The Poisonous Atmosphere That Pervades Iran

RoyaHakakian

April 6, 2023

In late November, a journalist named Ali Pour-Tabatabaie reported that 18 girls from an arts academy in the city of Qom, Iran, had fallen sick, apparently from the effects of poison. The story got little attention at the time, as the country was consumed with the protests that had begun after the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody. The 22-year-old woman had been arrested by the morality police on grounds of not wearing the hijab, or mandatory headscarf, properly. Two weeks after that first report of poisoning, 51 students were hospitalized in Qom. By the end of December, a dozen more cases of suspected mass poisoning of students, most of them female, were reported in states around the country. The timing of these incidents, occurring within weeks of the nationwide anti-regime protests led by women and girls, has raised suspicion for many Iranians that the attacks are a form of retribution for dissent.

The students complained of a variety of symptoms, including dizziness, nausea, shortness of breath, and general weakness, that had come on after they had smelled something foul. What some described as the odor of rotten fruit, and others compared to the smell of bleach, had suddenly filled the air. In the central city of Borujerd, a teacher said she had seen “something like a bomb” tossed into a school compound.

By March, more than 5,000 students, in 25 provinces and from 230 schools, had been affected. The closing of schools last month for the Iranian New Year, Nowruz, raised hopes that the attacks might have ended. But as schools reopened, those hopes were dashed when a series of new cases were reported in several cities.

When the first cases appeared, the authorities tried to downplay the issue. The governor of Qom attributed the incident to a carbon-monoxide leak from schools’ heating systems, but a parliament representative from the principality called it “suspicious.” Some officials accused the country’s foreign enemies, as Iran often does, while others dismissed the event entirely as mass hysteria. Some foreign observers cited by Nature magazine say that a mass psychogenic event brought on by stress reactions to the protest unrest and state violence cannot be ruled out; other experts discount this hypothesis, pointing to the abundant number of cases of hospitalizations of girls suffering physical effects.

In late February, a health minister said that some of the cases had been caused by chemical poisoning, although that statement was soon rebutted by the interior minister. No specific substance responsible for the symptoms has been identified, but the interior minister recently announced that “suspicious samples” had been recovered during investigations. In mid-March, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report that called the poisonings “deliberate.” The regime appears to have abandoned its earlier dismissals; by this month, more than 100 suspects had been arrested in connection with the incidents.

The government’s double-talk planted confusion among the public and suggested that there was no consensus among officials. Such contradiction—one official offering an explanation, only to be undermined by another—is characteristic of Tehran’s damage-control tactics. At times, an impression of division can reflect real tensions within the ruling elites. At others, it can be fabricated to project a false sense of behind-the-scenes competition between hawks and doves, as if the elites were somehow responsive to public opinion.

Amid this information mayhem, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, finally broke his silence after three months and offered a statement of his own: “If the poisoning of students is proven, those behind this crime should be sentenced to capital punishment and there will be no amnesty for them.”

The severity of Khamenei’s retributive language did not convince many people that he sincerely intended to investigate the poisonings and identify suspects. In a country that has installed more surveillance devices in public places than George Orwell’s Big Brother could dream of, few believed that the authorities did not already know who the culprits were. Furthermore, the sheer geographical spread of the poisonings made it improbable that anyone without access to state resources could have carried out the attacks. Yet, instead of those behind the crime, the reporter Pour-Tabatabaie was arrested, though his family are uncertain which agency is detaining him and on what charges.

Amid the doubt and fear, speculation abounds. Speaking with the Persian-language service of the BBC, Hatam Ghaderi, a political-science professor in Tehran, called the poisonings “the most blatant example of state-sponsored terrorism, intended to sow fear among people.” Ghaderi suggested that the incidents might be a show of force by the more radical, “Taliban-like” elements within the regime ahead of a power struggle anticipated after the death of the aged and ailing Khamenei. Ghaderi’s argument gains plausibility from the fact that Qom, the epicenter of the poisonings, is known for its religious seminaries and as a stronghold of Shiite clerics. And because even Qom had seen protests in recent months, the poisonings could be retaliation or deterrence aimed at the next generation of young women drawn to reject the hijab. If, in fact, rogue, “Taliban-like” elements are the culprits, or if the public is led to believe that they are, the supreme leader could appear as the lesser of two evils, compared with the utterly ruthless hard-liners who might be maneuvering to replace him.

Some Iranians nevertheless regard the supreme leader himself as chiefly responsible—not necessarily for directly ordering the poisoning attacks, but for tacitly permitting his conservative supporters to deal with dissent as they see fit. Even before the poisonings of schoolchildren began, the regime has been able to rely on plainclothes agents to carry out physical attacks on protesters; sometimes they include members of the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary organization aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Ali Sajjadi, a U.S.-based historian and journalist, believes that Khamenei has effectively incited such vigilantism as far back as June 2017, when he told a group of university students that they should see themselves not merely as “soldiers,” but as “officers” in a “soft war” in defense of the Islamic Republic’s values and beliefs. Elaborating on his bellicose metaphor, he told them that they should “fire at will.”

Those “officers” may have heard Khamenei’s declaration on October 3 that “some protesters only needed a punishment in order to recognize their error” as a call to action. What the punishment should be, and who should deliver it, were matters Khamenei left for others to decide for themselves. Not unlike the mob that broke into the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the devout followers of the supreme leader were given license to do what they thought he had asked of them.

When suspects were eventually arrested, the leniency shown by officials was striking, compared with the draconian treatment of protesters against the regime—hundreds have been killed in the streets, thousands imprisoned, and several executed. But these poisoning suspects thus far remain unnamed and have not been charged. An interior-ministry deputy spoke of the alleged perpetrators as if they were mere schoolyard pranksters. “Among the detainees are those who are not enemies, and who, with calm and proper guidance, will be managed,” the official said.

Until now, the Iranian regime had reserved its worst malevolence for dedicated political opponents. Its operatives have hunted down dissidents, including exiles, and assassinated, disappeared, beheaded, kidnapped, or executed them. If, as Ghaderi and others allege, these school poisonings were state-sanctioned, that would represent a new level of indiscriminate regime violence, dire even by Tehran’s standards, against its citizens. No question, the strength of such a sustained and widespread protest movement has made it the greatest domestic challenge to the Islamic Republic since the clerics took power in 1979. This time, as never before, the protesters were calling not for reform, but for regime change—a demand that even the former presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, under house arrest in Tehran, echoed in a message earlier this year. (The widely suspected vote-rigging in the 2009 election, when Mousavi ran against the conservative incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is what sparked Iran’s last great popular uprising, the Green Movement.)

The unprecedented calls for change within Iran present the United States with a historic opportunity. For years, many Americans have believed that the U.S. robbed Iran of a democratic future by supporting its last monarch, the Shah. History is now offering America a second chance to keep faith with the nation’s democratic aspiration. With Russia and China, and now possibly Saudi Arabia, as its autocratic allies, the theocratic regime in Tehran is poised to survive its economic woes. China hopes to replace America on the world stage, but for the many millions of Iranians who are yearning for a democratic future, China can offer only more of the dark present in which they already live. The Iranians’ demand for the rule of law creates a space for America to act as no other global leader can: by hearing and answering the call of people for freedom.

Iran, Saudi Arabia vow to bring Mideast 'security, stability' 

AFP

April 5, 2023 

Top diplomats from Middle East rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia met in Beijing on Thursday, resuming diplomatic relations and pledging to work together to bring "security and stability" to their turbulent region. 

In a joint statement released after talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the two sides vowed to continue to work together to improve ties. 

The meeting came after a surprise China-brokered deal in March put Tehran and Riyadh on a path to restore relations that had been severed seven years ago when protesters in Iran attacked Saudi diplomatic missions. 

"The two sides emphasised the importance of following up on the implementation of the Beijing Agreement and its activation in a way that expands mutual trust and the fields of cooperation and helps create security, stability and prosperity in the region," Thursday's joint statement said. 

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang "witnessed the signing of a joint statement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the two countries announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with immediate effect", the ministry said. 

French President Emmanuel Macron and EU chief Ursula von der Leyen were also in the Chinese capital Thursday, seeking to make Europe's case in a meeting with Xi Jinping for bringing an end to the conflict in Ukraine. 

Macron, in joint remarks to the media alongside Xi, welcomed the Iran-Saudi thaw as he congratulated his Chinese counterpart for securing "this important step forward". 

- Shock rapprochement - 

The shock rapprochement between mainly Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil exporter, and Shiite-majority Iran, strongly at odds with Western governments over its nuclear activities, has the potential to reshape relations across a region characterised by turbulence for decades. 

The two sides "negotiated and exchanged opinions with the emphasis on the official resumption of bilateral relations and the executive steps towards the reopening of the embassies and consulates of the two countries", Iran's foreign ministry said in a statement. 

Saudi state TV channel Al Ekhbariya aired footage of the pair of diplomats shaking hands in front of Saudi and Iranian flags and then talking and smiling. 

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning hailed the meeting, adding that the ministers "expressed their gratitude to China for its contribution to the promotion of dialogue". 

Under last month's agreement, the two countries are to reopen their embassies and missions within two months and implement security and economic cooperation deals signed more than 20 years ago. 

Saudi Arabia severed relations with Iran in January 2016, after protesters attacked its embassy in Tehran and consulate in the Iranian city of Mashhad over Riyadh's execution of the Saudi opposition Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. 

Talks between the foreign ministers are expected to be followed by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Riyadh.

Raisi accepted an invitation from Saudi Arabia's King Salman, Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber said on Monday.

- Challenge to US -

Iran and Saudi Arabia support rival sides in several conflict zones across the region, including in Yemen, where Huthi rebels are backed by Tehran and Riyadh leads a military coalition supporting the government.

The two sides also vie for influence in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.

Riyadh's traditional ally Washington welcomed the detente agreement but said it remains to be seen whether the Iranians will "honour their side of the deal".

China's success in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia together has challenged the United States' long-standing role as the main outside power broker in the Middle East.

An expert told AFP that Beijing's role would likely increase confidence that any deal would stick.

"Because China is a strong backer of Iran, Saudi should have more confidence in Iran's ability to comply with the agreement, an issue that has always been in doubt," said Joel Rubin, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs.

Thursday's meeting "suggests that the process hasn't gone off track since the Beijing announcement last month", said Ali Vaez, Director of  the International Crisis Group's Iran Project.

"But it's still early days to judge whether this is just a tactical detente or a way-station towards strategic rapprochement."

- Warming ties -

Officials from Iran and Saudi Arabia held several rounds of dialogue in Baghdad and Oman before they met in Beijing.

In 2016 several Gulf countries followed Riyadh's action in scaling back ties with Tehran, but they have led the way in restoring diplomatic relations.

Iran welcomed an Emirati ambassador last September, after a six-year absence, and on Wednesday named its own ambassador to the UAE following a nearly eight-year hiatus.

It said last year Kuwait had sent its first ambassador to Tehran since 2016.

Iran has also welcomed a potential rapprochement with Bahrain, a close Saudi ally, which in the past accused Iran of backing a Shiite-led uprising in the Sunni-ruled kingdom, an accusation Tehran denies.