using the language of building an ethnically and religiously diverse governance structure, the Islamist group has attempted to soften its hardline image and gain favor – or at least neutrality – from international stakeholders, like the U.S.
Yet skepticism about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s ultimate objectives persists.
Strategic calculations for Turkey
Turkey’s position on Syria now is equally complex. Turkey is home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees — the largest refugee-hosting country globally. A prolonged economic downturn and rising anti-refugee sentiment had pressured Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to signal a willingness to engage with Assad prior to the opposition offensive.
Turkey’s hope was that normalized relations with Syria would help facilitate refugee return and address concerns about a potential Kurdish state in northeastern Syria.
But Assad dismissed such overtures, and intensified airstrikes on Idlib – triggering new waves of displacement near the Turkish border.
Turkey’s Syria policy is also closely linked to its renewed peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. These talks reportedly include discussions about the potential release of imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader Abdullah Öcalan – whose influence runs deep in Kurdish-led regions in northern Syria.
The chance for a new Syria
The apparent end of Assad’s rule after half a century of brutal oppression signifies a pivotal moment for Syria – offering an opportunity to rebuild the nation on foundations of inclusivity, pluralism and stability.
Achieving this vision depends on the opposition factions’ ability to navigate the immense challenges of transition. This includes fostering unity among diverse groups, addressing grievances from years of conflict and establishing governance structures that reflect Syria’s ethnic, religious and political diversity. That will be no easy task.

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