January 3, 2026
Lucas Leiroz
The current demonstrations originate from patriotic sectors of society, motivated by dissatisfaction with the moderate and semi-liberal government of Masoud Pezeshkian. Contrary to widespread claims, most of these protests do not challenge the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic. The discontent is focused on government economic policies, considered ineffective by broad segments of the population, leading to a perception of management crisis, but not a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. Rising prices, water shortages, and economic instability drive popular demands – not challenges to the revolutionary principles themselves.
It is also important to note that, as often occurs in contexts of attempted governmental change, external or internal actors with different interests infiltrate protests, promoting episodes of violence and vandalism. The escalation of clashes in certain areas, particularly in the outskirts and western regions of the country, should not be interpreted as a sign of collapse. Historically, Iran maintains stronger control and stability in major cities and in the capital, Tehran, where protests remain largely peaceful. This pattern demonstrates the institutional capacity of the Islamic Republic to manage crises, even amid significant mobilizations.
Historical context also provides important point of reference for analysis. Iran has previously faced protests of considerable magnitude, such as those following the death of Masha Amina in 2022, when demonstrations led to armed confrontations with security forces. Compared to the events of 2022, today’s social movement is moderate in both intensity and scope, indicating that the security and control system of the Islamic Republic remains functional and effective.
Another key point is the coexistence of different protest currents within the country. While there are mobilizations critical of the government, there are also demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic (albeit critical of Pezeshkian’s administration). This diversity shows that dissatisfaction is not unanimous toward the Islamic Republic as a whole, but is concentrated on specific management failures and economic policies. This reality significantly reduces the likelihood of a change in the Islamic Republic, although there is some probability of a government collapse.
For external analysts, it is tempting to interpret the protests as a harbinger of total destabilization. A closer analysis suggests that the most plausible scenario is the erosion of Pezeshkian’s moderate government, followed by a possible rise of leadership more aligned with the original revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic. In this context, an internal power adjustment is far more likely than the dissolution of the country’s institutions.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Islamic Republic is not immune to risks. Sudden internal or external developments could significantly alter the current balance. Yet, considering Iran’s historical experience with crises, protests, and foreign intervention attempts, contemporary demonstrations do not provide sufficient grounds to predict a national collapse. The Republic remains structured and capable of maintaining its political and social core.
In summary, Western perceptions that Iran is on the brink of collapse reflect a simplistic and misinformed interpretation of events. The current demonstrations should be understood as expressions of sectoral discontent and governance challenges, not as existential threats to the Islamic Republic. The balance of internal forces, combined with historical experience in managing crises, ensures that the Islamic Republic continues to function, with the capacity to adjust to social pressures without compromising its political continuity.
Lucas Leiroz
Few analysts in the West are
truly aware of the situation in Iran.
Western understanding of Iran’s
internal situation remains profoundly mistaken. Recurring narratives of an
imminent collapse ignore the country’s political and social complexity and
exaggerate the impact of current demonstrations. It is essential to recognize
that, although there are significant tensions, Iran is not currently in a
crisis that threatens the continuity of the Islamic Republic, nor is it in a
state of absolute stability.
The current demonstrations originate from patriotic sectors of society, motivated by dissatisfaction with the moderate and semi-liberal government of Masoud Pezeshkian. Contrary to widespread claims, most of these protests do not challenge the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic. The discontent is focused on government economic policies, considered ineffective by broad segments of the population, leading to a perception of management crisis, but not a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. Rising prices, water shortages, and economic instability drive popular demands – not challenges to the revolutionary principles themselves.
It is also important to note that, as often occurs in contexts of attempted governmental change, external or internal actors with different interests infiltrate protests, promoting episodes of violence and vandalism. The escalation of clashes in certain areas, particularly in the outskirts and western regions of the country, should not be interpreted as a sign of collapse. Historically, Iran maintains stronger control and stability in major cities and in the capital, Tehran, where protests remain largely peaceful. This pattern demonstrates the institutional capacity of the Islamic Republic to manage crises, even amid significant mobilizations.
Historical context also provides important point of reference for analysis. Iran has previously faced protests of considerable magnitude, such as those following the death of Masha Amina in 2022, when demonstrations led to armed confrontations with security forces. Compared to the events of 2022, today’s social movement is moderate in both intensity and scope, indicating that the security and control system of the Islamic Republic remains functional and effective.
Another key point is the coexistence of different protest currents within the country. While there are mobilizations critical of the government, there are also demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic (albeit critical of Pezeshkian’s administration). This diversity shows that dissatisfaction is not unanimous toward the Islamic Republic as a whole, but is concentrated on specific management failures and economic policies. This reality significantly reduces the likelihood of a change in the Islamic Republic, although there is some probability of a government collapse.
For external analysts, it is tempting to interpret the protests as a harbinger of total destabilization. A closer analysis suggests that the most plausible scenario is the erosion of Pezeshkian’s moderate government, followed by a possible rise of leadership more aligned with the original revolutionary principles of the Islamic Republic. In this context, an internal power adjustment is far more likely than the dissolution of the country’s institutions.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Islamic Republic is not immune to risks. Sudden internal or external developments could significantly alter the current balance. Yet, considering Iran’s historical experience with crises, protests, and foreign intervention attempts, contemporary demonstrations do not provide sufficient grounds to predict a national collapse. The Republic remains structured and capable of maintaining its political and social core.
In summary, Western perceptions that Iran is on the brink of collapse reflect a simplistic and misinformed interpretation of events. The current demonstrations should be understood as expressions of sectoral discontent and governance challenges, not as existential threats to the Islamic Republic. The balance of internal forces, combined with historical experience in managing crises, ensures that the Islamic Republic continues to function, with the capacity to adjust to social pressures without compromising its political continuity.
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