اندیشمند بزرگترین احساسش عشق است و هر عملش با خرد

Tuesday, December 10, 2024

Syria after 13 years of U.S. state terrorism… what do you expect?

Finian Cunningham
In less than 13 days, a coalition of U.S.-backed jihadist militant groups took over Syria. The offensive, which began on November 27, culminated in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hastily stepping down and fleeing to Russia. Assad and his wife were confirmed to be in Moscow by December 9.
Syria rebels capture major city of Hama ...
Assad said he made his decision to preserve the peace in Syria. Russia said it was not involved in his decision-making.
The gloating by American and European politicians reflects the years of investment by the Western powers for regime change in Syria. An investment that seems to have paid off, finally.
It is misplaced to speculate that there may have been some kind of betrayal or “deal” by Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran to let the country go. Yes, the Syrian army and authorities capitulated in breath-taking short order. But it is callow to conjecture about a more devious move behind the scenes, such as Russia or Iran leaving its Syrian ally to the mercy of insurgents.
Syria was simply broken and exhausted by years of Western aggression and attrition. There was little that Russia or Iran could do to salvage an allied country.
The final collapse of Syria did not come after a 13-day blitzkrieg. It came after 13 years of non-stop state terrorism by the United States and its European NATO allies. The earlier phase of U.S.-sponsored proxy terrorism (2011 to 2020) was checked by the intervention of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. But the West’s proxies weren’t defeated definitively. In retrospect, that may be seen as a fateful strategic blunder.
The continuation of the proxy war after 2020 relied on the imposition of crippling economic and trade sanctions on Syria by the U.S. and the European Union. War by other means also involved the American and Turkish military forces illegally occupying Syrian territory in the north, east, and south, which enabled the theft of Syria’s oil and wheat exports. During Trump’s previous presidency, he openly bragged about “stealing Syria’s oil.”
So, from 2011, when the Obama administration targeted Syria for regime change, until the fall of Damascus at the weekend, the nation has endured a 13-year war of attrition. Even after the relative peace obtained due to Russia and Iran’s intervention from around 2020 onwards, Syrians have been starved of food, medicines and fuel. Over half its population suffered displacement from their homes. The Syrian economy was in ruins. Its currency had become worthless, adjusting for inflation by the hour. When the Western-backed insurgents launched their offensive on November 27 from the northern Idlib enclave, there was nothing left of the Syrian state to put up resistance. Aleppo, Hama, Homs and the capital fell like dominoes.
The main insurgent faction is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Mohammed al-Jawlani. HTS is an internationally proscribed terrorist organization that even the U.S. officially designates as an outlawed group. Its leader has a bounty of $10 million on his head offered by the State Department.
But in the shell game of U.S. proxy war, HTS and its leader are Washington’s assets. From 2011, the Americans and their NATO partners used Al Qaeda, ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra Front (later HTS) with ratlines of weapons and fighters from Libya, Turkey and all over the world to descend on Syria to inflict horrors. The Western media propagated the charade by cynically referring to the terrorist proxies as “moderate rebels.” The Pentagon-run military base at Al Tanf in southern Syria is said to be for training “moderate rebels” when, in reality, it is jihadist extremists who are weaponized.
Only last week before the final push on the Syria capital, Damascus, Al-Jawlani, the HTS commander, was given a primetime interview/platform by CNN, the U.S. news channel, to rehabilitate his image as a statesman-like leader instead of being a wanted terrorist. Al-Jawlani says the days when he and his organization were associates of ISIS and Al Qaeda are long gone. And CNN and other Western media do their best to make the claim sound plausible. Ah, such a happy ending!
It’s not clear at this early stage if Syria will now be plunged into sectarian bloodletting, reprisals, and murderous mayhem that characterized the earlier phase of U.S.-sponsored proxy war in Syria when Shia, Alawites, and Christians were beheaded for being “apostates and infidels.”
Ominously, the United States and Israel immediately started bombing the country, cynically claiming that they were trying to stabilize the situation.
The rapid events in Syria have taken aback the whole world. Who would have thought only two weeks ago that Assad would end up exiled in Moscow? The reaction of the U.S., Israel and other Western leaders is almost disbelief in what they see as their great luck.
Russia and Iran seem to have been genuinely blindsided. The NATO proxy war in Ukraine on Russia’s doorstep has no doubt taken a toll on Russian military resources. Iran is preoccupied with securing its own country from Israeli aggression.
American President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke excitedly about the new “opportunity” in Syria. Both claimed to have had a hand in the triumph of a terrorist insurgency. Netanyahu took credit for his genocidal war on Gaza and Lebanon for weakening Syria’s allies in Hezbollah and Iran.
Biden was even more shameless in spelling out how U.S. state terrorism destroyed Syria and paved the way for its takeover by terrorist proxies. He said: “Our approach has shifted the balance of power in the Middle East through a combination of support for our partners, sanctions, diplomacy [sic], and targeted military force.”
In Washington’s double-speak, “support for partners, sanctions and targeted military force” translates as sponsoring terrorists to traumatize a nation, economic warfare to grind it down, and illegal aggression to force final submission.
The destruction of Syria is another vast crime by the U.S.-led imperialist West.
 
Sara Harmouch
(The Conversation) – The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now?
One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad.
But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers.
What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad.
The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world.
In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”
The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.”
This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid.
Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria.
Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success?
Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia.
Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria.
The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war.
It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold.
This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics.
Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally.
How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria?
To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations.
Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement.
This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services.
Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups.
Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses.
In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government.
This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups.
In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs.
Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests.
Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off.
What does the US think of the group and al-Golani?
The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions.
Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani.
However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list.
What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader?
First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad.
But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies.
First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large.
This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws.
Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups.
Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity.
Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country.
However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support.

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