April 8, 2026
Bamo Nouri and Inderjeet Parmar
On the surface, all sides are claiming success. Donald Trump has declared a “total and complete victory”, presenting the agreement as evidence that US objectives have been met. Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership has framed the ceasefire as a strategic achievement, with its Supreme National Security Council formally endorsing the deal on the condition that attacks stop.
But beneath these competing narratives lies a deeper reality: the content and structure of the ceasefire suggests that Iran may have emerged not weakened, but strengthened. While much of its senior leadership has been assassinated during the conflict, the regime’s ability to rapidly appoint replacements and maintain cohesion points to institutional resilience rather than collapse.
The ceasefire was not imposed by decisive military defeat. It was negotiated – and shaped – around Iranian conditions, delivering gains, with Tehran’s ten-point plan serving as a starting framework for negotiations rather than a finalized agreement being imposed on Iran.
Tehran’s proposals went beyond ending hostilities. They include sanctions relief, access to frozen assets, reconstruction support and continued influence over the Strait of Hormuz. They also include effective US withdrawal from the Middle East – and an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil transits, has been reopened under Iranian oversight, a clear signal of where leverage now lies. Control over Hormuz is not just strategic but economic. Iran has reportedly proposed continuing the charging of transit fees it begin during the conflict – creating a potential revenue stream at precisely the moment reconstruction is needed.
In effect, a war that involved sustained bombing of Iranian infrastructure may now leave Iran with new financial mechanisms to rebuild and potentially expand its regional influence.
The logic is paradoxical but familiar. Military campaigns are designed to degrade an opponent’s capabilities. But when they fail to produce decisive political outcomes, they often create new opportunities for the targeted state. Iran entered this war already adapted to pressure. Years of sanctions had forced it to build resilience by diversifying networks, strengthening institutions and developing asymmetric strategies.
What the war appears to have done is accelerate that process. Rather than collapsing, Iran has demonstrated its ability to disrupt global energy markets, absorb sustained strikes and force negotiations on terms that include economic concessions.
Illusion of victory
This is where the dissonance in US messaging becomes most visible. The US president may have framed the ceasefire as a “complete victory” but, tellingly, while the ceasefire deal will involve the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been the US president’s main demand in recent days, talks will center on Iran’s ten-point plan rather than the original US 15-point plan, which centered on dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.
The shift suggests an American search for an off-ramp. At the same time, Iran has maintained a consistent position: rejecting temporary arrangements unless they deliver structural outcomes such as sanctions relief and security guarantees.
For Washington, the ceasefire halts escalation and stabilizes markets. For Tehran, it aims to consolidate the leverage offered by its control of the Strait of Hormuz. This asymmetry suggests the ceasefire is not a neutral pause, but a moment that could lock in a shift in regional power.
The most decisive dimension of this shift is economic. The war has destabilized global markets – with oil prices fluctuating sharply in response to disruptions of supply. But the ceasefire introduces a new dynamic. If sanctions are eased, Iran gains access to global markets at a time of sustained energy demand. Combined with potential transit revenues and reconstruction flows, this creates the conditions for a significant economic rebound.
In effect, the war risks producing the opposite of its intended outcome. Rather than weakening Iran economically, it may instead have strengthened it.
A stronger Iran, a weaker order?
This raises a larger question: What does this ceasefire reveal about power itself? For decades, US influence in the Middle East has rested on military dominance and economic pressure. This conflict suggests both are under strain.
Militarily, the US and Israel have demonstrated overwhelming capability, yet without decisive outcomes. Iran has retained its core capacities, maintained cohesion and leveraged its position to shape deescalation.
At the same time, for the US and Israeli legitimacy has eroded. The war’s contested justification, civilian toll and lack of broad international support have weakened the two countries’ standing, even among allies. American soft power – long central to its global leadership – is diminished. Trump’s increasingly abusive social media posts have certainly alienated even its closest allies, most of whom stayed silent in face of US threats.
Economically, Iran’s ability to influence – and potentially monetize – global energy flows gives it a form of structural power that force alone cannot neutralize. The result is a paradox: A war intended to contain Iran may have reinforced its strength.
It is still early. Ceasefires can collapse, negotiations can fail, and conflicts can reignite. But if this agreement holds – even temporarily – it may mark a turning point. Not because it ends the war, but because of what it reveals about how wars are now won and lost. Victory is no longer defined by battlefield dominance alone, but by outcomes that are economically sustainable, politically legitimate and strategically durable.
On those measures, Iran appears well positioned. The US and Israel may have demonstrated military superiority. But Iran has demonstrated something different: the ability to endure, adapt and convert pressure into leverage.
That’s why this ceasefire matters not just as an end to a phase of conflict but marking the moment when a war intended to weaken Iran instead left it stronger – and exposed the limits of the power that sought to contain it.
Amin Saikal
Just hours before, many had been alarmed by Trump’s threats to bomb Iran back to “the stone age” and destroy its “civilization.”
The ceasefire provides a breathing space for hammering out a “definitive agreement concerning long-term peace with Iran, and peace in the Middle East”, according to Trump.
However, the road to a final settlement will be complex and bumpy, though not insurmountable.
Underestimating the enemy
After six weeks of escalating war and rhetoric, starting with joint US-Israel attacks on Iran and the latter’s robust response, the three combatants have not only inflicted serious blows on each other. The region and the world have also suffered from a massive oil, liquefied gas and inflationary crisis as Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz.
This was not something Trump had expected. He initially anticipated the combined US and Israeli military power would rapidly prevail. This would force Tehran, which had suppressed widespread public protests early in the year, to capitulate and thus open the way for favourable regime change.
But the Iranian government proved to be more resilient, entrenched and resourceful than anticipated. The government was also strategic in fighting back by hitting US assets across the Persian Gulf and Israel, as well as closing the strait.
Meanwhile, Trump could not solicit active support from US allies for his joint war endeavors with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Gaza.
The allies had not been consulted. They didn’t consider it to be in their individual national interests to participate in a war contrary to international law and the United Nations Charter.
Further, the United States’ global adversaries, Russia and China – both having strategic cooperation agreements with Iran – vehemently opposed the war. They joined scores of other countries around the world in calling for de-escalation and measures to avoid more economic repercussions.
The conflict widened. Israel unleashed a campaign to occupy southern Lebanon in response to attacks from Iran-aligned Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah.
The costs of the war then soared for all sides. For the US alone, the price tag amounted to at least US$1 billion a day. This added substantially to the federal debt of close to $40 trillion.
The situation evolved into a race between missiles and interceptors; it would just be a matter of who ran out first. It was recently reported that Israel was running low on interceptors and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) faced a shortage of manpower.
Unpopular war
On the other hand, despite the US and Israeli decapitation of its leadership, air supremacy and bombardment of thousands of military and non-military targets, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintained a sustained retaliatory capability.
It managed to fire dozens of advanced missiles and drones on a daily basis against targets in the Gulf and Israel.
More importantly, the war proved increasingly unpopular in the United States. As the public felt the effects of it on the rising cost of living and at the petrol stations, some 61% of citizens opposed the war. Trump’s ratings plummeted in the opinion polls.
In view of these variables, Trump could not possibly stand by his promise of escalating Operation Epic Fury to the level of erasing such a sizeable country as Iran. Iranian cultural and patriotic features, as well as the devotion of the country’s many citizens to Shia Islam, mitigated against outside aggression, as in previous occasions in its history.
No easy peace
This is not to claim that negotiating and concluding a comprehensive agreement for an enduring peace between the US and Iran will be easy. But a crucial section of Trump’s acceptance of the ceasefire, which gives us an insight into his thinking, is as follows:
Bamo Nouri and Inderjeet Parmar
Sustained bombing of its
infrastructure may have left Iran with new financial mechanisms to rebuild and
even expand its regional influence
Ceasefires are often presented as
moments of relief – pauses in violence that open the door to diplomacy. But
sometimes they reveal something more consequential: who has actually gained
from the war. The emerging ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran may be one
of those moments.
On the surface, all sides are claiming success. Donald Trump has declared a “total and complete victory”, presenting the agreement as evidence that US objectives have been met. Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership has framed the ceasefire as a strategic achievement, with its Supreme National Security Council formally endorsing the deal on the condition that attacks stop.
But beneath these competing narratives lies a deeper reality: the content and structure of the ceasefire suggests that Iran may have emerged not weakened, but strengthened. While much of its senior leadership has been assassinated during the conflict, the regime’s ability to rapidly appoint replacements and maintain cohesion points to institutional resilience rather than collapse.
The ceasefire was not imposed by decisive military defeat. It was negotiated – and shaped – around Iranian conditions, delivering gains, with Tehran’s ten-point plan serving as a starting framework for negotiations rather than a finalized agreement being imposed on Iran.
Tehran’s proposals went beyond ending hostilities. They include sanctions relief, access to frozen assets, reconstruction support and continued influence over the Strait of Hormuz. They also include effective US withdrawal from the Middle East – and an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil transits, has been reopened under Iranian oversight, a clear signal of where leverage now lies. Control over Hormuz is not just strategic but economic. Iran has reportedly proposed continuing the charging of transit fees it begin during the conflict – creating a potential revenue stream at precisely the moment reconstruction is needed.
In effect, a war that involved sustained bombing of Iranian infrastructure may now leave Iran with new financial mechanisms to rebuild and potentially expand its regional influence.
The logic is paradoxical but familiar. Military campaigns are designed to degrade an opponent’s capabilities. But when they fail to produce decisive political outcomes, they often create new opportunities for the targeted state. Iran entered this war already adapted to pressure. Years of sanctions had forced it to build resilience by diversifying networks, strengthening institutions and developing asymmetric strategies.
What the war appears to have done is accelerate that process. Rather than collapsing, Iran has demonstrated its ability to disrupt global energy markets, absorb sustained strikes and force negotiations on terms that include economic concessions.
Illusion of victory
This is where the dissonance in US messaging becomes most visible. The US president may have framed the ceasefire as a “complete victory” but, tellingly, while the ceasefire deal will involve the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been the US president’s main demand in recent days, talks will center on Iran’s ten-point plan rather than the original US 15-point plan, which centered on dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.
The shift suggests an American search for an off-ramp. At the same time, Iran has maintained a consistent position: rejecting temporary arrangements unless they deliver structural outcomes such as sanctions relief and security guarantees.
For Washington, the ceasefire halts escalation and stabilizes markets. For Tehran, it aims to consolidate the leverage offered by its control of the Strait of Hormuz. This asymmetry suggests the ceasefire is not a neutral pause, but a moment that could lock in a shift in regional power.
The most decisive dimension of this shift is economic. The war has destabilized global markets – with oil prices fluctuating sharply in response to disruptions of supply. But the ceasefire introduces a new dynamic. If sanctions are eased, Iran gains access to global markets at a time of sustained energy demand. Combined with potential transit revenues and reconstruction flows, this creates the conditions for a significant economic rebound.
In effect, the war risks producing the opposite of its intended outcome. Rather than weakening Iran economically, it may instead have strengthened it.
A stronger Iran, a weaker order?
This raises a larger question: What does this ceasefire reveal about power itself? For decades, US influence in the Middle East has rested on military dominance and economic pressure. This conflict suggests both are under strain.
Militarily, the US and Israel have demonstrated overwhelming capability, yet without decisive outcomes. Iran has retained its core capacities, maintained cohesion and leveraged its position to shape deescalation.
At the same time, for the US and Israeli legitimacy has eroded. The war’s contested justification, civilian toll and lack of broad international support have weakened the two countries’ standing, even among allies. American soft power – long central to its global leadership – is diminished. Trump’s increasingly abusive social media posts have certainly alienated even its closest allies, most of whom stayed silent in face of US threats.
Economically, Iran’s ability to influence – and potentially monetize – global energy flows gives it a form of structural power that force alone cannot neutralize. The result is a paradox: A war intended to contain Iran may have reinforced its strength.
It is still early. Ceasefires can collapse, negotiations can fail, and conflicts can reignite. But if this agreement holds – even temporarily – it may mark a turning point. Not because it ends the war, but because of what it reveals about how wars are now won and lost. Victory is no longer defined by battlefield dominance alone, but by outcomes that are economically sustainable, politically legitimate and strategically durable.
On those measures, Iran appears well positioned. The US and Israel may have demonstrated military superiority. But Iran has demonstrated something different: the ability to endure, adapt and convert pressure into leverage.
That’s why this ceasefire matters not just as an end to a phase of conflict but marking the moment when a war intended to weaken Iran instead left it stronger – and exposed the limits of the power that sought to contain it.
Amin Saikal
A billion dollars a day, no
allied support and a resilient Iran forced Trump into a ceasefire he once would
have called surrender
President Donald Trump’s
acceptance of a Pakistani proposal for a two-week ceasefire in the war with
Iran brings a sigh of relief to the international community.Just hours before, many had been alarmed by Trump’s threats to bomb Iran back to “the stone age” and destroy its “civilization.”
The ceasefire provides a breathing space for hammering out a “definitive agreement concerning long-term peace with Iran, and peace in the Middle East”, according to Trump.
However, the road to a final settlement will be complex and bumpy, though not insurmountable.
Underestimating the enemy
After six weeks of escalating war and rhetoric, starting with joint US-Israel attacks on Iran and the latter’s robust response, the three combatants have not only inflicted serious blows on each other. The region and the world have also suffered from a massive oil, liquefied gas and inflationary crisis as Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz.
This was not something Trump had expected. He initially anticipated the combined US and Israeli military power would rapidly prevail. This would force Tehran, which had suppressed widespread public protests early in the year, to capitulate and thus open the way for favourable regime change.
But the Iranian government proved to be more resilient, entrenched and resourceful than anticipated. The government was also strategic in fighting back by hitting US assets across the Persian Gulf and Israel, as well as closing the strait.
Meanwhile, Trump could not solicit active support from US allies for his joint war endeavors with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Gaza.
The allies had not been consulted. They didn’t consider it to be in their individual national interests to participate in a war contrary to international law and the United Nations Charter.
Further, the United States’ global adversaries, Russia and China – both having strategic cooperation agreements with Iran – vehemently opposed the war. They joined scores of other countries around the world in calling for de-escalation and measures to avoid more economic repercussions.
The conflict widened. Israel unleashed a campaign to occupy southern Lebanon in response to attacks from Iran-aligned Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah.
The costs of the war then soared for all sides. For the US alone, the price tag amounted to at least US$1 billion a day. This added substantially to the federal debt of close to $40 trillion.
The situation evolved into a race between missiles and interceptors; it would just be a matter of who ran out first. It was recently reported that Israel was running low on interceptors and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) faced a shortage of manpower.
Unpopular war
On the other hand, despite the US and Israeli decapitation of its leadership, air supremacy and bombardment of thousands of military and non-military targets, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintained a sustained retaliatory capability.
It managed to fire dozens of advanced missiles and drones on a daily basis against targets in the Gulf and Israel.
More importantly, the war proved increasingly unpopular in the United States. As the public felt the effects of it on the rising cost of living and at the petrol stations, some 61% of citizens opposed the war. Trump’s ratings plummeted in the opinion polls.
In view of these variables, Trump could not possibly stand by his promise of escalating Operation Epic Fury to the level of erasing such a sizeable country as Iran. Iranian cultural and patriotic features, as well as the devotion of the country’s many citizens to Shia Islam, mitigated against outside aggression, as in previous occasions in its history.
No easy peace
This is not to claim that negotiating and concluding a comprehensive agreement for an enduring peace between the US and Iran will be easy. But a crucial section of Trump’s acceptance of the ceasefire, which gives us an insight into his thinking, is as follows:
we received a 10 point proposal from Iran (in response to the US 15-point proposal), and believe it is a workable basis on which to negotiate. Almost all of the various points of past contention have been agreed to between the United States and Iran, but a two week period will allow the Agreement to be finalized and consummated.
The ten points include a
secession of hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, though Israel has
since claimed Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire.
Some of the other key elements are:
If this happens and all the parties negotiate in good faith, there is room for optimism. We could potentially see the dawn of a post-war regional order based more on a localised collective security arrangement than on a regional supremacy of one actor over another.
RN Prasher
The US has lost a few aircraft, more to friendly fire than to enemy action. Some Americans, Israelis and Arabs have been killed. Countries of the Middle East have suffered damage to their water and oil infrastructure. Israel has suffered building damage, deaths and injuries.
The human and material losses sustained by Iran are much greater than those suffered by the rest. Such damage is the natural outcome of any armed conflict.
There are intangible losses on both sides. The fissure between the Trump administration and Europe, already substantial, has widened. NATO members did not extend support to the US and largely remained on the sidelines.
Iran has burned its bridges with many countries of the Middle East, and reconciliation may have to await regime change.
The image that has emerged of the regime is that it absorbed the beating passively, retaliating very little against the US and preferring to strike its Middle Eastern allies instead. Iranians will henceforth have less faith in the regime’s capability to defend the country’s assets.
By vetoing the Hormuz resolution at the UN and openly supplying weapons, explosive precursor chemicals and real-time intelligence to Iran during the war, Russia and China took an undeniably partisan position. They had already lost Syria to Turkey; now they have lost the rest of the Middle East.
The Shia-Sunni divide is now a wider geopolitical one — Sunni with the West, Shia with Russia, China and North Korea. While India retained its commercial ties with Iran and Russia without causing much annoyance to Trump, Pakistan may be questioned by the Saudis in the coming days for ignoring their defense pact and remaining neutral.
It will be interesting to see who says what at the next Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, if and when it is held.
Russian and Chinese exports of air-defense equipment have taken three hits in quick succession: the brief Indo-Pakistani conflict, the successful capture of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro and now the Iran war have all demonstrated America’s capability of neutralizing these defenses. China has clearly been selling outdated equipment; global buyers will be warier in the future.
The effectiveness of the Hormuz Strait as a chokepoint will worry China about the similar potential of the Strait of Malacca, which straddles Malaysia and Indonesia and through which a substantial portion of its oil imports pass. India is creating an island sentry post near the strait.
Despite the US’s diminished weapons stocks, it appears that the lessons of this war will, for the time being, deter China from moving on Taiwan.
The biggest gainer has been Israel; the US is now visibly watching its back. There are murmurs that Benjamin Netanyahu pushed Trump into this war. Trump is not a pushover, but there was certainly a nudge.
For the duration of the war, Israel had a free hand in Lebanon, inflicting substantial losses on Hezbollah and gaining ground in the south. This will help the Beirut government further marginalize Hezbollah and regain effective control of the country.
Trump has reinforced his image as a bully taking on the Iranian neighborhood thug — a role he clearly relishes. The rescue of crews from a hostile country during the war has enhanced the image of the US; the significant losses suffered during the rescue operation will be remembered as the price the US is willing to pay for each service member.
There were such instances in the Vietnam War, too. The ability of the US war machine to operate far from its homeland and remain largely unmolested is now undisputed. The battlefield synergy of the US and Israeli armed forces has also been fully established.
Middle Eastern countries must now remain aligned with the US, despite popular sentiment to the contrary. Israel, too, will be part of the bandwagon, and the fading Abraham Accords may be back in the limelight.
India, despite its bonhomie with Iran and Russia during the war, has affirmed its presence in the region by opening its doors wide to Israel. Technological and military cooperation between the two nations is widening rapidly. In this situation, distancing India from the US will remain a pipe dream for China.
Russia’s oil gains from a choked Hormuz and elevated prices are somewhat offset by increased Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil facilities. In this brief war, Ukraine has gained monetarily and in prestige by successfully marketing its low-cost interceptor drones to the Middle East.
Even if China starts offering cheaper clones, the reputational damage to Chinese defense equipment sustained across recent conflicts means Ukraine will remain in this business for the foreseeable future. And while there is no clear winner of the Iran war, the early upshots have already changed the world in many consequential ways.
Andrew Korybko
Both sides will aim to declare victory, but the hurdles to a durable peace agreement are many
The US and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, the details of which have not been confirmed by both sides, averting Trump’s threat to destroy Iran.
The purported statement by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council that CNN and others reported was dismissed as fake by Trump, who instead shared Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi’s cryptic X post on his Truth Social account.
Whatever the truth about the terms may be, US-Iranian talks will resume in Islamabad on Friday (April 10). Here are five preliminary thoughts:
1. Israel will follow US’s lead
While Israel may have wanted the US to achieve their shared goals through military means, it will not brazenly impede the ceasefire’s implementation and risk the US leaving it to fend for itself — hence its acceptance of the decision, which in turn facilitates Friday’s planned talks.
If those negotiations stall, Israel might try to provoke Iran into resuming full-scale hostilities if it senses the US would join in, though it is unlikely to attempt this if talks appear to be going well.
2. Multisided security guarantees
Iran requires the US to withdraw its forces from the Gulf, whether to the status quo ante bellum, further or entirely.
Meanwhile, the US and Israel demand the removal of Iran’s enriched uranium, at a minimum international monitoring of its nuclear program and curbs on its missile program.
US sanctions, including secondary ones, could snap back if war resumes. As for the Gulf, the UAE and Israel may become military allies, while the rest of the region consolidates militarily under Saudi leadership.
3. US won’t likely accept the petroyuan
The petroyuan — Iran’s alleged requirement of payment in yuan for safe transit through the strait — will probably not figure into any peace deal.
The US would rather Iran split payment with Oman in dollars as a form of reparations, which would also strengthen the petrodollar, than allow the petroyuan to emerge as a competitor.
Likewise, the US may also demand that Iran eventually zero out its oil sales to China in exchange for sanctions relief, even if only informally agreed to.
4. Talks could be another trap
Iran repeatedly reminded the world during the conflict that the US attacked it twice while negotiations were underway, so it is possible it will do so a third time.
In this scenario, Trump may have issued his threat to destroy Iran without coordinating with Israel and the Gulf kingdoms, leaving them more vulnerable than if they had more time to prepare for Iran’s retaliation.
The two-week ceasefire may give them enough time, even if they would prefer the US not initiate this sequence.
5. Sword of Damocles of radical global change
On that note, the US has the capability and intent to destroy Iran, which would drive Iran to do its utmost to take the Gulf kingdoms down with it.
The resulting disruption would throw Afro-Eurasia into chaos as the region’s energy exports go offline indefinitely — all while the US withdraws to “Fortress America” in the Western Hemisphere, from where it would divide and rule the Eastern one.
This sword of Damocles of radical global change, therefore, remains and should not be forgotten.
Both sides have declared victory, but the war is not over until there is a US-Iranian agreement to that effect — one that may prospectively incorporate elements from former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s proposal, published in Foreign Affairs last week.
It is accordingly premature to declare a victor, which can only be determined with confidence upon the conclusion of a peace deal, based on the fate of Iran’s enriched uranium, nuclear program, missile program, oil exports to China and the petroyuan.
Stephen Semler
Data shows Israel doesn’t pay for most of the weapons the US sells to it — US taxpayers do
The Trump administration expects US taxpayers to fund not only its own military adventurism but Israel’s as well.
Ending American subsidies for Israel’s wars is one reason why Sens. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), and Peter Welch (D-Vt.) recently filed Joint Resolutions of Disapproval opposing US$659 million in President Donald Trump-approved bomb sales to Israel, with many of the bombs coming directly from US stocks.
“Given the horrific destruction that Israel’s extremist government has wrought on Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon, the last thing in the world that American taxpayers need to do right now is to provide 22,000 new bombs to the [Benjamin] Netanyahu government,” Sanders said in a statement.
Van Hollen added that “Congress must use all the tools at our disposal to end Trump’s war, including stopping the transfer… of taxpayer-funded bombs to the Netanyahu government.”
All told, US taxpayers funded $17.8 billion in arms sales to Israel under President Joe Biden—$11.9 billion government-brokered and $5.9 billion commercial—81% of the $22 billion in sales from 2021-2024.
The senators are right to highlight US taxpayers’ role in these arms deals. That they’re reported as sales belies who’s actually paying for them. Americans, not Israelis, pay for the vast majority of US arms sales to Israel.
Who Really Pays for US Arms Sales to Israel
US arms sales to Israel aren’t really sales, at least not in the typical sense. Israel’s position as purchaser in these weapons deals isn’t synonymous with funder. This is made clear in the arms sales notifications themselves.
Consider the four most recent notified arms sales to Israel published in the Federal Register: $740 million for armored personnel carriers, $1.98 billion for tactical vehicles and accessories, $3.8 billion for attack helicopters and related weaponry, and $150 million for utility helicopters and parts.
After “Prospective Purchaser,” all these notifications list Government of Israel. After “Funding Source,” all list Foreign Military Financing—or FMF, the US military aid program through which Israel receives at least $3.3 billion a year.
In practice, FMF functions as a gift card for Israel to spend on weapons. US taxpayers are stuck paying for the gift card. The only trace of Israeli funding in those $6.7 billion in arms sales is in the tactical vehicle deal, where National Funds follows FMF on the funding source line.
What about the pair of sales including 22,000 bombs, objected to by Sanders, et al.? Both deals are funded by FMF, or in other words, US taxpayers.
This is, of course, a small sample size. But four years of arms sales data tell the same story: Israel doesn’t pay for most of the weapons the US sells it—US taxpayers do.
This fact undermines the economic justification for these arms sales. By foreclosing any claims that they bring significant foreign investment into the US, the case for these sales collapses into the same flawed job creations argument that many hawks use to defend lavish government spending on the military.
The jobs argument is itself a tacit admission of a weak national security justification. A policy that truly concerned the nation’s very existence wouldn’t have to be sold in terms as banal as job creation. The security justification alone would be convincing enough.
Military spending is the least efficient way a government can create jobs. Using military aid to boost employment is like buying a plane ticket to watch a film: Yes, there’s an in-flight movie; no, that doesn’t justify the expense.
Even that analogy is generous. The relationship between military spending and jobs is not self-evident. In 1985, the US military budget was $295 billion—$746 billion in today’s dollars—and there were 3 million workers in the US arms industry.
By 2021, the US military budget had increased by $132 billion in real terms—to $879 billion—while the number of arms industry workers had dropped to 1.1 million. Despite military spending increasing 18% above inflation, there was a 63% drop in arms industry employment.
Under Biden, US Taxpayers Funded $18 Billion in Arms “Sales” to Israel
American arms sales are either US government brokered (“Foreign Military Sales”) or commercial (“Direct Commercial Sales”).
I collected data on both via the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Historical Sales Books and the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ (DDTC) Section 655 Reports, respectively. Both yearly publications tally the value of authorized arms sales.
The Biden administration authorized $22 billion in arms sales to Israel, including more than $13.2 billion in US government-brokered sales and over $8.7 billion in commercial sales.
According to the DSCA report, 90% of the government-brokered deals were funded with US military aid. The DDTC report doesn’t specify the funding source, but 68% is a reasonable estimate based on the average annual share of FMF funding that Israel reportedly spends on commercial sales.
All told, US taxpayers funded $17.8 billion in arms sales to Israel under President Joe Biden—$11.9 billion government-brokered and $5.9 billion commercial—81% of the $22 billion in sales from 2021-2024. That’s nearly $18 billion in subsidies disguised as sales.
US taxpayers deserve a refund, not more of the same from Trump.
Some of the other key elements are:
- the US must fundamentally commit to guaranteeing non-aggression
- the continuation of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz
- removal of primary and secondary sanctions on Iran
- and acceptance of Iran’s right that it can enrich uranium for its nuclear program (for peaceful purposes).
If this happens and all the parties negotiate in good faith, there is room for optimism. We could potentially see the dawn of a post-war regional order based more on a localised collective security arrangement than on a regional supremacy of one actor over another.
RN Prasher
War has transformed Middle East,
shattered NATO, unnerved China, diminished Russia and exposed the limits of US
power
The Iran war may have paused, if
not finally ended. Iran has lost its leaders, half of its missile and drone
stocks, and a substantial part of its military and civil infrastructure.
Thousands of Iranians, a majority of them combatants, have been killed or
injured.The US has lost a few aircraft, more to friendly fire than to enemy action. Some Americans, Israelis and Arabs have been killed. Countries of the Middle East have suffered damage to their water and oil infrastructure. Israel has suffered building damage, deaths and injuries.
The human and material losses sustained by Iran are much greater than those suffered by the rest. Such damage is the natural outcome of any armed conflict.
There are intangible losses on both sides. The fissure between the Trump administration and Europe, already substantial, has widened. NATO members did not extend support to the US and largely remained on the sidelines.
Iran has burned its bridges with many countries of the Middle East, and reconciliation may have to await regime change.
The image that has emerged of the regime is that it absorbed the beating passively, retaliating very little against the US and preferring to strike its Middle Eastern allies instead. Iranians will henceforth have less faith in the regime’s capability to defend the country’s assets.
By vetoing the Hormuz resolution at the UN and openly supplying weapons, explosive precursor chemicals and real-time intelligence to Iran during the war, Russia and China took an undeniably partisan position. They had already lost Syria to Turkey; now they have lost the rest of the Middle East.
The Shia-Sunni divide is now a wider geopolitical one — Sunni with the West, Shia with Russia, China and North Korea. While India retained its commercial ties with Iran and Russia without causing much annoyance to Trump, Pakistan may be questioned by the Saudis in the coming days for ignoring their defense pact and remaining neutral.
It will be interesting to see who says what at the next Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, if and when it is held.
Russian and Chinese exports of air-defense equipment have taken three hits in quick succession: the brief Indo-Pakistani conflict, the successful capture of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro and now the Iran war have all demonstrated America’s capability of neutralizing these defenses. China has clearly been selling outdated equipment; global buyers will be warier in the future.
The effectiveness of the Hormuz Strait as a chokepoint will worry China about the similar potential of the Strait of Malacca, which straddles Malaysia and Indonesia and through which a substantial portion of its oil imports pass. India is creating an island sentry post near the strait.
Despite the US’s diminished weapons stocks, it appears that the lessons of this war will, for the time being, deter China from moving on Taiwan.
The biggest gainer has been Israel; the US is now visibly watching its back. There are murmurs that Benjamin Netanyahu pushed Trump into this war. Trump is not a pushover, but there was certainly a nudge.
For the duration of the war, Israel had a free hand in Lebanon, inflicting substantial losses on Hezbollah and gaining ground in the south. This will help the Beirut government further marginalize Hezbollah and regain effective control of the country.
Trump has reinforced his image as a bully taking on the Iranian neighborhood thug — a role he clearly relishes. The rescue of crews from a hostile country during the war has enhanced the image of the US; the significant losses suffered during the rescue operation will be remembered as the price the US is willing to pay for each service member.
There were such instances in the Vietnam War, too. The ability of the US war machine to operate far from its homeland and remain largely unmolested is now undisputed. The battlefield synergy of the US and Israeli armed forces has also been fully established.
Middle Eastern countries must now remain aligned with the US, despite popular sentiment to the contrary. Israel, too, will be part of the bandwagon, and the fading Abraham Accords may be back in the limelight.
India, despite its bonhomie with Iran and Russia during the war, has affirmed its presence in the region by opening its doors wide to Israel. Technological and military cooperation between the two nations is widening rapidly. In this situation, distancing India from the US will remain a pipe dream for China.
Russia’s oil gains from a choked Hormuz and elevated prices are somewhat offset by increased Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil facilities. In this brief war, Ukraine has gained monetarily and in prestige by successfully marketing its low-cost interceptor drones to the Middle East.
Even if China starts offering cheaper clones, the reputational damage to Chinese defense equipment sustained across recent conflicts means Ukraine will remain in this business for the foreseeable future. And while there is no clear winner of the Iran war, the early upshots have already changed the world in many consequential ways.
Andrew Korybko
Both sides will aim to declare victory, but the hurdles to a durable peace agreement are many
The US and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, the details of which have not been confirmed by both sides, averting Trump’s threat to destroy Iran.
The purported statement by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council that CNN and others reported was dismissed as fake by Trump, who instead shared Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi’s cryptic X post on his Truth Social account.
Whatever the truth about the terms may be, US-Iranian talks will resume in Islamabad on Friday (April 10). Here are five preliminary thoughts:
1. Israel will follow US’s lead
While Israel may have wanted the US to achieve their shared goals through military means, it will not brazenly impede the ceasefire’s implementation and risk the US leaving it to fend for itself — hence its acceptance of the decision, which in turn facilitates Friday’s planned talks.
If those negotiations stall, Israel might try to provoke Iran into resuming full-scale hostilities if it senses the US would join in, though it is unlikely to attempt this if talks appear to be going well.
2. Multisided security guarantees
Iran requires the US to withdraw its forces from the Gulf, whether to the status quo ante bellum, further or entirely.
Meanwhile, the US and Israel demand the removal of Iran’s enriched uranium, at a minimum international monitoring of its nuclear program and curbs on its missile program.
US sanctions, including secondary ones, could snap back if war resumes. As for the Gulf, the UAE and Israel may become military allies, while the rest of the region consolidates militarily under Saudi leadership.
3. US won’t likely accept the petroyuan
The petroyuan — Iran’s alleged requirement of payment in yuan for safe transit through the strait — will probably not figure into any peace deal.
The US would rather Iran split payment with Oman in dollars as a form of reparations, which would also strengthen the petrodollar, than allow the petroyuan to emerge as a competitor.
Likewise, the US may also demand that Iran eventually zero out its oil sales to China in exchange for sanctions relief, even if only informally agreed to.
4. Talks could be another trap
Iran repeatedly reminded the world during the conflict that the US attacked it twice while negotiations were underway, so it is possible it will do so a third time.
In this scenario, Trump may have issued his threat to destroy Iran without coordinating with Israel and the Gulf kingdoms, leaving them more vulnerable than if they had more time to prepare for Iran’s retaliation.
The two-week ceasefire may give them enough time, even if they would prefer the US not initiate this sequence.
5. Sword of Damocles of radical global change
On that note, the US has the capability and intent to destroy Iran, which would drive Iran to do its utmost to take the Gulf kingdoms down with it.
The resulting disruption would throw Afro-Eurasia into chaos as the region’s energy exports go offline indefinitely — all while the US withdraws to “Fortress America” in the Western Hemisphere, from where it would divide and rule the Eastern one.
This sword of Damocles of radical global change, therefore, remains and should not be forgotten.
Both sides have declared victory, but the war is not over until there is a US-Iranian agreement to that effect — one that may prospectively incorporate elements from former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s proposal, published in Foreign Affairs last week.
It is accordingly premature to declare a victor, which can only be determined with confidence upon the conclusion of a peace deal, based on the fate of Iran’s enriched uranium, nuclear program, missile program, oil exports to China and the petroyuan.
Stephen Semler
Data shows Israel doesn’t pay for most of the weapons the US sells to it — US taxpayers do
The Trump administration expects US taxpayers to fund not only its own military adventurism but Israel’s as well.
Ending American subsidies for Israel’s wars is one reason why Sens. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), and Peter Welch (D-Vt.) recently filed Joint Resolutions of Disapproval opposing US$659 million in President Donald Trump-approved bomb sales to Israel, with many of the bombs coming directly from US stocks.
“Given the horrific destruction that Israel’s extremist government has wrought on Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon, the last thing in the world that American taxpayers need to do right now is to provide 22,000 new bombs to the [Benjamin] Netanyahu government,” Sanders said in a statement.
Van Hollen added that “Congress must use all the tools at our disposal to end Trump’s war, including stopping the transfer… of taxpayer-funded bombs to the Netanyahu government.”
All told, US taxpayers funded $17.8 billion in arms sales to Israel under President Joe Biden—$11.9 billion government-brokered and $5.9 billion commercial—81% of the $22 billion in sales from 2021-2024.
The senators are right to highlight US taxpayers’ role in these arms deals. That they’re reported as sales belies who’s actually paying for them. Americans, not Israelis, pay for the vast majority of US arms sales to Israel.
Who Really Pays for US Arms Sales to Israel
US arms sales to Israel aren’t really sales, at least not in the typical sense. Israel’s position as purchaser in these weapons deals isn’t synonymous with funder. This is made clear in the arms sales notifications themselves.
Consider the four most recent notified arms sales to Israel published in the Federal Register: $740 million for armored personnel carriers, $1.98 billion for tactical vehicles and accessories, $3.8 billion for attack helicopters and related weaponry, and $150 million for utility helicopters and parts.
After “Prospective Purchaser,” all these notifications list Government of Israel. After “Funding Source,” all list Foreign Military Financing—or FMF, the US military aid program through which Israel receives at least $3.3 billion a year.
In practice, FMF functions as a gift card for Israel to spend on weapons. US taxpayers are stuck paying for the gift card. The only trace of Israeli funding in those $6.7 billion in arms sales is in the tactical vehicle deal, where National Funds follows FMF on the funding source line.
What about the pair of sales including 22,000 bombs, objected to by Sanders, et al.? Both deals are funded by FMF, or in other words, US taxpayers.
This is, of course, a small sample size. But four years of arms sales data tell the same story: Israel doesn’t pay for most of the weapons the US sells it—US taxpayers do.
This fact undermines the economic justification for these arms sales. By foreclosing any claims that they bring significant foreign investment into the US, the case for these sales collapses into the same flawed job creations argument that many hawks use to defend lavish government spending on the military.
The jobs argument is itself a tacit admission of a weak national security justification. A policy that truly concerned the nation’s very existence wouldn’t have to be sold in terms as banal as job creation. The security justification alone would be convincing enough.
Military spending is the least efficient way a government can create jobs. Using military aid to boost employment is like buying a plane ticket to watch a film: Yes, there’s an in-flight movie; no, that doesn’t justify the expense.
Even that analogy is generous. The relationship between military spending and jobs is not self-evident. In 1985, the US military budget was $295 billion—$746 billion in today’s dollars—and there were 3 million workers in the US arms industry.
By 2021, the US military budget had increased by $132 billion in real terms—to $879 billion—while the number of arms industry workers had dropped to 1.1 million. Despite military spending increasing 18% above inflation, there was a 63% drop in arms industry employment.
Under Biden, US Taxpayers Funded $18 Billion in Arms “Sales” to Israel
American arms sales are either US government brokered (“Foreign Military Sales”) or commercial (“Direct Commercial Sales”).
I collected data on both via the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Historical Sales Books and the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls’ (DDTC) Section 655 Reports, respectively. Both yearly publications tally the value of authorized arms sales.
The Biden administration authorized $22 billion in arms sales to Israel, including more than $13.2 billion in US government-brokered sales and over $8.7 billion in commercial sales.
According to the DSCA report, 90% of the government-brokered deals were funded with US military aid. The DDTC report doesn’t specify the funding source, but 68% is a reasonable estimate based on the average annual share of FMF funding that Israel reportedly spends on commercial sales.
All told, US taxpayers funded $17.8 billion in arms sales to Israel under President Joe Biden—$11.9 billion government-brokered and $5.9 billion commercial—81% of the $22 billion in sales from 2021-2024. That’s nearly $18 billion in subsidies disguised as sales.
US taxpayers deserve a refund, not more of the same from Trump.
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