The second chapter is titled “Revolution and Transition”. It defines a revolution and compares it with Iranian uprisings. Revolutions in other countries, such as in Russia and China, are studied in detail, and a comparison is made with the Iranian revolution and the role of those who played an active role in it. At the opening of this chapter, the author mentions that the revolution in Iran was a surprise to all, including the United States. This belief contradicts many other experts who consider that the revolution was guided by the US government, if not initiated by it, due to the Shah’s ideas and behaviors in the last few years of his reign. The demonstration of Iranian students during the last trip the Shah made to the United States, which was during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the size and the length of the opposition, showed clearly to anyone watching it on the screen, how the Shah’s regime was volatile. After a brief discussion as to how shocking the Iranian revolution was to other leaders, the book discusses in detail the events during and right after the revolution, with Khomeini acting as the leader. Then it goes back to the ruling of the Shah and his father, their differences, and their powers that changed the whole structure of the country. How the US political power controlled Iran and how the leadership improved living conditions by shaping the political structure is also discussed in depth. This chapter ends with a phrase “…Khomeini clawed his country back from the grasp of a model dictator and his superpower backer and remolded it as an anti-hegemonic, theo-political actor, challenging both the regional and international orders (P.62).” It is perhaps necessary to mention here an important fact which is detailed in the book, that as in all other revolutions, there were many actors who helped and shaped, and even gave their lives for the revolution, with non-Islamic views or wishing the country to become an Islamic state. As it has been recorded by many, Khomeini started a hegemonic ruling himself, while many other political actors were on the scene and struggling for the revolution. In order to establish his ruling, Khomeini slaughtered the leaders of all other groups, and anyone acting contradictory to his view of the government, soon after the success of the revolution.
The following chapter discusses Khomeini’s theological rulings. It begins with the assumption of non-Islamic groups who participated in the revolution, hoping that with Khomeini’s leadership, they could establish their own political views. The book mentions that those non-Islamic groups, who participated in the revolution and spilled blood for it, counted on Khomeini’s words when he was in exile and repeatedly announced that after the success of the revolution, he would migrate to the religious town of Ghom, and stay only as a religious leader. According to the book: “In an interview on May 6, 1978, with Le Monde’s special envoy, Lucien George, he had declared: In the society we intend to establish, the Marxists will be free to express their opinions… we have never denied them the freedom or infringed upon it. Everyone is free to express his opinion. When asked in the same interview whether he intended to head the government personally… his reply was: Personally? No. Neither my age, nor my position, nor my own inclinations make me suitable for such a task (P.64).” The book also quotes from Khomeini about an Islamic state: “In another interview with Le Monde on October 17, 1978, when asked what he meant by an ‘Islamic Government’, he replied ‘we do not intend to take over the government (P.64).” Of course Khomeini lied in order to satisfy those who did not believe in an Islamic state, which is a great majority of Iranians today. The book mentions that neither Khomeini nor his inner circle believed that the Shah’s power would be crushed so quickly. What the book does not mention is that the reason was the United States, which ordered the Shah to leave the country since they did not think his power was useful to the West any longer, as he was planning and expressed himself many times that he was making Iran the greatest nation in the Middle East.
Khomeini’s Jihadi approach passed the revolution is discussed next, as well as his view of such an approach in Islam. It continues that Khomeini: “spared no effort in crushing all those who might jeopardize the religious, national, and international vision that he envisaged for himself and for Iran. To implement his Islamic political vision in Iran and to project it as revolutionary throughout the Muslim world (P.68)". According to the book, Khomeini had three main jihadi objectives, which were elimination of state apparatus as well as elimination of all opponents, and total Islamization of Iranian state. To ensure his three principles were met, he executed all people close to the Shah, all leaders and proponents of other factions who participated in the revolution, Islamic or non-Islamic, and destroyed anything that did not sound Islamic to him, and finally got votes for an Islamic regime! The rest of the chapter discusses this Jihadi (fight against enemies of Islam)/ Ijtihadi (Islamic judgement) aspects of Khomeini’s ruling.
Following chapter discusses general direction of the government under Khomeini’s successor, Khamenei. As Khamenei was very loyal to Khomeini during his rule; so he was selected to succeed his predecessor. There is a biography of Khamenei at the beginning of the chapter, focusing on his leadership style. As Rafsanjani was extremely influential in empowering Khamenei as the new leader, he became Iran’s president for two terms. The book deliberates Rafsanjani’s leadership style in detail, and continues with an account of the presidential methods of other leaders following him. At the end of the chapter and under the title “The Post-Revelutionary Generation”, it discusses the youth population of Iranians, most of whom have no or little memory of Khomeini and the revolution. Although the government’s propaganda on Khomeini and his revolution is all over the country squares, media, and schools, the new generation does not have any sympathy for it. “Among these Iranians today, especially in urban areas, Khomeini’s Islamic political legacy is widely perceived as stifling, suffocating, regressive, and anti-modern. This critique, expressed more often in private than in public settings (for obvious reasons), sees Khomeini’s Islamic order as a key impediment to Iran’s cultural, economic, and national potential as a nation rich in resources and manpower (P. 125,126).” It continues in revealing Iranian youth’s power in dodging government officials in their criticism of the government, and expressing themselves in art and music, once banned by the government. Then, the Green movement is shortly discussed, along with the fact that Iranian people’s ability to access their media through satellites and other means of learning sourced from outside of the country, such as Facebook, at the time that they are banned by the government.
Chapter five is titled “Resource Capabilities”. In this chapter, we learn about the economy and its management, reform in the economy, rentierism in politics and in economy, military power and its capabilities, and countering Western nations' propaganda against the Iranian government, through what is called a soft war. One of the tools of the government is its religious charitable foundations, which have a budget allocation of between twenty to thirty percent of GDP. Some of the functions of these foundations are described briefly: “Martyrs Foundation funds social welfare projects such as Rassoul al-Azam hospital in Beirut (where health care is free for families of soldiers killed fighting Israel and is subsidized by the foundation). The US Treasury estimates that Hezbollah receives $100-$200 million a year from Iran. ‘Iran had rebuilt 504 roads, 19 bridges, 149 schools, 48 mosques and churches, and 64 Power stations.’ In addition, in the two decades prior to 2007, Iran constructed around 330 schools teaching a total of around 700,000 students, 20 hospitals and clinics, and 550 miles of roads in Lebanon (P. 159,160).” What is not mentioned in the book is the disastrous conditions Iranians have in their own country, while the government is so generous in Lebanon. We also know that in recent months, all these constructions have been demolished by Israeli bombs.
In the following chapter, the book discusses the relations of the Islamic Republic with the outside world. Khomeini’s slogan of “neither East, nor West, but Islamic” has been the motto and the policy of the Iranian government. This is argued in detail throughout this chapter. The government's adventurism outside Iranian borders is discussed here as well. For example, after the creation of the Taliban by Pakistan, in order to expand its influence, the Iranian government felt a threat from the expansion of Sunni Islam in its neighborhood, and began controlling the Afghan government. Considering that the Iranian economy has been in a fiasco since the Islamic Republic, and the situation is constantly getting worse, while the Iranian population is getting poorer (just by checking the Iranian exchange rate), the funds the Iranian government has spent outside of Iran, in order to maintain its power, are astonishing. “At the 2002 Tokyo Afghanistan donor conference, Iran pledged $500 million for reconstruction- the largest of any country outside the OECD. It added another $100 million to this amount in 2006 and $50 million in donations, plus $300 million in loans, in 2008… Between 2007 and 2013, it contributed $50 million a year for counternarcotics operations alone (P. 177, 178).” These generous donations for reconstruction were made during the time Iran’s infrastructure was in real need of improvements. The generosity of the government of Iran, while the number of the poor in the country and the number of those leaving the country are increasing by the day, is astonishing. “Since 2001 US intervention, Iran has become Afghanistan’s largest trading partner with a balance of trade that weighs overwhelmingly in Iran’s favor. The total volume of trade in 2015 between the two countries reached $2.4 billion, $2.3 billion of which was Iranian exports. Afghan imports to Iran accounted for only $10 million and comprised mostly seeds and plants (P. 178).” Government’s generosity towards other neighbors continues: “Iran has become Iraq’s largest trading partner, with trade reaching $12 billion in 2015, and plans to expand it to $20 billion in 2018… In 2015, Iran spent $13.5 million rebuilding and renovating holy shrines, double the amount spent the previous year (P.186).” While Iranians are suffering from a lack of clean water and electricity, and they get poorer by day, the government’s generosity outside of its borders continues in places such as Syria, where the whole government’s structure was replaced by US allies recently. “In the financial dimension, it is estimated that Iran has helped maintain the regime to the tune of more than $6 billion annually, on average, since 2011. Part of this has been in the form of massive loans; in 2013 alone. Iran extended a $3.6 billion line of credit to the regime, as well as an additional $1 billion for non-oil-related products (P.187).” The book continues discussing the Iranian government’s relations with other neighbors for the remainder of this chapter.
Chapter seven discusses the relationship of the Iranian government with major powers, especially the United States, Russia, China and EU. Again, it is amazing to know the amount of funds transferred to other countries for superfluous purchases, while Iranians are suffering from a lack of basic needs. “In 2016, Russia delivered a supply of its advanced S-300 surface-to-surface missile systems to Iran. Tehran is currently negotiating a $10 billion arms deal… Russo-Iranian economic relations remained limited until recently, largely due to the international sanctions on Iran. In fact, bilateral trade decreased from $1.7 billion in 2014 to $1.3 billion in 2015… As an early sign, the volume of Russo-Iranian trade jumped by almost 80 percent in 2016, almost doubling to $2 billion (P.226).
The final chapter of the book concludes the dialogue on Iran by summarizing the condition of the government and its people. Previous chapters maintained the government’s roles and responsibilities towards other nations, especially neighboring states. This chapter deals mostly with the relationship of the theocratic government with the Iranian people. Although the book does not specify it, with the news coming from Iran, one can guess that close to eighty percent of the Iranian population, or those who are not benefiting from the Islamic government, are in disaccord with the mullahs’ regime. It is important to acknowledge that only people living in the country, not political discourse with other nations, would determine the destiny of this regime. “It [The Islamic system] has, finally, caused a growing gulf between the ruling elites and the public, corresponding to a stat-society dichotomy that has alienated many citizens, especially among the postrevolution generation, from the regime, its conservative clerical strands in particular (P. 242).” Challenges facing the Islamic government are also reviewed in this chapter as well: “The Islamic Republic’s processes of change and development have been marred by a heavy top-down approach, enabling the rulling clerics, bonyads, sepah, and companies linked to these powerful forces to use their positions for personal, theological, political, corrupt practices, which have permeated the state and society in different ways, resulted in socioeconomic disparities and inequalities that rival the people’s suffereing under the Shah’s rule, which Khomeini had promissed that an Islamic government would alleviate (P. 243).” However, the book’s claim, on the same page, that rural inhabitants enjoy better living conditions than they did under the Shah’s regime can be contested. In its final pages, the book talks about Khamenei’s successor (his son, Mujtaba), who had been viewed in the past: “… given Mujtaba’s accumulation of wealth through allegedly illegal activities, and given that the constitutional and clerical qualifications are not hereditary in Iran, his odds do not appear good either(P. 249)." On the same page, Trump’s views of Iran in his first term is also stated: “Invigorated by support from the Israeli and Saudi leaderships, Trump has persistently castigated the Iranian regime as ‘corrupt,’ a supporter of ‘terrorism,’ and the source of all menace in the Middle East (P. 249)." Although this statement about Trump is from the time of his first term as president, he still speaks about the Iranian regime the same way, and even worse than before, which was characterized by his speech during his last week’s trip to the Middle East. The final assessment of Iranian regime is placed in the final pages of the book: “The future of the Islamic Republic is most likely to be influenced by a power struggle that has already been settled but nonetheless remains consequential: between the conservative, or jihadi, and the reformist, or ijtihadi, clusters… Yet as the Republic moves forward, the ijtihadi aspect is likely to gain ground as the postrevolution generation comes of age (P.256).”
As it was mentioned earlier, the book was written during the first term of Trump’s presidency. The US relationship with Iran did not seem to have changed much during Biden's presidency. However, Trump is more aggressive in all areas in his second term, and under the pressure from Israel to attack Iran, which he seems to be ignoring. Domestic policies of the Islamic Republic are not discussed in detail in the book, and a great majority of the book is a discussion of its foreign policies. People in Iran resent the government more and more every day, and although the small minority supporting the government has arms and financial benefits, systematic corruption is so widespread that more and greater uprisings are envisioned shortly, especially after Khamenei’s death. In all assessments, the book gives a very detailed and substantive picture of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policies.
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