Iran isn't worried about the US attacking it, but Biden has other ways to cut a deal with Tehran

JohnReid Wilcox, Defense Priorities

March 28, 2023

The trend lines in US-Iran relations today make for grim reading in Washington. Faced with unrelenting US pressure, Iran's leaders are regularly meeting with Russian and Chinese officials and pledging unprecedented levels of cooperation. Iran's nuclear program recently crossed a key threshold into production of weapons-grade uranium.

American policymakers today face a key inflection point in the bilateral relationship, and the "no nuclear deal, no crisis" dynamic appears increasingly unsustainable.

Hawkish analysts are calling for a renewed Iran strategy focused on a formal exit from the dormant — or dead — JCPOA, increased sanctions coordination and interdiction efforts, and forward deployment of US military assets. But this amounts to little more than a rehash of the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" strategy, which failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and instead led Iran to ramp up its nuclear program and increase its proxy attacks.

The ultimate coercive tool for the US would be an act of war — an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities or key military centers.

But Washington's willingness to use the military option is less than credible today. An attack on Iran could not be subcontracted out to Israel; such a major endeavor would require US participation. But would President Joe Biden, or any other US president, be willing to stake a term's worth of political capital on such a tremendous risk?

Amidst the backdrop of the US's disastrous efforts in the Middle East over the past two decades, a desire to focus on China, and the long war in Ukraine, the Islamic Republic is probably not immediately fearful of an attack. Additionally, many Israeli and American officials openly admit that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities might do very little to set back its nuclear progress. Indeed, attacks may incentivize Tehran to proceed more quickly with its nuclear program.

If coercive tools fall short of achieving key American objectives, engagement options could still offer a better way out of the nuclear stalemate. Since the Trump administration's exit from the JCPOA, a diplomatic asymmetry has halted progress in the nuclear talks.

Tehran had no means of dispute resolution after the US's unilateral exit and no way to recover lost revenues after the US stepped out of compliance with the accord. It remains skeptical of the credibility and durability of a US commitment to provide sanctions relief, and its dangerous security environment and rigid revolutionary ideology preclude the possibility of a first step towards Washington.

Some tools of engagement are still available to the Biden administration which could change this calculus and induce Tehran back toward accepting curbs on its nuclear program.

First, Iranian assets frozen abroad (particularly in South Korea and Iraq) have long been discussed as part of a package to return to the JCPOA but have never been released by Washington.

Second, Tehran has voiced understandable concerns about the limited practical impact of US sanctions relief – Washington should signal that in the event of a nuclear agreement, it would take steps to provide proactive assurances to investors and financial institutions that sanctions have been verifiably lifted.

Third, in the event of serious Iranian interest in restoring a nuclear accord, the US should be prepared to decouple a deal's curbs on Iranian nuclear advances from the IAEA's longstanding safeguards probe into potential past undeclared nuclear activity, and apply diplomatic pressure as such.

Such steps may not be sufficient to restore the JCPOA – the original terms of the deal will likely never return due to the diplomatic damage of recent years, and a broader rapprochement is off the table in the medium-term.

But these measures could be enough to signal enough good faith to shift Tehran's perceptions and build momentum for an interim agreement which restores international monitoring access to Iran's nuclear facilities and stops its production of weapons-grade uranium. Paired with private US messaging to China, they could also bolster multilateral diplomatic efforts to pressure Iran back into curbing its nuclear advances.

Iran's domestic uprising has captured global attention and must merit a mention. The IRI's hardliners continue to consolidate power via a bloody and brutal crackdown on its citizens and have continued to badly damage the state-society relationship. The "Women, Life, Freedom" movement deserves Americans' attention and solidarity. But US policymakers can do little to alter the direction of this social movement and extensive attempts to do so could backfire.

Abandoning diplomatic efforts to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear bomb risks paving a path toward the IRI's further entrenchment and creating new, dangerous post-revolutionary scenarios involving unsecured nuclear material.

The proposals provided here face a stark uphill battle in the current domestic and geopolitical environments. But for Washington, resigning itself to the worst-case outcome risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Without any momentum towards a new deal, the likelihood of a new crisis grows greater.

 

It's Time to Get Tough on Iran. Really Tough | Opinion

MeirBen Shabbat and Eran Lerman

March 27, 2023

The failure of diplomatic efforts to bring Iran back to the JCPOA nuclear deal, and the problematic role being played by Iran in the Russia-Ukraine war, require a new Western strategy regarding Iran. This would aggressively push back against Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional aggressions to reduce the risk of actual war with Iran. It also would seek to reverse the drift of regional players toward Russia and China, and to stabilize a new global order.

Washington should seek a joint U.S.-European declaration that the JCPOA no longer holds, and a U.N. Security Council resolution on the resumption of sanctions on Iran ("snapback"). The United States should also advance a military option against Iran and pose a credible threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic's regime. This would not necessarily lead to war. Just the opposite is true: Without such measures, the likelihood of a violent eruption in the Middle East significantly will increase.

The present Iranian leadership could not have hoped for an easier period than the one it is now experiencing. Tehran is marching forward towards its hegemonic goals, unhindered and away from the limelight.

While Washington is absorbed by domestic concerns, by the war in Ukraine, and by the ebb and flow of tensions with China (and while Israel is distracted with internal disputes), Iran is enhancing relations with Russia and China. Iran may very well feel that catapulting to the threshold of military nuclear power is but a simple, riskless decision away.

Iran has enriched uranium to 84 percent which is very close to the 90 percent level necessary for a nuclear weapon. It has accumulated significant amounts of fissile material at various levels of enrichment and is barring International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to sites associated with the nuclear project. It refuses to answer the agency's questions.

At the same time, Iran is continuing its subversive activities across the region via proxy forces, deepening its political, economic and security grip in Iraq and Syria, expanding its production and export of military drones, and overall playing a significant role in the creation of an anti-American axis.

Internal protests against the regime in Iran are continuing but have been contained by brutal repression. The protests have not succeeded, yet, in posing a real threat to the regime.

As for Western responses, the European Union parliament indeed has adopted a resolution calling to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its subsidiaries as terror organizations (given its terror activities, its involvement in repressing dissent, and its supplying of drones to Russia), but this is a non-binding text. The resolution has been met with derision and disdain by the IRGC commander, General Hussein Salami. He warned that such Western resolutions only motivate the IRGC to escalate its opposition to "Iran's enemies."

U.S. policy towards Iran remains anemic. President Joe Biden and his team regularly declare their commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining military nuclear capability, but they present neither a plan of action nor take active measures towards this goal.

Biden may have said, in passing, that the JCPOA "deal is dead," but the fact that no such formal announcement has been made, and no alternative measures have been announced, leaves open the prospect that Washington has not yet fully abandoned the idea of a return to former President Barack Obama's weak nuclear deal with Iran.

Iran's arrogance and its overweening self-confidence regarding the Biden administration demonstrates the erosion of U.S. standing and influence in the Middle East. This can be deduced from the conduct of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which studiously have avoided siding with the U.S. against Russia on Ukraine and have bolstered their relations with China in the search for diplomatic support, alongside or in place of Washington's.

Even committed believers in the diplomatic option within the White House will find it difficult to deny that their approach to Iran has failed, with the U.S. paying dearly as a result. Now, with diplomacy at the point of collapse and in the face of Iran's provocative involvement in the war in Ukraine, it is finally time for Washington to check Iran's aggrandizement and aggression (as long urged by Israel), and in the process to rebuild U.S. ties with pro-Western countries in the Middle East.

This is the place to note that in Iran's view both its nuclear and conventional build-up are meant primarily to secure the survival of the Islamist regime against external foreign intervention. But the regime is there not just to survive. It is driven by an ambitious vision of Islamic revolution and regional hegemony.

In the past, sanctions have taken a heavy economic toll on Iran. However, sanctions not only have failed to generate a real threat to the regime's survival, they have not halted Iran's terrorist aims nor its military build-up.

The Biden administration cannot leave the Iranian question hanging. It would do well to put together a road map with the following elements: Snapback sanctions on Iran with tight supervision (especially of Iranian oil exports and dual-use technologies); designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization across Europe; suspension of Iranian membership in international forums; sanctions and economic pressure on individuals and organizations involved in repressing human rights; penalties on key Iranian industries; covert disruptive measures against Iran's nuclear program; and the articulation and demonstration of a credible military threat against Iran's rulers.

Some Americans fear that such steps will bring the U.S. closer to war with Iran. We argue that instead these moves will enhance American deterrence and prevent war. The elimination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 by a U.S. drone strike is a case in point. Iran reduced its overall terrorist activity in the wake of this bold move. Tehran understood the imbalance of power between the U.S. and Iran.

While this may not be a sufficient base upon which to draw broader conclusions, it does suggest that there is no need to overstate the dangers involved in tough action against Iran, nor to ignore the huge gap in relative strength between the two rivals. And the cost of the alternative—the implications of failure to act against Iran—must be borne in mind.

 

Sen. Cotton blasts Sec. Lloyd Austin over Iran proxy attack: ‘I don’t believe you’

AndersHagstrom

March 28, 2023

Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., blasted Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin for not notifying lawmakers of an Iranian proxy attack on U.S. forces in Syria last week.

Cotton began the heated back-and-forth with Austin during the defense secretary's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. The line of questioning related to an attack on U.S. forces in Syria by an Iranian proxy group last week.

The attack landed the same day that senators voted down an amendment from Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., which would have required President Biden's administration to prove that Iran was no longer providing support to proxy groups.

"Do believe that you should have notified us that morning while we were voting on amendments directly related to this kind of attack?" Cotton asked.

"Again, there is no connection between when we notified you, Senator, and your vote. The chairman and I were testifying that morning as well. So as soon as we came out of testimony, we began work on crafting response options," Lloyd responded.

"Secretary Austin, I don't believe you. I believe that your office specifically withheld notification of this deadly strike against Americans because the Rubio amendment on which we voted midday directly touched on exactly this scenario: Not repealing these use of force resolutions if the president couldn't certify that Iran was no longer attacking us in Iran and Syria," Cotton stated. "That's what I believe. Nothing you can say is going to change my belief about that. And I got to say, I think I speak for a lot of my colleagues."

"I just want to say, Senator, that that is absolutely not true," Lloyd insisted.

"Maybe you didn't personally do it. Maybe you didn't personally do it. But I believe entirely that people in your office did that. You have a vast legislative operation, as Sen. Wicker pointed out. Do you really expect us to believe that they didn't know that we were voting on a Rubio amendment, that directly, directly covered exactly this kind of attack? I don't believe that. I don't believe it. I believe there was a conscious decision made not to inform Congress because you fear that it might lead to the passage of the Rubio amendment, which would kill the entire bill," Cotton concluded.

Last week's attack saw Iran proxy forces launch about seven rockets targeting a U.S. base in Northeast Syria on Friday. There were no U.S. casualties and no damage to the base near the Al-Omar oil field, defense officials said.