From Waltz to Hormuz: Why a Gulf Escalation would backfire Systemically

February 17, 2026
‏Peiman Salehi
( Middle East Monitor ) – Most analyses of potential US escalation against Iran in the Gulf remain confined to deterrence logic and regional balances of power. The debate often focuses on credibility, retaliation, and red lines. Yet such framing misses a deeper structural reality. When viewed through the lens of classical international relations theory, a Gulf crisis is not merely a bilateral confrontation. It is a stress test for the global industrial system.

“Map of Straits of Hormuz” Public Domain. Via Picryl.

Kenneth Waltz, in Man, the State, and War (1959), argued that conflict can be understood through three “images”: the individual, the state, and the international system. Applying this framework to the current US–Iran dynamic reveals that the most consequential risks lie not at the level of personalities or even state rivalry, but at the systemic level.
The individual level
At the first image, leadership behaviour matters. Donald Trump’s political style has historically combined transactional bargaining with strategic brinkmanship. Escalation, or the credible threat of it, can function as political signaling both externally and domestically. In this sense, tension in the Gulf may serve as a mechanism for projecting resolve or recalibrating negotiations.
However, escalation at the individual level does not necessarily imply a desire for full-scale war. It often reflects controlled risk-taking raising pressure without crossing the threshold into uncontrollable conflict. Yet even calibrated escalation operates within broader constraints that individual actors do not fully control.
The state level
At the second image, the structural rivalry between Washington and Beijing becomes central. The United States remains engaged in a long-term economic and technological competition with China. Energy flows are part of that equation.
Roughly 83 percent of Middle Eastern crude exports flow to four Asian economies: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. China alone is deeply reliant on Gulf producers for its imported oil. From a narrow state-centric perspective, instability in the Strait of Hormuz could be interpreted as a pressure point against Beijing’s economic backbone.
Within this logic, energy chokepoints appear as strategic leverage. Disruption could raise costs for China, complicate industrial output, and inject uncertainty into supply chains. Seen purely through the prism of state competition, this might appear tactically rational.
But this reasoning collapses at the third image.
The systemic level
At the systemic level, the logic changes entirely. The international system today is not only defined by polarity but by dense interdependence. Energy chokepoints no longer produce contained regional crises; they generate global reverberations.
The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one-fifth of global oil trade and a significant share of LNG exports, particularly from Qatar. According to a June 2025 analysis by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), approximately 10 per cent of Europe’s LNG imports originate from Qatar and the UAE and transit through Hormuz. Italy, Belgium, and Poland are among the primary recipients, with Italy accounting for nearly half of these Gulf LNG volumes.
At first glance, 10 per cent may appear manageable. But this figure reflects only direct LNG imports from those Gulf suppliers. It does not capture the broader market dynamics that would unfold in the event of disruption.
Around 82 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports flow to Asian buyers. Should Hormuz face instability, Asian importers China, Japan, South Korea, and India would aggressively compete for alternative cargoes. The LNG market is globally integrated and price-sensitive. Europe, having reduced reliance on Russian pipeline gas, remains structurally dependent on LNG imports to stabilise supply and maintain storage levels.
The International Energy Agency’s 2025 gas market outlook underscored the continued importance of LNG for European energy security. Even if direct Gulf exposure appears limited in percentage terms, price amplification would transmit rapidly across European markets.
The systemic risk is therefore not simply volume loss but price contagion.
An energy shock in the Gulf would ripple beyond fuel markets. Germany’s industrial core, Italy’s processing sectors, and Eastern European manufacturing remain sensitive to energy volatility. The 2022–2023 crisis demonstrated how quickly gas price spikes translate into inflation, fiscal pressure, and industrial slowdown.

“Moreover, the four primary recipients of Middle Eastern oil China, India, Japan, and South Korea form a substantial share of global manufacturing output. From electronics to machinery and intermediate goods, their production feeds global supply chains. Disruption in energy flows to these economies would not remain confined to Asia it would cascade through global trade networks.

Even limited escalation carries systemic consequences. Insurance premiums for tankers would rise. Risk perception alone could push oil and gas benchmarks upward. Markets react not only to physical shortages but to credible threats.
Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that destabilisation of Iran would destabilise the region.

“Whether through direct disruption or elevated risk premiums, Hormuz functions as a strategic lever. Yet the broader implication is often overlooked: in a tightly interconnected industrial world, leverage cuts both ways.

A strategy that appears tactically rational at the state level applying pressure through energy vulnerability may prove strategically self-defeating at the systemic level. Europe, still navigating the aftershocks of its energy decoupling from Russia, would face renewed inflationary pressure. Asian manufacturing hubs would confront cost spikes. Supply chains would tighten.
Waltz’s framework reminds us that while leaders act and states compete, structure constrains outcomes. In 2026, that structure is defined by industrial interdependence and energy vulnerability. A crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would therefore not merely test US–Iran deterrence.
It would test the resilience of the global system itself.
 

US, Iranian Officials Set For New Negotiations Aimed At Preventing War

( RFE/RL ) – US and Iranian officials will meet in Switzerland on February 17 for a second round of negotiations over a deal aimed at curbing Tehran’s nuclear program and averting war.
The sides held indirect talks earlier this month in Oman, the first since Israel and the United States bombed Iran’s key nuclear sites during a brief conflict in June.
The talks come amid a major American military buildup in the Middle East. Tensions have been building after mass nationwide protests in Iran last month, during which authorities launched a brutal crackdown that rights groups say killed thousands of people.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi will hold talks in Geneva with White House special envoy Steve Witkoff and US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, with Omani representatives acting as mediators.
“I am in Geneva with real ideas to achieve a fair and equitable deal. What is not on the table: submission before threats,” Araqchi said on X on February 16 as he arrived for talks with Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Tehran has said it is willing to accept restrictions on ⁠its nuclear program in exchange for relief from crippling US economic sanctions, but it will not relinquish its right to enrich uranium.
Washington has sought to expand the scope of the talks to include restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles program and ending Tehran’s support for armed groups in the Middle East — issues that Tehran considers nonstarters.
The United States and Iran will have to overcome deep mistrust and animosity to strike a deal. Another barrier is the increased political costs of an agreement for both sides.
“Today, any positive concession to the Islamic republic would effectively be rewarding a regime that in recent weeks has killed several thousand Iranians,” Ali Vaez, director of the Iran Project at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda.
For Iran, “reaching an agreement with a president who has not only carried out military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities but has even threatened military intervention in Iran’s internal affairs is difficult,” he said.
Negotiating a new comprehensive nuclear deal will be extremely difficult, experts say.
To avoid a war, Vaez said, “the only viable short-term path is a largely symbolic understanding that buys time and potentially creates better conditions for more detailed and technical negotiations in the future.”
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking in Hungary on February 16, said Trump has “made clear he prefers diplomacy and an outcome of negotiated settlement.”
“It’s been very difficult for anyone to do real deals with Iran because we’re dealing with radical Shi’a clerics who are making theological decisions, not geopolitical ones. But, let’s see what happens. I hope it works out,” Rubio added.
The negotiations in Geneva come after repeated threats from Trump of military action against Tehran, first over Iran’s brutal crackdown on protests, and then more recently over the country’s nuclear program.
Western countries have long suspected Iran of seeking a nuclear weapon, while Tehran insists its program is for civilian purposes only.
World powers struck a landmark nuclear deal with Tehran in 2015 to prevent an Iranian bomb. Western economic sanctions were eased at the time, but Iran began reneging on commitments after Donald Trump, in his first term as US president, withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and re-imposed sanctions.
On February 13, the US president said regime change in Iran would be the “best thing that could happen.”
He also confirmed that a second aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, would soon join a “massive” US armada in the Arabian Sea.