Raphael Machado
A
nuclear Iran, far from necessarily leading to a nuclear war, could actually
convince Israel to act more prudently and restrain its aggressive actions
against Palestinians and neighboring countries, Raphael Machado writes.
The primary justification offered
for Israel’s attacks against Iran on June 12 was the claim that Iran was on the
verge of developing nuclear weapons.
According to the narrative
presented by Israel and repeated by Netanyahu in his public speeches justifying
the missile strikes against nuclear scientists and generals linked to Iran’s
nuclear program, the level of uranium enrichment and the program’s progress
allegedly guaranteed that Iran would soon be capable of assembling and
equipping missiles with atomic warheads.
Iran’s nuclear program has
existed for decades but only gained significant momentum in the new millennium
due to a specific state-driven focus and international collaboration with
Russia, China, and Pakistan. Immediately, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) began paying closer attention to Iran’s nuclear program (with far more
demands for inspections, verifications, and disclosures than for any other
country on the planet), turning it into a target of intelligence operations not
only by Israel but also by the U.S., France, and the U.K.
The obvious reason is that,
post-Iraq, Iran is Israel’s primary geopolitical rival in the region.
This level of pressure, which
signaled an unwillingness to accept Iran’s sovereign nuclear program, led the
country to develop more discreet research and enrichment facilities, away from
the far-from-impartial eyes of the IAEA. However, when spies exposed Iran’s
secret nuclear program, it resulted in the notorious international standoff a
few years ago, culminating in sanctions against the country.
Initially, Iran capitulated to
Western pressure under President Khatami, agreeing to suspend all uranium
enrichment and fully open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections,
effectively surrendering control of its nuclear program to the agency. Dissatisfied
with these completely unilateral and excessive restrictions, however, Iranians
gradually resumed uranium enrichment, and under Ahmadinejad’s government, they
announced full control over the nuclear fuel cycle. Immediately, the country
was hit with sanctions, followed by various guarantees offered to persuade Iran
to acquire its nuclear needs from the West rather than develop its own
enrichment capabilities.
Under the protection of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which Iran is a signatory, the
country insisted on its right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. By the
end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran’s uranium enrichment level had already
placed it months away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon—if it so
desired.
However, the Rouhani
administration backtracked, and Iran once again capitulated to the West. Iran
showed willingness to accept a new agreement under the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA), which imposed extremely strict limits on uranium enrichment,
the deactivation of nearly all its centrifuges, and relentless international
inspections. In other words, uniquely harsh and unprecedented conditions that,
once again, practically “internationalized” Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.
And even after accepting these impositions, not all sanctions were lifted—only
those affecting financial and commercial matters. Sanctions on Iran’s military
trade remained in place.
Yet, unsatisfied, the Mossad
forged documents to accuse Iran of continuing to maintain secret nuclear
facilities and of having attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past. As a
result, the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement, creating the
international deadlock that has persisted from Raisi’s government until now.
The current state of Iran’s
nuclear program is such that, if it wished, the country could prepare half a
dozen atomic bombs within a week—something Iran has always denied on religious
grounds.
Now, in light of this context, it
is crucial to consider the fact that the Middle East’s only nuclear power,
Israel, possesses a civil-military nuclear program and uranium enrichment
facilities that are not under IAEA supervision. In fact, Israel does not even
admit to having nuclear weapons, despite most experts estimating that the
country possesses around 200 warheads.
This is, therefore, a clear case
of double standards, where Iran is expected to submit to rules from which its
geopolitical rival, Israel, is exempt.
Historically, however, Iran has
always refused to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and has maintained this
position to this day. Despite this, public opinion has increasingly shifted in
the opposite direction, with the majority now—including among critics of the
system—believing that Iran should possess its own nuclear weapons.
This prohibition stems from a
fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in the mid-1990s. However,
Ayatollah Khomeini himself had already issued a fatwa against weapons of mass
destruction in general, after being questioned about the possibility of their
development (especially in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, during which the
Iraqis used chemical weapons against the Iranians). None of these fatwas were
officially published; they were oral and situational fatwas on the subject. But
public comments from Khamenei confirm this stance, and the Supreme Leader has
insisted on it despite calls for the fatwa to be revoked.
Fatwas, of course, are not
irreversible, unchangeable, or irrevocable. They have binding power but can be
freely altered or withdrawn by the head of the Velayat-e Faqih.
My perspective on this, as an
analyst, is first of all that tactical nuclear weapons cannot be categorized as
weapons of mass destruction. I consider them as such mainly because of their
inability to cause widespread and indiscriminate destruction over large areas.
Tactical nuclear weapons, in practice, were designed for use in conventional
military operations, to eliminate troop concentrations and destroy enemy
fortifications. They, in themselves, therefore, do not truly violate Khamenei’s
fatwa (if it is directed against “weapons of mass destruction” in a generic
sense), nor can they be seen as violating Islamic war precepts, which require
the protection of innocents.
In any case, however, Ayatollah
Khamenei should certainly revoke or modify the fatwa. In practice, nuclear
weapons are defensive artifacts ensuring sovereignty more than specifically
tools of destruction. They exist precisely to guarantee peace and save lives—the
lives of the country that, by possessing nuclear weapons, ensures that it will
not be the target of indiscriminate attacks. Considering that Iran is a marked
target for destruction by Israel, a nuclear state, and considering that Israel
intends to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program, Iran finds itself at a
crossroads where it will either capitulate or enter a fateful war against
Israel, a nuclear power. Not developing nuclear weapons, under these
conditions, would be suicide.
Finally, there is the issue of
geopolitical balance. Everyone can agree (and, in fact, even counter-hegemonic
powers like Russia and China agree) that nuclear weapons are far too dangerous
to be treated like conventional weapons and allowed to proliferate freely
around the planet, risking falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.
Nevertheless, the current
“nuclear system” is structured to preserve the nuclear weapons of those who
already possess them and to prevent any other nation—even one that is a
responsible and orderly international actor—from developing them.
Simultaneously, a pariah state like Israel continues to multiply its own
nuclear arsenal without any impediment or oversight.
When analyzing the geopolitical
context of the Middle East, it becomes evident that Israel’s possession of
nuclear weapons gives the country an immense level of boldness on the
international stage. Israel indiscriminately attacks civilian targets, committing
genocide in Gaza, attempts to invade Lebanon, steals parts of Syria, and bombs
Iran. And Israel relies on the fact that any Iranian response to its attacks
will remain very limited for fear of an Israeli nuclear reaction. Similarly,
Israel does not fear adverse decisions in international courts, knowing they
will not result in armed interventions.
A nuclear Iran, therefore, far
from necessarily leading to a nuclear war, could actually convince Israel to
act more prudently and restrain its aggressive actions against Palestinians and
neighboring countries. A revelation that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would
likely trigger Israel’s instinct for self-preservation and force Tel Aviv into
dialogue and the search for an uncomfortable coexistence with Tehran.
The opposite notion—that a
nuclear Iran is “dangerous”—is based on a crude “orientalism” that paints
Iranians as “fanatical barbarians” incapable of possessing nuclear weapons
without immediately using them or handing them over to armed proxy militias.
Naturally, in the already
conflictual context in which Israel and Iran are, in practice, at war, the
scenario changes somewhat in terms of risks because of heightened tensions.
Still, it is necessary to think
about the correlation between multipolarity and nuclear weapons. Going against
both unrestricted proliferation and absolute limitation, perhaps it is time to
consider a system that recognizes the legitimacy of some higher-level regional
actors—such as Brazil and Iran—possessing nuclear weapons as factors of
regional balance against potential foreign interventions and as centers of
“defense umbrellas” to ensure the security of neighboring countries.
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