April
6, 2023
In
late November, a journalist named Ali Pour-Tabatabaie reported that 18 girls
from an arts academy in the city of Qom, Iran, had fallen sick, apparently from
the effects of poison. The story got little attention at the time, as the
country was consumed with the protests that had begun after the death of Mahsa
Amini in police custody. The 22-year-old woman had been arrested by the
morality police on grounds of not wearing the hijab, or mandatory headscarf,
properly. Two weeks after that first report of poisoning, 51 students were
hospitalized in Qom. By the end of December, a dozen more cases of suspected
mass poisoning of students, most of them female, were reported in states around
the country. The timing of these incidents, occurring within weeks of the nationwide
anti-regime protests led by women and girls, has raised suspicion for many
Iranians that the attacks are a form of retribution for dissent.
The
students complained of a variety of symptoms, including dizziness, nausea,
shortness of breath, and general weakness, that had come on after they had
smelled something foul. What some described as the odor of rotten fruit, and
others compared to the smell of bleach, had suddenly filled the air. In the
central city of Borujerd, a teacher said she had seen “something like a bomb”
tossed into a school compound.
By
March, more than 5,000 students, in 25 provinces and from 230 schools, had been
affected. The closing of schools last month for the Iranian New Year, Nowruz,
raised hopes that the attacks might have ended. But as schools reopened, those
hopes were dashed when a series of new cases were reported in several cities.
When
the first cases appeared, the authorities tried to downplay the issue. The
governor of Qom attributed the incident to a carbon-monoxide leak from schools’
heating systems, but a parliament representative from the principality called
it “suspicious.” Some officials accused the country’s foreign enemies, as Iran
often does, while others dismissed the event entirely as mass hysteria. Some
foreign observers cited by Nature magazine say that a mass psychogenic event
brought on by stress reactions to the protest unrest and state violence cannot
be ruled out; other experts discount this hypothesis, pointing to the abundant
number of cases of hospitalizations of girls suffering physical effects.
In
late February, a health minister said that some of the cases had been caused by
chemical poisoning, although that statement was soon rebutted by the interior
minister. No specific substance responsible for the symptoms has been
identified, but the interior minister recently announced that “suspicious
samples” had been recovered during investigations. In mid-March, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report that called the
poisonings “deliberate.” The regime appears to have abandoned its earlier dismissals;
by this month, more than 100 suspects had been arrested in connection with the
incidents.
The
government’s double-talk planted confusion among the public and suggested that
there was no consensus among officials. Such contradiction—one official offering
an explanation, only to be undermined by another—is characteristic of Tehran’s
damage-control tactics. At times, an impression of division can reflect real
tensions within the ruling elites. At others, it can be fabricated to project a
false sense of behind-the-scenes competition between hawks and doves, as if the
elites were somehow responsive to public opinion.
Amid
this information mayhem, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, finally broke his
silence after three months and offered a statement of his own: “If the
poisoning of students is proven, those behind this crime should be sentenced to
capital punishment and there will be no amnesty for them.”
The
severity of Khamenei’s retributive language did not convince many people that
he sincerely intended to investigate the poisonings and identify suspects. In a
country that has installed more surveillance devices in public places than
George Orwell’s Big Brother could dream of, few believed that the authorities
did not already know who the culprits were. Furthermore, the sheer geographical
spread of the poisonings made it improbable that anyone without access to state
resources could have carried out the attacks. Yet, instead of those behind the
crime, the reporter Pour-Tabatabaie was arrested, though his family are
uncertain which agency is detaining him and on what charges.
Amid
the doubt and fear, speculation abounds. Speaking with the Persian-language
service of the BBC, Hatam Ghaderi, a political-science professor in Tehran,
called the poisonings “the most blatant example of state-sponsored terrorism,
intended to sow fear among people.” Ghaderi suggested that the incidents might
be a show of force by the more radical, “Taliban-like” elements within the
regime ahead of a power struggle anticipated after the death of the aged and
ailing Khamenei. Ghaderi’s argument gains plausibility from the fact that Qom,
the epicenter of the poisonings, is known for its religious seminaries and as a
stronghold of Shiite clerics. And because even Qom had seen protests in recent
months, the poisonings could be retaliation or deterrence aimed at the next
generation of young women drawn to reject the hijab. If, in fact, rogue,
“Taliban-like” elements are the culprits, or if the public is led to believe
that they are, the supreme leader could appear as the lesser of two evils,
compared with the utterly ruthless hard-liners who might be maneuvering to
replace him.
Some
Iranians nevertheless regard the supreme leader himself as chiefly
responsible—not necessarily for directly ordering the poisoning attacks, but
for tacitly permitting his conservative supporters to deal with dissent as they
see fit. Even before the poisonings of schoolchildren began, the regime has
been able to rely on plainclothes agents to carry out physical attacks on
protesters; sometimes they include members of the Basij, a volunteer
paramilitary organization aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Ali Sajjadi, a U.S.-based historian and journalist, believes that Khamenei has
effectively incited such vigilantism as far back as June 2017, when he told a
group of university students that they should see themselves not merely as
“soldiers,” but as “officers” in a “soft war” in defense of the Islamic
Republic’s values and beliefs. Elaborating on his bellicose metaphor, he told
them that they should “fire at will.”
Those
“officers” may have heard Khamenei’s declaration on October 3 that “some
protesters only needed a punishment in order to recognize their error” as a
call to action. What the punishment should be, and who should deliver it, were
matters Khamenei left for others to decide for themselves. Not unlike the mob
that broke into the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the devout followers of the
supreme leader were given license to do what they thought he had asked of them.
When
suspects were eventually arrested, the leniency shown by officials was
striking, compared with the draconian treatment of protesters against the
regime—hundreds have been killed in the streets, thousands imprisoned, and
several executed. But these poisoning suspects thus far remain unnamed and have
not been charged. An interior-ministry deputy spoke of the alleged perpetrators
as if they were mere schoolyard pranksters. “Among the detainees are those who
are not enemies, and who, with calm and proper guidance, will be managed,” the
official said.
Until
now, the Iranian regime had reserved its worst malevolence for dedicated
political opponents. Its operatives have hunted down dissidents, including
exiles, and assassinated, disappeared, beheaded, kidnapped, or executed them.
If, as Ghaderi and others allege, these school poisonings were state-sanctioned,
that would represent a new level of indiscriminate regime violence, dire even
by Tehran’s standards, against its citizens. No question, the strength of such
a sustained and widespread protest movement has made it the greatest domestic
challenge to the Islamic Republic since the clerics took power in 1979. This
time, as never before, the protesters were calling not for reform, but for
regime change—a demand that even the former presidential candidate Mir-Hossein
Mousavi, under house arrest in Tehran, echoed in a message earlier this year.
(The widely suspected vote-rigging in the 2009 election, when Mousavi ran
against the conservative incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is what sparked Iran’s
last great popular uprising, the Green Movement.)
The
unprecedented calls for change within Iran present the United States with a
historic opportunity. For years, many Americans have believed that the U.S.
robbed Iran of a democratic future by supporting its last monarch, the Shah.
History is now offering America a second chance to keep faith with the nation’s
democratic aspiration. With Russia and China, and now possibly Saudi Arabia, as
its autocratic allies, the theocratic regime in Tehran is poised to survive its
economic woes. China hopes to replace America on the world stage, but for the
many millions of Iranians who are yearning for a democratic future, China can
offer only more of the dark present in which they already live. The Iranians’
demand for the rule of law creates a space for America to act as no other
global leader can: by hearing and answering the call of people for freedom.
Iran, Saudi Arabia vow to bring Mideast 'security, stability'
April 5,
2023
Top
diplomats from Middle East rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia met in Beijing on
Thursday, resuming diplomatic relations and pledging to work together to bring
"security and stability" to their turbulent region.
In a
joint statement released after talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein
Amir-Abdollahian and Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the two sides
vowed to continue to work together to improve ties.
The
meeting came after a surprise China-brokered deal in March put Tehran and
Riyadh on a path to restore relations that had been severed seven years ago
when protesters in Iran attacked Saudi diplomatic missions.
"The
two sides emphasised the importance of following up on the implementation of
the Beijing Agreement and its activation in a way that expands mutual trust and
the fields of cooperation and helps create security, stability and prosperity in
the region," Thursday's joint statement said.
Chinese
Foreign Minister Qin Gang "witnessed the signing of a joint statement
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the two countries announced the resumption
of diplomatic relations with immediate effect", the ministry said.
French
President Emmanuel Macron and EU chief Ursula von der Leyen were also in the
Chinese capital Thursday, seeking to make Europe's case in a meeting with Xi
Jinping for bringing an end to the conflict in Ukraine.
Macron,
in joint remarks to the media alongside Xi, welcomed the Iran-Saudi thaw as he
congratulated his Chinese counterpart for securing "this important step
forward".
- Shock
rapprochement -
The shock
rapprochement between mainly Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil
exporter, and Shiite-majority Iran, strongly at odds with Western governments
over its nuclear activities, has the potential to reshape relations across a
region characterised by turbulence for decades.
The two
sides "negotiated and exchanged opinions with the emphasis on the official
resumption of bilateral relations and the executive steps towards the reopening
of the embassies and consulates of the two countries", Iran's foreign
ministry said in a statement.
Saudi
state TV channel Al Ekhbariya aired footage of the pair of diplomats shaking hands
in front of Saudi and Iranian flags and then talking and smiling.
Chinese
foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning hailed the meeting, adding that the
ministers "expressed their gratitude to China for its contribution to the
promotion of dialogue".
Under
last month's agreement, the two countries are to reopen their embassies and
missions within two months and implement security and economic cooperation
deals signed more than 20 years ago.
Saudi
Arabia severed relations with Iran in January 2016, after protesters attacked
its embassy in Tehran and consulate in the Iranian city of Mashhad over
Riyadh's execution of the Saudi opposition Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr.
Talks
between the foreign ministers are expected to be followed by Iranian President
Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Riyadh.
Raisi
accepted an invitation from Saudi Arabia's King Salman, Iran's First Vice
President Mohammad Mokhber said on Monday.
-
Challenge to US -
Iran and
Saudi Arabia support rival sides in several conflict zones across the region,
including in Yemen, where Huthi rebels are backed by Tehran and Riyadh leads a
military coalition supporting the government.
The two
sides also vie for influence in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.
Riyadh's
traditional ally Washington welcomed the detente agreement but said it remains
to be seen whether the Iranians will "honour their side of the deal".
China's
success in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia together has challenged the United
States' long-standing role as the main outside power broker in the Middle East.
An expert
told AFP that Beijing's role would likely increase confidence that any deal
would stick.
"Because
China is a strong backer of Iran, Saudi should have more confidence in Iran's
ability to comply with the agreement, an issue that has always been in
doubt," said Joel Rubin, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Legislative Affairs.
Thursday's
meeting "suggests that the process hasn't gone off track since the Beijing
announcement last month", said Ali Vaez, Director of the International Crisis Group's Iran
Project.
"But
it's still early days to judge whether this is just a tactical detente or a
way-station towards strategic rapprochement."
- Warming
ties -
Officials
from Iran and Saudi Arabia held several rounds of dialogue in Baghdad and Oman
before they met in Beijing.
In 2016
several Gulf countries followed Riyadh's action in scaling back ties with
Tehran, but they have led the way in restoring diplomatic relations.
Iran
welcomed an Emirati ambassador last September, after a six-year absence, and on
Wednesday named its own ambassador to the UAE following a nearly eight-year
hiatus.
It said
last year Kuwait had sent its first ambassador to Tehran since 2016.
Iran has
also welcomed a potential rapprochement with Bahrain, a close Saudi ally, which
in the past accused Iran of backing a Shiite-led uprising in the Sunni-ruled
kingdom, an accusation Tehran denies.
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