February 13, 2024
In Partnership with
Few books can aptly be described as
“prophetic,” but the latest release by the Israeli political sociologist Yagil
Levy is certainly one of them. Levy submitted the manuscript of “Shooting and
Not Crying: The New Militarization of Israel in the 2000s” in April 2022, and
the book was published in February 2023 by Lamda – The Open University Press,
as if to prepare us for the events of October 7. 
Almost every chapter and subsection
in the book points to a phenomenon whose consequences we witnessed that day:
the military’s complete reliance on technology as a decisive factor in warfare;
the adoption of the concept, promoted by previous IDF Chief of Staff Aviv
Kochavi, of an army that is “small and lethal”; the obsession with the idea of
“deterrence,” which is supposed to negate the other side’s will to fight; and
the complete addiction to the status quo as the only possible and desirable
state of affairs. All these factors, together and separately, can explain the
resounding and shocking military failure of October 7.
Levy illustrates the direct
connection between these phenomena and various sociological changes that have
occurred within the Israeli army in recent years. First and foremost, he points
out the gradual withdrawal of the old Ashkenazi middle class from the ranks of
the combat forces and their replacement by new groups: settlers and religious
Zionists, ex-Soviets and Ethiopian immigrants, Mizrahim, and Druze.
From the moment the established
middle class stopped paying a price for the conflict, both in terms of deaths
and economically, Levy writes, the path was paved for taking any talk of
political solutions off the table. That discourse was instead replaced with a
“conflict management” approach reliant on Israel’s military superiority.
Religious Zionist leaders who took senior command positions introduced a system
of religious justifications for the use of violence, and the entire military
began to see force as a supreme value — as evidenced by the ubiquity of the
discourse of revenge and “counting bodies.”
The outcome of these processes has
been evident in Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip, which is now in its fourth
month — and is being investigated for potential violations of the Genocide
Convention at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
Throughout 380 pages packed with
examples, Levy describes a system that has almost reached perfection. The
political echelon wants to maintain the status quo, and the military provides
it with legitimacy in exchange for funds and status. Even the processes of
economic and social liberalization that Israel underwent in the last two
decades have not stopped the militarization, only reinforced it; consider the
entry of women into combat units, one of the core issues for the liberal middle
class that serves this precise purpose.
Only in the book’s epilogue, over a
span of one and a half pages, does Levy outline the way out of this cycle:
increasing the cost of maintaining the conflict, exhausting the military path,
and formulating a credible political alternative, he says, could provide a
turning point. However, so long as the price of maintaining the conflict is low
— in terms of lives lost, financial costs, and regional stability — there will
be no real desire to abandon the status quo.
Yet this seemingly perfected system,
Levy told +972 and Local Call in an interview last month, has shifted out of
balance after October 7. Now, he sees the potential for change coming mainly
from the international arena, although he acknowledges that its significance
has diminished. The Palestinians, whom the army had almost disregarded as a
threat, have shaken the mighty Israel.
“I think there is a horizon [for
change],” Levy said. “Why? Because the issue is not so much the internal costs
as the possibility that the world will impose limits on Israel. The United
States or the European Union can create a situation where Israel will find
itself paying a price. This is something that can trigger some kind of turning
point among the Israeli middle class, which, as I tried to describe in the
book, has been entirely passive for many years with regard to managing the
conflict because it simply does not pay a noticeable price for it.
“The second possibility is reaching
the limits of the military option,” Levy continued. “This war ends when it
becomes clear to everyone that Israel has not achieved its desired outcome, and
at least part of the public understands that it has not succeeded. Not because
the left stabbed it in the back, but because it cannot succeed. This could lead
to the conclusion that it is necessary to try another way.
“This is related to the third
condition I mentioned: the formulation of a credible political alternative,”
Levy went on. “There is now a certain attentiveness in Israeli society to the
idea that the Palestinian Authority will return to Gaza, perhaps even by
default. The combination of these three possibilities can create a kind of
turning point among segments of the secular public.
“Can I tell you that for certain?
No. But does it make me somewhat optimistic? Yes. This war has created a major
tectonic shift.”
According to your book, from the
moment political negotiations cease, the role of the army is to ensure the
status quo and provide it with legitimacy. Will October 7 break this cycle, and
damage the public’s trust in the army?
There is at least the potential here
for trust in the military to be broken, but it’s not a total break. Very broad
segments of the Israeli public believe that a military victory in Gaza is
possible, and that this possibility is being hindered by international
pressure.
Over time, there will also be claims
of internal pressures, including the notion that the pressure to rescue the
hostages is diverting attention from the war effort. There is also likely to be
much greater polarization in Israeli society after the war, which may shift the
secular Israeli middle class — the group that is key to a future political
settlement — from its apathy.
But at this stage, the military
paradigm has not failed — certainly not in the sense of public trust in it. The
fact is that the army and its mode of operation enjoy a very high level of
trust. When this path ends in frustration, I have no doubt that some will come
and say, “We need to try a different paradigm.” In the meantime, I don’t see
this change.
Even with such a high number of
casualties among soldiers? More than 550 Israeli soldiers have been killed
since October 7, including over 220 while fighting inside Gaza.
It is a lot, but without diminishing
the tragedy of each and every one, this number does not raise question marks
for two reasons. First, after what happened on October 7, death is perceived as
a kind of fate. Second, when we look at the map of casualties, we see that a
majority of them come from outside the secular middle class: religious
Zionists, settlers, immigrants from the Soviet Union, Ethiopians, and Druze.
This war has not sent a shockwave
through the centers of power in Israel. What will shock those families is an
economic cost, international sanctions. Perhaps also a moral price, such as the
discussions about genocide [at the ICJ].
During the Lebanon War [which began
in 1982], for 12 years — from 1985 to 1997 — there were no forces within
Israeli society that pushed for change. The Archimedean point was the
helicopter disaster [in which two helicopters transporting Israeli soldiers
into Lebanon collided, killing 73 people]. The disaster was important, because
in a very circumstantial way the composition of the casualties reflected the
wars of the past. Therefore, it horrified the middle class and created a big
movement [to end the war]. Without it, it would have been possible for Israeli
forces to stay in Lebanon for many more years.
Reservists were seen as a potential
political force [when, for example, 3,000 reservists refused to participate in
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982]. However, the gradual change in the
army’s composition is also reflected slowly in the reserve forces. Moreover,
the reserves have become a semi-selective force: those who identify with the
mission will come, while those who don’t will stay at home.
There is the potential for a certain
kind of protest in the reserves. People returning home may find themselves in
financial hardship, and will see that the country is not helping them. Students
returning to their studies may find that their peers have advanced academically
beyond them. This could incite a rebellion within the reserve community.
However, it will not be political; it will be more of a materialistic
rebellion.
If the army stays in Gaza for an
extended period of time in all kinds of security zones — including the crazy
idea of returning to the Philadelphi
Corridor [along Gaza’s border with Egypt],
which the army has intentionally avoided entering — you will see more and more
reservists getting wounded. But the army has the ability to produce
architectures that narrow the role of the reserves, knowing that it could be
politically explosive. More regular units will be established, or more
ultra-Orthodox will be conscripted from the parts of the community that are
showing more signs of willingness to enlist, and of course women, which is one
of the biggest internal military developments of this war.
What will be the result of the
army’s failure to achieve its stated goal of eliminating Hamas?
I estimate that the phenomenon I
have called “the blue-collar rebellion” will intensify. We are already seeing
soldiers defying the army and its professed values at an unprecedented scale.
The videos from the mosque in Jenin [in which Israeli soldiers were seen
singing and praying in Hebrew through the mosque’s loudspeaker], talk of
revenge, talk of returning to Gush Katif [the Jewish settlements that stood in
Gaza until Israel’s “disengagement” from the Strip in 2005], posting
photographs of Palestinian detainees [in northern Gaza] — these are messages
that contradict the army’s basic codes.
Such defiance by soldiers has been
seen before on a much smaller scale, such as in the cases of “David HaNahlawi”
[who in 2014 was filmed punching a Palestinian activist in Hebron, and whose
punishment by the army provoked a backlash of online solidarity among soldiers]
and Elor Azaria [who in 2016 was filmed shooting dead a Palestinian who had
attempted to stab soldiers but was already incapacitated, also in Hebron], but
it had largely calmed down until now.
My assessment is that as the gap
between the goals of the war and their realization increases, — that is, when
soldiers will feel that they have invested their time and risked their lives
and the lives of their friends and it all went down the drain, even if as a
result of the fact that the world and the left stabbed the nation in the back —
these conversations will be amplified significantly.
The army isn’t even trying to impose
discipline on this matter. The only phenomenon that has bothered the military
lately, and which it hasn’t gained control over, is looting. It is much more
widespread than we know. In a recent discussion that I participated in, a
veteran leftist recounted hearing from her grandson that his friends looted a
grocery store. He did not participate, but enjoyed the fruits.
Why is the army not managing to
control this?
Because it decided to choose its
battles. The priority right now is keeping the troops in high fighting spirit,
not to deal with discipline, and certainly not to have to deal with critics on
the right. [IDF Chief of Staff] Herzi Halevi understood that cost very well
after punishing the soldiers involved in the Jenin mosque incident.
A chief education officer issued a
daily order [against looting]. It’s pathetic. A chief education officer is a
figure who can speak about values, he is not a commanding figure. Prohibition
of looting is first and foremost a matter of military discipline. The fact that
they talk about “military values” and not “military orders” is a very clear
expression of leniency. Values can be debated, orders cannot.
What do you understand about the
current rules of engagement in Gaza?
There are none. How do I know?
Because the starting point in “Operation Cast Lead” in 2008-9 and “Operation
Protective Edge” in 2014 was that the soldiers were operating in a “sterile
zone.” Why sterile? Because we told the residents to leave, which means
everything is a legitimate target. We heard it from soldiers who testified to
Breaking the Silence, and we heard it from Tzvika Fogel [who served as a
general during Operation Cast Lead and now serves as a Knesset member for the
far-right Otzma Yehudit/Jewish Power party] who said: “There’s no such thing as
an innocent person in Gaza.”
Since the Second Intifada, the army
has not given soldiers written rules of engagement, so the matter is open to
interpretation. The fact that every person [in a “sterile zone”] is a
legitimate target is also one of the reasons for the high rate of friendly-fire
and accidental killings [which account for around one-fifth of the soldiers
killed in Gaza since October 7].
Any talk of restraint is a dirty
word. In 2014, after Operation Protective Edge, the military prosecutor’s
office came under a lot of pressure. In response, army commanders began saying
that the prosecutor’s office does not restrict them. I heard Gadi Eisenkot [a
former IDF Chief of Staff, and a member of the current war cabinet] at a recent
forum in which he said that there is no way that the prosecutor’s office will
tell the army to stop. He essentially said: “There is no prosecutor’s office
now.” That’s a statement you’re not supposed to make.
According to your book, within the
framework of maintaining the status quo, the military was granted the status of
policymaker. Military means replaced political means. If the army admits that
there is no military solution, it will lose this role.
It is not accurate to say that the
army shapes the policy, but the political framework is a military framework.
Netanyahu shapes policy within a world of military concepts. There is no
political exit strategy and no political vision, which are the ABCs of any war.
How do you view the growing discord
between the military on the one hand, and Netanyahu and the right on the other
— the stormy debates in the war cabinet, and ministers’ attacks on the army
chief of staff and generals?
The army is seen as having broken a
contract in the deepest sense. It offered a service of legitimization to the
political leaders in return for status and resources. It violated this contract
because the legitimacy for the status quo, which it was supposed to provide, is
now eroding. Even the right now understands this. The moment an American
president declares, “There is no going back to the status quo,” this becomes a
guiding tone for leaders of the Western world.
The Israeli right gives this
violation much deeper meaning than just “military failure.” You received a lot
of money and a lot of status, and you failed to maintain the status quo due to
foolish mistakes on October 7, which could have been easily avoided. Because of
your shameful mistakes, we are now facing a situation where the world is
standing against us.
So the right is disappointed with
the army, but the attack also stems from its view of the army as representing
the middle class. The military’s great failure, in the eyes of the right, was
not restraining the protests of the air force pilots and other reservists [in
the context of the mass protests against the far-right government’s judicial
overhaul]. This meant that the army became strongly identified with the Israeli
center-left, rightfully or not.
The narrative we are seeing now
holds the center-left responsible for undermining [national] unity and inviting
our enemies to attack us, and the army is seen here as representing a [liberal,
secular] system of values that extends beyond the military establishment
itself.
Does the right really think it can
bring the army to fully reoccupy Gaza?
Yes.
And the army?
The army will cooperate with them.
A full occupation?
Not a full, eternal occupation, but
an occupation in the sense that we will remain there until “purification” [i.e.
total eradication of Hamas] is complete. The army is saying, “We need to remain
there; it’s going to be a long struggle, and we need time.”
The army did not act against the
political echelon at the defining moment of October 7 and did not say that
there were goals it was unable to achieve. When the [2006] war in Lebanon broke
out, according to the Winograd Commission [established by the government after
the war to derive lessons], Dan Halutz [the IDF Chief of Staff at the time]
said: “The politicians are talking about ‘crushing’; I am much more modest.”
This insight did not exist now
because this is a humiliated army. The army has been humiliated for a whole
year by the Israeli right; it is perceived as lacking a backbone in the West
Bank, lacking a backbone to rein in the pilots’ protest, and what happened on
the morning of October 7 only exacerbated this. And when the army is
humiliated, it is pliant.
But what will happen if Netanyahu
actually orders the army to re-establish the civil administration — the
bureaucracy responsible for civilians under occupation — in Gaza and occupy the
Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s border with Egypt? The military isn’t crazy
about that, is it?
There will be debates about this,
and it is possible that in this matter the army will say to the right,
“Enough.” But these are clashes over how to manage the conflict, not about the
political vision.
The army can hit the brakes. Don’t
forget that, more than anyone else, the army fears international investigations
into war crimes. Parts of the army may conclude that it has lost its ability to
influence things. Therefore, even at the cost of clashing with the right, the
army needs to preserve some of its professional assets, certainly if it gains
the backing of parts of the center-left and the United States. This support is
the army’s lifeline — as this war has demonstrated
more than any moment since 1973.
The army will not agree to be the
pawn of the extreme right. It also understands the limitations of budget and
[the reliance on] reservists. It is not for nothing that the army has pressed
for a type of de-escalation that will allow for the release of some of the
reservists.
Returning to where we started, you
wrote that only if three conditions are met — raising the cost of managing the
conflict, exhausting the military option, and formulating a credible political
alternative — will there be a chance of moving beyond the status quo. Has the
war thrown the system out of its perfect equilibrium?
Yes, because the significant
upheaval and large-scale casualties have greatly disturbed the world. There is
an international interest here. The United States needs Saudi Arabia, and Saudi
Arabia cannot go back to betraying the Palestinians as it tried to betray them
before.
What about within Israel?
Internally, the change will only
happen when there will be very high costs that will force our eyes open.
In other words, in order for there
to be an internal change, the external actions have to be more dramatic?
This is the realization that I’ve
come to. I gave too little space to external pressure.
Perhaps the book also underestimates
the ability of the Palestinians to influence the system, to demonstrate agency.
On October 7 and throughout the war that followed, the Palestinians have been
saying: “You built a perfect system, but you forgot us.”
I understand this critique, but I
don’t agree with it. The Palestinians demonstrated agency during the First
Intifada and the Second Intifada, and they are demonstrating agency again now.
The point is that on October 7, Israel — as a result of its own failures — did
not manage to confront a threat that it could have easily prevented. This gave
the Palestinians much more power than they truly had.
The story of October 7 is a tale of
a grotesque failure. We wouldn’t be sitting here now if Israel had taken a few
minor actions — another battalion here or there, a bit more alertness,
equipment that was checked over a little more.
It’s reasonable to assume that Hamas
did not expect to be so successful, but in the end, it was the Palestinians who
threw the Israeli system off balance.
Totally.
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