Jamil Mazen
Shaqura and Saif Alislam Eid
On October 7,
2023, Hamas carried out operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” targeting the Israeli
military positions surrounding Gaza, and the Israeli towns adjacent to the
Strip. In the words of Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing the
Qassam Brigades, the Al-Aqsa Flood operation was aimed at eliminating the
Israeli army’s Gaza Division. In Deif’s words, it was also meant to mark the
beginning of the battle for “the Great Liberation” — to restore all occupied
Palestinian territories that were settled in 1948.
A Palestinian woman walks past buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in
the southern Gaza Strip city of Khan Younis, on April 12, 2024. (Credit
Image: © Rizek Abdeljawad/Xinhua via ZUMA Press APAimages)
Since then,
Israel has claimed to have killed Deif, and a number of Hamas leaders. It has
regained control of the areas surrounding the Gaza Strip, and waged a ferocious
war on Gaza in a military operation called “Swords of Iron,” killing tens of
thousands of Palestinians. All the while, it has imposed an even more stringent
blockade on the Gaza Strip, denying the small Palestinian territory access to
water, food, and electricity.
Since the
beginning of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, Israel and its allies
have sought to both “eliminate Hamas” and to change the political reality in
Gaza. The Israeli visions of “the day after” the war have been amply covered in
international media, with complete disregard for the Palestinian view, or at
least Hamas’ view as the ruling power in Gaza for the past 17 years.
Recently, Egypt
has been playing a significant role in hosting ceasefire negotiations between
Israel and Hamas, as well as reconciliation talks between Hamas and the
Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the occupied West Bank. A source
in Hamas, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Mondoweiss that they were
in contact with “influential countries” that could help reach a ceasefire
agreement, but that some ceasefire proposals, such as the one presented by
Russia, focused more on the exchange of captives than the long-term future of
Gaza.
Though numerous
rounds of ceasefire negotiations have fallen apart over the past year, the
latest talks in Egypt are reportedly closer to fruition than ever before. With
the prospect of a deal on the horizon, the question of ‘what happens after a
ceasefire’ has come to the fore once again.
Based on
interviews conducted with Hamas officials — some of whom requested anonymity
due to the sensitivity of their role — this article lays out the possible
visions of what “the day after” the war might look like, assessing the
likelihood and feasibility of each proposal in a moment wrought with
uncertainty.
Israel’s
post-war scenarios for Gaza
Officially,
Israel has no actual plan for the Gaza Strip after the war — however, three
visions from Israeli government officials and non-governmental actors, who
represent trends within Israeli society, have gained traction in public
discourse.
The first is
that of the far-right in Israel, which seeks to resettle in the Gaza Strip, not
only returning to the settlements that existed in Gaza prior to 2005 but to
resettle in new areas of Gaza. While ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel
Smotrich have led the call for the full reoccupation of Gaza, this view does
not have the full support of other members of the government and has been
criticized even by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration.
Yoav Gallant,
who served as Israel’s defense minister until November 2024, had meanwhile
called for the formation of an international force overseeing security in the
Gaza Strip to be headed by the United States and a “moderate” Arab state such
as Jordan, Morocco, or the United Arab Emirates. However, the majority of these
“moderate” countries have refused to participate in such a plan, aside from
Saudi Arabia, whose Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan said in July that Riyadh
would back the deployment of international forces in Gaza, but only under a UN
mandate. Hamas has rejected the entry of any forces to Gaza, whether Arab or
international, and said they would treat these as “occupying” forces.
Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, has called for the establishment of a
“buffer zone” within the Gaza Strip near Israeli towns, continued Israeli
military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor — the area along Gaza’s border
with Egypt — the permanent closure of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt,
continued freedom of movement for Israeli forces anywhere in Gaza without a
specified end in sight, as well as the permanent closure of UNRWA. Despite
these strict demands, Netanyahu has yet to suggest any vision for who or what
would govern the Gaza Strip should he achieve his stated goal of eradicating
Hamas.
The Egyptian
proposal: A Palestinian Authority takeover
Egypt has
meanwhile proposed creating a committee to manage the Gaza Strip under the
financial and administrative supervision of the West Bank-based Palestinian
Authority (PA), either under PA Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa or a new
Palestinian national government that would be created with this aim in mind.
Khalil
Al-Hayyah, the acting head of Hamas’ political bureau, has publicly stated that
Hamas would work towards this goal.
Basem Naim, a
member of Hamas’ politburo in Qatar, criticized the Egyptian proposal, telling
Mondoweiss that it lacked clarity regarding its administrative structure, legal
framework, and what agreements, if any, it might involve regarding security
coordination with Israel or Palestinian resistance movements.
A source inside
Hamas involved in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and the Egypt-led
intra-Palestinian talks told Mondoweiss that both Hamas and PA delegations to
Egypt were on the same page and favorable to this proposed committee, but that
Hamas had asked for assurance of the approval of PA President Mahmoud Abbas
himself, given the historically fraught relationship between the two parties
and the failure of previous talks on the matter.
“We learned the
lesson from meetings with the PA in Moscow and Beijing, the final call for
anything related to the PA is in Abbas’ hands and not the delegation that the
PA sent,” the source said. “We can figure out whether Abbas is serious about
the agreement through the personnel he sends as the head of the delegation.”
On December 8,
leading Fatah figure Abdullah Abdullah officially expressed to Egypt the
party’s reservations over what it deemed “insufficient guarantees” of national
unity, suggesting that the committee fall under the aegis of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) rather than the PA.
Despite nominal
support from negotiating Palestinian factions, none of the meetings held in the
past year have so far resulted in any announcement from Hamas and the PA
regarding the establishment of such a committee or any decision that would
effectively lead to Palestinian political reunification or pave the way to
addressing the needs of the people of Gaza.
One of the Hamas
sources nonetheless told Mondoweiss that Hamas prefers to go with the committee
solution proposed by Egypt, as it no longer has the capacity to rule Gaza
alone.
How Hamas views
the ‘day after’ in Gaza
Amid all the
debates about the future of Gaza, “Hamas sees the ‘day after’ as a purely
national Palestinian matter, with neither intervention nor guardianship from
anyone, and the outcome must be reassuring to the region and satisfactory to
the international arena,” Naim told Mondoweiss, emphasizing the importance of
maintaining geographical unity between Gaza and the West Bank, which have
effectively been operating as two separate political entities — one under Hamas
governance, the other under the Fatah-led PA — since 2007.
Speaking with
Hamas officials in Doha, the movement envisages three possible scenarios for
the day after the war in Gaza.
Option 1: A
unity government
The first
option, which is the one favored by Hamas, is the creation of a technocratic
unity government bringing together all Palestinian factions, including Fatah,
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP).
“Hamas will try
to reach this option as it’s the best option for them and the Palestinian
people,” Naim said.
But even within
the movement, this scenario is seen as unlikely however. Hossam Badran, Hamas’
media spokesman in Qatar, told Mondoweiss, alluding to Abbas and his entourage:
“It’s probably not going to happen, because of the intransigence of the Palestinian
National Authority [PA], whose decision has become dependent on certain
political figures.”
Badran’s
skepticism surrounding the likelihood of Abbas and the PA agreeing to a
technocratic unity government in Gaza does not appear to be unfounded. On
December 19, The Washington Post quoted Mahmoud Habbash, a senior adviser to
Abbas, as saying “I don’t trust Netanyahu’s intentions and I don’t trust
Hamas’s intentions.”
Upon returning
from a meeting with Abbas in Cairo, Habbash further equated Israel and Hamas,
saying both are concerned with staying in power while people in Gaza suffer.
And though it remains to be seen whether Abbas will agree to a technocratic
unity government, Habbash’s statements provide little hope for this option to
come to fruition.
Option 2: A
local administration
Hamas’s second
option, if the first one fails, is to form a local administration with
technocrats from the Gaza Strip, whose main role would revolve around the
reconstruction of Gaza and reorganization of civilian life, independently from
Palestinian political factions.
The likelihood
of this scenario also appears slim, however, as it is difficult to imagine how
this administration could gain legitimacy in the absence of a national
consensus and a continued rift between Hamas and the PA. For some Palestinian
and international parties, such an administration formed by Hamas alone would
be regarded as a de facto continuation of the movement’s rule in Gaza since
2007, and not as an expression of Palestinian political consensus. As such, it
would likely face difficulties in obtaining the international aid necessary for
the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
Meanwhile, after
the war, the people of Gaza will most likely be focused on demanding an
improvement in their catastrophic living conditions and the provision of basic
services. If the population considers such a government to be without genuine
independence from Hamas, it could also lose popular support.
In response to
these concerns, Naim simply said that such a scenario would be formed in a way
that would be both “reassuring to the region and satisfactory to the
international arena.”
Option 3: Back
to the status quo
The third
scenario, should Hamas still stand after the war, would be a return to the
status quo on October 6, 2023, when Hamas led a local government on its own in
Gaza. “This option would come by default after the end of the war if Hamas
doesn’t reach a persuasive agreement for governance after the war,” Naim said.
According to
Badran, given the current context, in the event of Israeli forces withdrawing
from any area of the Gaza Strip, “those who reclaim the area and conduct
civilian and bureaucratic life for the people in the area are governmental
representatives” — meaning that those most likely to be able to reorganize Gaza
in the aftermath of the war would be those with prior experience of running
governmental institutions in the small Palestinian territory.
However, this is
not the movement’s preferred option, both Badran and Naim said, and seems
particularly unlikely given Israel’s refusal to end the war with Hamas still in
power. Israel has insisted that any future body governing Gaza would have to
agree never to attack Israel, something Hamas would likely never agree to so
long as a Palestinian state is not established.
Like option two,
Hamas’ return to power could harm the likelihood of Gaza being rebuilt and
receiving the essential humanitarian aid its residents need, as international
aid could be conditioned on it not reaching Hamas. If Hamas failed to provide
prompt and effective solutions to Gaza’s emergency humanitarian and
reconstruction crises, it could lose public support, which would further
complicate the political and humanitarian landscape of Hamas and the
Palestinian people in Gaza.
Plans for
humanitarian recovery
Amid uncertainty
over the political and administrative future of the Gaza Strip, reconstruction
remains a top priority.
A source within
Hamas responsible for housing reconstruction as part of wider post-war planning
told Mondoweiss on condition of anonymity that the concept of “the day after”
will have to contend with Israel seeking to undermine any Palestinian attempt
at political or civil authority in Gaza. According to this source, “the Rafah
crossing will be representative of the ‘day after’ the war in Gaza, and whoever
controls the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi axis will become the Gaza
Strip’s de facto ruler” and determine what aid and material is able to enter
the small enclave.
According to a
September report from the United Nations Satellite Centre, an estimated 66% of
Gaza’s structures have been damaged or destroyed since October 7, 2023. The
U.N. estimates there are some 40 million tons of debris and rubble in Gaza,
which could take up to 15 years and nearly $650 million to clear it all away.
Nevertheless, as
for shelter and relief in the “day after” scenario, the source said Hamas had a
full five-year vision to rebuild Gaza. “The first two years would be focused on
cities made of ‘caravans’ for families that have completely lost their homes.
Whoever lost his house partially will be offered a ‘tent’ of the highest
specifications. Regarding minor damage not exceeding $10,000, the sheltering
committee will hand over the amounts these families need to restore their
homes,” the source said.
According to the
source’s estimates, plans for five “caravan cities” across the Gaza Strip to
provide temporary shelter would require $1 billion, while the full
reconstruction process could amount to nearly $40 billion. He added that
“reconstruction would be in the hands of the citizens of Gaza and
reconstruction financing would be from international and regional parties.”
While all
scenarios envisaged by Hamas are highly dependent on when and on which note the
war will one day end, short of reaching an agreement with other Palestinian
political factions, Hamas may continue to be the de facto authority managing
the daily and civil affairs in Gaza in the foreseeable future, even if acting
behind the scenes.
Nevertheless,
whichever scenario does come to fruition, one thing is certain: in the wake of
the mass destruction caused by Israel, the task of rebuilding Gaza and
providing essential humanitarian relief is too monumental a task to be handled
by Hamas alone.
Juan
Cole
Ann
Arbor (Informed Comment) – On the Sunday before Christmas, Pope Francis said,
“May the weapons be silenced and Christmas carols resound!” according to
Kristina Molare at the Catholic News Agency.
The
Pope continued, in a clear condemnation of the Israeli government, “With sorrow
I think of Gaza, of so much cruelty; of the children machine-gunned, the
bombing of schools and hospitals… So much cruelty!”
He
said, “Let us pray for a ceasefire on all war fronts, in Ukraine, the Holy
Land, in all the Middle East and the entire world, at Christmas.”
On
Saturday, he had been equally forthright on Israel’s atrocities in Gaza,
saying, “Yesterday they did not allow the Patriarch (of Jerusalem) into Gaza as
promised.”
“Yesterday
children were bombed. This is cruelty, this is not war.”
The
Pontiff underlined, “I want to say it because it touches my heart.”
(Latin
Archbishop Pierbattista Pizzaballa did ultimately manage to visit Gaza City on
Sunday to conduct mass for the Christian Palestinian refugees from Israeli
bombardment there, in coordination with Israeli authorities. But apparently
until the Pope spoke out, the Israeli military had denied him permission.)
Francis’s
increasingly outspoken condemnation of Israel has caused several controversies
this fall. In a new book first published in Italian in November, the pope
called for a painstaking investigation of whether Israel is guilty of genocide
in Gaza (see below for an excerpt from my earlier analysis of these passages).
On
December 7, artisans from the Bethlehem Christian community presented a
nativity scene at the Vatican’s Paul VI Hall. The installation was headed by
Johny Andonia, 39. At the last moment, he decided to wrap the baby Jesus in a
keffiyeh, the patterned scarf that is commonly worn by men in the Levant, Iraq
and Arabia, but which has come to symbolize the Palestinians in particular. He
said the scarf was a symbol to demonstrate the “existence” of Palestinians.
After an outcry from Israel and its supporters ensued, the scarf was removed
after three days.
Bethlehem
in Palestine has a population of 29,000 about 3,000 of them Christians.
Palestinian Christians have suffered from Israeli colonial brutality like all
other Palestinians.
I
wrote on November 21,
Pope
Francis has a new book, Hope never disappoints. Pilgrims towards a better
world. . . The Pope mentions Gaza on several occasions in the book. At one
point he expresses concern about migration crises around the world, colored as
they are by “violence and hardship,” in the Sahara, the Mexican-US border, and
the Mediterranean, “which has become a large cemetery in the past decade.” He
adds, “also in the Middle East,” because of the “humanitarian tragedy” in Gaza
. . .
The
Catholic leader laments that so many Ukrainians have been forced to flee, and
praises countries that took them in, such as Poland. He then turns to the
Middle East, where, he says, we have seen something similar . . .
Francis
said he was thinking especially of those who leave Gaza in the midst of the
famine that has hit the Strip. Experts estimate that about 100,000 Palestinians
from Gaza managed to flee to Egypt before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu occupied the Rafah crossing with Israeli troops.
Then
Pope Francis dropped his bombshell. According to some experts, he wrote, “what
has been happening in Gaza has the characteristics of a genocide.”
He
insisted that a painstaking investigation be carried out to determine whether
the situation fits the technical definition formulated by jurists and
international organizations. He is likely referring to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the Genocide Convention of 1948, on the basis
of which the International Court of Justice is deliberating on whether what the
Israelis are doing in Gaza is a genocide . . .
His
last mention of Gaza comes in a passage where he recalls a photograph of a
Palestinian grandmother in Gaza, her face not visible, holding in her arms the
lifeless body of her five-year-old granddaughter, who had just been killed in
an Israeli bombing, along with other family members. He notes that the image
has been called “The Pieta of Gaza.”
The
Encyclopedia Britannica explains, “Pietà, as a theme in Christian art,
depiction of the Virgin Mary supporting the body of the dead Christ. . . . the
great majority show only Mary and her Son. The Pietà was widely represented in
both painting and sculpture, being one of the most poignant visual expressions
of popular concern with the emotional aspects of the lives of Christ and the
Virgin.”
He
says that the photo, taken in a hospital morgue, conveys strength, sorrow and
the unimaginable pain inflicted by war. He ends by again insisting that
innocents must be protected even in the midst of warfare, a principle, he says,
that is engraved on the hearts of all people.
The
consequence of the Pope’s comments throughout is a humanization of the
Palestinians — a humanization of which US and British media outlets have
largely proved themselves incapable. The only way they can be all right with
over 17,000 dead children in Israel’s campaign against Gaza is that they do not
see them as truly human. Otherwise, even the death of one little granddaughter
would have us all weeping uncontrollably.
Not
only does the Pope humanize Palestinian suffering, refusing to lose his empathy
in the face of the magnitude of the slaughter and the sheer number of children
in burial shrouds, but in a sense he even divinizes Palestinian suffering. The
dead little girl in her grandma’s arms is a Christ-like figure — Christ-like in
her innocence, which did not prevent her from being brutally killed. And the
heart-wrenching mourning of her grandmother is like the grief of the Mother
Mary over her crucified son, himself the incarnation on earth of the divine.
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