March
28, 2023
The
trend lines in US-Iran relations today make for grim reading in Washington.
Faced with unrelenting US pressure, Iran's leaders are regularly meeting with
Russian and Chinese officials and pledging unprecedented levels of cooperation.
Iran's nuclear program recently crossed a key threshold into production of
weapons-grade uranium.
American
policymakers today face a key inflection point in the bilateral relationship,
and the "no nuclear deal, no crisis" dynamic appears increasingly
unsustainable.
Hawkish
analysts are calling for a renewed Iran strategy focused on a formal exit from
the dormant — or dead — JCPOA, increased sanctions coordination and
interdiction efforts, and forward deployment of US military assets. But this
amounts to little more than a rehash of the Trump administration's
"maximum pressure" strategy, which failed to achieve any of its
stated objectives and instead led Iran to ramp up its nuclear program and
increase its proxy attacks.
The
ultimate coercive tool for the US would be an act of war — an attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities or key military centers.
But
Washington's willingness to use the military option is less than credible
today. An attack on Iran could not be subcontracted out to Israel; such a major
endeavor would require US participation. But would President Joe Biden, or any other
US president, be willing to stake a term's worth of political capital on such a
tremendous risk?
Amidst
the backdrop of the US's disastrous efforts in the Middle East over the past
two decades, a desire to focus on China, and the long war in Ukraine, the
Islamic Republic is probably not immediately fearful of an attack.
Additionally, many Israeli and American officials openly admit that an attack
on Iran's nuclear facilities might do very little to set back its nuclear
progress. Indeed, attacks may incentivize Tehran to proceed more quickly with
its nuclear program.
If
coercive tools fall short of achieving key American objectives, engagement
options could still offer a better way out of the nuclear stalemate. Since the
Trump administration's exit from the JCPOA, a diplomatic asymmetry has halted
progress in the nuclear talks.
Tehran
had no means of dispute resolution after the US's unilateral exit and no way to
recover lost revenues after the US stepped out of compliance with the accord.
It remains skeptical of the credibility and durability of a US commitment to
provide sanctions relief, and its dangerous security environment and rigid
revolutionary ideology preclude the possibility of a first step towards
Washington.
Some
tools of engagement are still available to the Biden administration which could
change this calculus and induce Tehran back toward accepting curbs on its
nuclear program.
First,
Iranian assets frozen abroad (particularly in South Korea and Iraq) have long
been discussed as part of a package to return to the JCPOA but have never been
released by Washington.
Second,
Tehran has voiced understandable concerns about the limited practical impact of
US sanctions relief – Washington should signal that in the event of a nuclear
agreement, it would take steps to provide proactive assurances to investors and
financial institutions that sanctions have been verifiably lifted.
Third,
in the event of serious Iranian interest in restoring a nuclear accord, the US
should be prepared to decouple a deal's curbs on Iranian nuclear advances from
the IAEA's longstanding safeguards probe into potential past undeclared nuclear
activity, and apply diplomatic pressure as such.
Such
steps may not be sufficient to restore the JCPOA – the original terms of the
deal will likely never return due to the diplomatic damage of recent years, and
a broader rapprochement is off the table in the medium-term.
But
these measures could be enough to signal enough good faith to shift Tehran's
perceptions and build momentum for an interim agreement which restores
international monitoring access to Iran's nuclear facilities and stops its
production of weapons-grade uranium. Paired with private US messaging to China,
they could also bolster multilateral diplomatic efforts to pressure Iran back
into curbing its nuclear advances.
Iran's
domestic uprising has captured global attention and must merit a mention. The
IRI's hardliners continue to consolidate power via a bloody and brutal
crackdown on its citizens and have continued to badly damage the state-society
relationship. The "Women, Life, Freedom" movement deserves Americans'
attention and solidarity. But US policymakers can do little to alter the
direction of this social movement and extensive attempts to do so could backfire.
Abandoning
diplomatic efforts to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear
bomb risks paving a path toward the IRI's further entrenchment and creating
new, dangerous post-revolutionary scenarios involving unsecured nuclear
material.
The
proposals provided here face a stark uphill battle in the current domestic and
geopolitical environments. But for Washington, resigning itself to the
worst-case outcome risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Without any
momentum towards a new deal, the likelihood of a new crisis grows greater.
It's Time to Get Tough on Iran. Really Tough | Opinion
March
27, 2023
The
failure of diplomatic efforts to bring Iran back to the JCPOA nuclear deal, and
the problematic role being played by Iran in the Russia-Ukraine war, require a
new Western strategy regarding Iran. This would aggressively push back against
Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional aggressions to reduce the risk of actual
war with Iran. It also would seek to reverse the drift of regional players
toward Russia and China, and to stabilize a new global order.
Washington
should seek a joint U.S.-European declaration that the JCPOA no longer holds,
and a U.N. Security Council resolution on the resumption of sanctions on Iran
("snapback"). The United States should also advance a military option
against Iran and pose a credible threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic's
regime. This would not necessarily lead to war. Just the opposite is true:
Without such measures, the likelihood of a violent eruption in the Middle East
significantly will increase.
The
present Iranian leadership could not have hoped for an easier period than the
one it is now experiencing. Tehran is marching forward towards its hegemonic
goals, unhindered and away from the limelight.
While
Washington is absorbed by domestic concerns, by the war in Ukraine, and by the
ebb and flow of tensions with China (and while Israel is distracted with
internal disputes), Iran is enhancing relations with Russia and China. Iran may
very well feel that catapulting to the threshold of military nuclear power is
but a simple, riskless decision away.
Iran
has enriched uranium to 84 percent which is very close to the 90 percent level
necessary for a nuclear weapon. It has accumulated significant amounts of
fissile material at various levels of enrichment and is barring International
Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to sites associated with the nuclear
project. It refuses to answer the agency's questions.
At
the same time, Iran is continuing its subversive activities across the region
via proxy forces, deepening its political, economic and security grip in Iraq
and Syria, expanding its production and export of military drones, and overall
playing a significant role in the creation of an anti-American axis.
Internal
protests against the regime in Iran are continuing but have been contained by
brutal repression. The protests have not succeeded, yet, in posing a real
threat to the regime.
As
for Western responses, the European Union parliament indeed has adopted a
resolution calling to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its
subsidiaries as terror organizations (given its terror activities, its
involvement in repressing dissent, and its supplying of drones to Russia), but
this is a non-binding text. The resolution has been met with derision and
disdain by the IRGC commander, General Hussein Salami. He warned that such
Western resolutions only motivate the IRGC to escalate its opposition to
"Iran's enemies."
U.S.
policy towards Iran remains anemic. President Joe Biden and his team regularly
declare their commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining military nuclear
capability, but they present neither a plan of action nor take active measures
towards this goal.
Biden
may have said, in passing, that the JCPOA "deal is dead," but the
fact that no such formal announcement has been made, and no alternative
measures have been announced, leaves open the prospect that Washington has not
yet fully abandoned the idea of a return to former President Barack Obama's
weak nuclear deal with Iran.
Iran's
arrogance and its overweening self-confidence regarding the Biden
administration demonstrates the erosion of U.S. standing and influence in the
Middle East. This can be deduced from the conduct of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states, which studiously have avoided siding with the U.S. against Russia on Ukraine
and have bolstered their relations with China in the search for diplomatic
support, alongside or in place of Washington's.
Even
committed believers in the diplomatic option within the White House will find
it difficult to deny that their approach to Iran has failed, with the U.S.
paying dearly as a result. Now, with diplomacy at the point of collapse and in
the face of Iran's provocative involvement in the war in Ukraine, it is finally
time for Washington to check Iran's aggrandizement and aggression (as long
urged by Israel), and in the process to rebuild U.S. ties with pro-Western
countries in the Middle East.
This
is the place to note that in Iran's view both its nuclear and conventional
build-up are meant primarily to secure the survival of the Islamist regime
against external foreign intervention. But the regime is there not just to
survive. It is driven by an ambitious vision of Islamic revolution and regional
hegemony.
In
the past, sanctions have taken a heavy economic toll on Iran. However, sanctions
not only have failed to generate a real threat to the regime's survival, they
have not halted Iran's terrorist aims nor its military build-up.
The
Biden administration cannot leave the Iranian question hanging. It would do
well to put together a road map with the following elements: Snapback sanctions
on Iran with tight supervision (especially of Iranian oil exports and dual-use
technologies); designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization across
Europe; suspension of Iranian membership in international forums; sanctions and
economic pressure on individuals and organizations involved in repressing human
rights; penalties on key Iranian industries; covert disruptive measures against
Iran's nuclear program; and the articulation and demonstration of a credible
military threat against Iran's rulers.
Some
Americans fear that such steps will bring the U.S. closer to war with Iran. We
argue that instead these moves will enhance American deterrence and prevent
war. The elimination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 by a U.S. drone strike
is a case in point. Iran reduced its overall terrorist activity in the wake of
this bold move. Tehran understood the imbalance of power between the U.S. and
Iran.
While
this may not be a sufficient base upon which to draw broader conclusions, it
does suggest that there is no need to overstate the dangers involved in tough
action against Iran, nor to ignore the huge gap in relative strength between
the two rivals. And the cost of the alternative—the implications of failure to
act against Iran—must be borne in mind.
Sen. Cotton blasts Sec. Lloyd Austin over Iran proxy attack: ‘I
don’t believe you’
March
28, 2023
Sen.
Tom Cotton, R-Ark., blasted Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin for not notifying
lawmakers of an Iranian proxy attack on U.S. forces in Syria last week.
Cotton
began the heated back-and-forth with Austin during the defense secretary's
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. The line of
questioning related to an attack on U.S. forces in Syria by an Iranian proxy
group last week.
The
attack landed the same day that senators voted down an amendment from Sen.
Marco Rubio, R-Fla., which would have required President Biden's administration
to prove that Iran was no longer providing support to proxy groups.
"Do
believe that you should have notified us that morning while we were voting on
amendments directly related to this kind of attack?" Cotton asked.
"Again,
there is no connection between when we notified you, Senator, and your vote.
The chairman and I were testifying that morning as well. So as soon as we came
out of testimony, we began work on crafting response options," Lloyd
responded.
"Secretary
Austin, I don't believe you. I believe that your office specifically withheld
notification of this deadly strike against Americans because the Rubio
amendment on which we voted midday directly touched on exactly this scenario:
Not repealing these use of force resolutions if the president couldn't certify
that Iran was no longer attacking us in Iran and Syria," Cotton stated.
"That's what I believe. Nothing you can say is going to change my belief
about that. And I got to say, I think I speak for a lot of my colleagues."
"I
just want to say, Senator, that that is absolutely not true," Lloyd
insisted.
"Maybe
you didn't personally do it. Maybe you didn't personally do it. But I believe
entirely that people in your office did that. You have a vast legislative
operation, as Sen. Wicker pointed out. Do you really expect us to believe that
they didn't know that we were voting on a Rubio amendment, that directly,
directly covered exactly this kind of attack? I don't believe that. I don't
believe it. I believe there was a conscious decision made not to inform
Congress because you fear that it might lead to the passage of the Rubio
amendment, which would kill the entire bill," Cotton concluded.
Last
week's attack saw Iran proxy forces launch about seven rockets targeting a U.S.
base in Northeast Syria on Friday. There were no U.S. casualties and no damage
to the base near the Al-Omar oil field, defense officials said.
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