March
5, 2023
While
the international community was focused on the anniversary of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, inspectors from the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), discovered uranium residue enriched
to 84 percent in Iranian centrifuge cascades. Weapons-grade fissile material is
typically characterized as uranium enriched to 90 percent, but it is worth
recalling that the U.S. atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945 was a
fission weapon enriched to an average of 80 percent. The Iranians may claim
that they are not enriching beyond 60 percent, and that these are mere
particles, but the discovery should set off alarm bells.
It
is a reminder that Iran has achieved the capacity to produce weapons-grade
material very quickly. Enriching to 60 percent—something that the IAEA’s
director, Rafael Grossi, says has “no justification for civilian purposes”—has
already put the Iranians in that position. Granted, creating weapons-grade
fissile material is not the same as having a bomb, but it is the most important
element needed for bomb-making. The IAEA may not know yet whether the 84
percent is simply a limited residue from the cascades or whether this was a
deliberate move by the Iranians to enrich to near weapons-grade. But we do know
that, for the second time in a month, Iran has engaged in suspicious activity
at an enrichment site. At Fordow, the Iranians connected two clusters of
advanced centrifuges enriching uranium to 60 percent and did not inform the
IAEA that it had done so. This is contrary to their obligations under the terms
of the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Now there is also the 84 percent
finding.
Regardless
of the Iranian explanation, Iran is drawing closer to enriching to
weapons-grade, and on its current pace could easily accumulate 10 bombs’ worth
of fissile material enriched to 60 percent by the end of this year. And a
senior defense official this week suggested that it would take the Iranians
less than two weeks to make such material weapons-grade. Two implications of
this emerging reality need to be considered. First, the Iranians are acting as
if enriching to near weapons-grade and accumulating large amounts of fissile
material pose no risk to them. And second, the idea that Israel will sit back
and not act against what its leaders view as an existential threat is an
illusion.
Israel
may be preoccupied with the Netanyahu government’s judicial-overhaul plan and
the growing levels of violence with the Palestinians, but Israeli leaders from
across the political spectrum share the prime minister’s concerns about the
quantity of bomb-making fissile material that Iran is accumulating and the
hardening of its nuclear infrastructure, which will make it more and more
difficult for Israel to destroy. Benjamin Netanyahu has already told U.S.
officials and French President Emmanuel Macron that if nothing is done soon to
stop the advance of the Iranian nuclear program, Israel will have no choice but
to attack.
The
IAEA’s discovery of the enriched materials will only confirm the deepening
Israeli belief that the current approach of the U.S. and its allies will
eventually result in Iran getting a bomb, and that, regardless of statements to
the contrary, America and the international community are prepared to live with
that outcome. Israel, however, is not.
If
the Biden administration wants to force the Iranians to recognize the dangerous
risk they are running and convince the Israelis that it has a way to deter the
Iranians from advancing their program, it must respond to the recent
revelation. The Iranians, the Israelis, and others in the region will certainly
be watching to see what the U.S. does.
To
be effective, that response should be shaped by a four-part strategy. First,
the Biden administration must alter its declaratory policy. Saying that “every
option remains on the table,” as Secretary of State Antony Blinken did in an
interview, impresses no one, least of all the Iranians. Instead, Blinken or
President Joe Biden should announce that although the U.S. favors diplomacy for
resolving the threat of the Iranian nuclear program, the Iranians continue to
demonstrate that they don’t; instead, their actions are drawing them closer and
closer to a bomb, something that the U.S. has pledged to prevent, and Iran must
understand that its actions jeopardize its entire nuclear infrastructure,
including parts that could in theory be used for civilian energy purposes.
Declaring this would signal that the U.S. is beginning to prepare the American
public and the international community for possible military action against
Iran’s nuclear program.
Second,
to give these words force, the Iranians need to see the U.S. rehearsing its own
air-to-ground attacks in exercises in the region. The recent major joint
exercise with Israel was a good first step. It needs to be repeated. Parallel
to this, the Biden administration should be visibly engaging with the Israelis,
Saudis, Emiratis, and others on consultations and exercises designed to blunt
any possible Iranian attacks against those countries. This would demonstrate
that the administration is not only preparing for a possible attack, but also
anticipating how the Iranians might retaliate against American allies in the
region—and how the U.S. has planned to foil that.
Third,
Tehran is under two misapprehensions: It does not believe that we will act
militarily against Iran, and it thinks we will also stop the Israelis from
doing so. The administration can counter that impression by providing material
and munitions that would make any Israeli strikes more effective. Given the
distances involved and the lack of access to forward bases, Israel needs
refueling tankers so that it can hit fortified Iranian targets multiple times.
It has contracted for four Boeing KC-46A air tankers, but the first is not
scheduled for delivery until late 2025. The Biden administration can ensure
that the Israelis are first in line, enabling tankers to arrive this year. The
U.S. can also provide more powerful munitions than the ones Israel currently
has for collapsing hardened targets. This unusual move of providing Israel with
such specific military assistance would send a message loud and clear: Far from
holding the Israelis back, the U.S. will support them.
Fourth,
the Biden administration must also act in a way that is out of character in
Iranian eyes. Over the past month, America’s forces in Syria were targeted
twice by Iranian Shiite-militia proxies. In neither case did the U.S.
retaliate. The Iranians need to see something they do not expect—a military
response showing that whatever constraints were previously observed now no
longer apply. Proxy attacks must be answered, without hesitation and
disproportionately. Such action could include, for example, unacknowledged U.S.
air strikes on the camps in Iran where these militias are trained. If the U.S.
does not claim responsibility, the Iranians would not be forced to respond—but
they would get the point.
If
the U.S. adopts all of these measures, the Iranians would take notice. The aim
would be to get the Iranians to stop the advance of their nuclear-enrichment
program, and in so doing reopen the possibility of a diplomatic pathway to
reverse it.
Is
such an approach free of risk? No. Iran may test us to see how serious we are.
The Islamic Republic’s leaders may say that they will walk away from the
nonproliferation treaty, and so deny the IAEA any access at all. But this much
is certain: For the U.S. to hold to the current policy will do nothing to alter
Iran’s progress toward the moment when it can choose to go for a bomb—and
Israel is simply not going to wait for that.
Without
a clear show of resolve by the U.S. to act on its own behalf, unilateral
Israeli strikes on the Iranian nuclear program will trigger Hezbollah and maybe
Hamas missile attacks on Israel, potentially numbering thousands per day. Iran
itself may launch retaliatory attacks against the Saudis and other regional
adversaries, in an effort to show that if Iran pays a price, everyone will pay
a price. If the Biden administration does not change course, there is a good
chance it will face a regional conflict in the Middle East.
To
avoid a war with a threatening adversary, that adversary has to believe you
will use force. A clear signal of a new American approach may now be essential
not only to persuade the Iranians to stop their advance toward a nuclear
weapon, but also to show China and Russia that the U.S. is capable of dealing
with multiple threats at once and that it has the will to do so. As well as
deterring the Iranians, the Biden administration can alter the calculus of the
Chinese and Russians over expansionist plans in other parts of the world.
Iran makes sweeping pledge of cooperation to IAEA before board meeting
March
4, 2023
VIENNA
(Reuters) -Iran has given sweeping assurances to the U.N. nuclear watchdog that
it will finally assist a long-stalled investigation into uranium particles
found at undeclared sites and even re-install removed monitoring equipment, the
watchdog said on Saturday.
The
International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran issued a joint statement on IAEA
chief Rafael Grossi's return from a trip to Tehran just two days before a
quarterly meeting of the agency's 35-nation Board of Governors.
The
statement went into little detail but the possibility of a marked improvement
in relations between the two is likely to stave off a Western push for another
resolution ordering Iran to cooperate, diplomats said. Iran has, however, made
similar promises before that have yielded little or nothing.
"Iran
expressed its readiness to ... provide further information and access to
address the outstanding safeguards issues," the joint statement said. A
confidential IAEA report to member states seen by Reuters said Grossi
"looks forward to ... prompt and full implementation of the Joint
Statement".
Iran
is supposed to provide access to information, locations and people, Grossi told
a news conference at Vienna airport soon after landing, suggesting a vast
improvement after years of Iranian stonewalling.
Iran
would also allow the re-installation of extra monitoring equipment that had
been put in place under the 2015 nuclear deal, but then removed last year as
the deal unravelled in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018
under then-President Donald Trump.
Iran's
Atomic Energy Organization spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi, however, said
Tehran had not agreed to give access to people.
"During
the two days that Mr. Grossi was in Iran, the issue of access to individuals
was never raised," Kamalvandi told state news agency IRNA, adding there
also has been no deal regarding putting new cameras in Iran's nuclear
facilities.
Follow-up
talks in Iran between IAEA and Iranian officials aimed at hammering out the
details would happen "very, very soon", Grossi said.
Asked
if all that monitoring equipment would be re-installed, Grossi replied
"Yes". When asked where it would be re-installed, however, he said
only that it would be at a number of locations.
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