July 15, 2026
Fereshteh Sadeghi
Fereshteh Sadeghi
The US-Israeli war on
Iran has transformed the strategic waterway into a new flashpoint, placing
unprecedented pressure on relations between Tehran and Muscat.
Iran and Oman have
been allies for decades, with ties predating the Islamic Republic. That
continuity is now under strain, as the US-Israeli war on Iran and Washington’s
pressure on Muscat begin to test the terms of the relationship in the narrow
waters of the Strait of Hormuz.
The question now unfolds at sea, in ports, and in exchanges between officials trying to manage a crisis that has moved beyond diplomacy.
On 12 July, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz until further notice, amid rising tensions with the US and what Tehran describes as repeated violations of a ceasefire reached on 8 April 2026, after 40 days of war imposed by the US and Israel.
The decision to close the strategic waterway was presented as a direct response to Washington’s violation of the Pakistani-mediated memorandum of understanding (MoU) that followed the ceasefire, which Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump separately signed on 18 June.
Tehran’s grievances were laid out in detail. Contrary to Article 1 of the 10-point MoU, the US failed to halt Israeli attacks on Lebanon. At the same time, Washington opened what Iranian officials described as an “illegal route” in the southern belt of the Strait of Hormuz, in Omani waters – contradicting Article 5, which granted Iran authority to “make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels through the waterway.”
A corridor and a dilemma
Iran’s complaints over what it calls an illegal corridor, reportedly made operational under US pressure on Oman – pressure the Iranian Foreign Ministry says has hindered efforts to establish a joint mechanism – have created a dilemma between Tehran and Muscat, whose relations have long been defined by trust, mutual respect, and good neighborliness.
On 11 July, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Muscat to discuss “Article 5 of the MoU, coordination between the two Persian Gulf coastal states and administrative measures regarding the passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.”
The talks, attended by Qatar, did not yield the outcome Tehran had expected, with Oman proposing a third passage through the strait, toll-free, which Araghchi rejected and referred back to Tehran for review.
That hesitation soon gave way to escalation, as US and Iranian forces resumed attacks on each other’s positions, with Tehran targeting vessels escorted by the US Navy through the so-called Omani corridor.
Strikes extended beyond the strait, as Iran targeted US military facilities in the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.
A day after Araghchi returned from Muscat, Iran said it had struck US aircraft carrier support and refueling platforms at the port of Duqm, prompting Oman to summon the Iranian ambassador and deliver a formal note of protest over drone attacks targeting sites in the governorates of Musandam and Al-Wusta.
It is worth noting that Musandam is an Omani exclave overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, and is a strategically vital territory that has drawn interest from both the UAE and Israel.
In the early phase of the 40-day war and the subsequent closure of Hormuz, Oman maintained a position of neutrality, neither endorsing nor opposing Iran’s plans to impose transit fees on vessels.
That position shifted by late May, as US pressure intensified, including threats from Trump that Washington would “blow up Oman” if it became involved in disputes over transit fees.
Muscat tried to find a middle way, stating, “Although it is not in favor of transit fees, prohibited under international law,” it backs “Environmental dues and navigational services” if Iran levies on ships entering or leaving the Persian Gulf.
In his early June visit to Muscat, lead Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf announced that “Tehran reached an agreement with the Omanis to manage the traffic at the Strait of Hormuz.”
Iranian doubts resurface
Iran did not expect Oman to allow the US to open a rival corridor in its waters. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said:
“In the last round of talks in Muscat, we tried to reach a mechanism to guarantee the safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, in consultation with Oman. Unfortunately, we did not reach that objective due to hidden and clear pressures from the US on Oman.”
Former diplomat Mohammad Javad Larijani, in a state TV interview, criticized the negotiating team for bringing Oman into the talks. He implied that, “Oman is not a powerful player in this region and Americans would never allow it to have a say about the critical waterway, which one-fifth of oil energy consumption passes through.”
West Asian affairs expert, Seyyid Reza Sadr al-Husseini, told Fars News:
“Americans put immense pressure on Oman and activated one of its inactive military bases in Duqm. That military installation had no activity against Iran before, but was recently used by the American army in strikes against Iran.”
Husseini adds, “Iran had spared Oman from attacks for months, but now makes no exception anymore, it will strike back at any military base used as a platform for attacks, and Duqm was one of them.”
The Iranian expert went on to say, “As a friendly and neighboring country whose relationship with Iran was always based on trust, Oman was expected to resist coercions by the United States or some regional countries and refuse to allow its soil to be used for creating insecurity in the region.”
Oman under pressure
Not all assessments in Iran align with that view. Javad Mir Galvi Bayat, an expert specialized in Iran–Oman relations, argues that Muscat faced limited options under the scale of pressure exerted by the US, western states, and regional actors:
“Nobody can imagine that Muscat could resist Donald Trump who was threatening to blow up Oman or the treasury secretary who was bullying Oman with sanctions. Oman does not have military capacity nor a prosperous economy to withstand sanctions, neither its citizens can resist economic sanctions.”
Bayat even hails Oman for going beyond its military and political limits, noting that “up until now Muscat has refused to allow Israelis and Americans to use its airspace or land bases for attacks on Yemen or Iran. It cannot hold out more than that.”
Tehran’s next steps
Iranians have seemingly decided not to expect much from Oman.
Member of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee at the Iranian Parliament Ali Khedhrian said:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran with or without Oman, will not step back from this strategic waterway. It will exert its power. The Sultanate of Oman can cooperate with Iran in this matter but if it decides not to cooperate or (even worse) help the enemy behind the scene, it would be not spared from Iranian missiles.”
Bayat agrees that Oman has so far managed to stay away from this (regional) war:
“They know the bigger the conflict becomes, the more it would drag them into. So, they seek to resolve this regional conflict through their usual approach, which is diplomacy. Though diplomacy has failed and is unacceptable for the time being.”
He suggests “Iran must use soft military power, including strikes on the American base in Musandam or depositing naval mines in the Omani side of the strait. That would eventually rescue Omanis from Washington’s pressures.”
Iran has already adopted this strategy. In addition to targeting the port of Duqm, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has destroyed America’s long-range air surveillance radar and maritime detection radar sites in Oman.
War pressure and durable ties
Despite the escalation, some Iranian assessments continue to view the relationship as resilient.
Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi, writing in Le Monde, said, “It is time to shift from assigning the blame of conflict (on Iran) to building mechanisms to prevent future conflicts.”
Busaidi noted, “The post-1979 (Persian) Gulf security architecture that was based on containing Iran has failed and needs re-assessment.” He added, “Recent events showed many of the region’s security challenges stem from decisions made outside this region rather than inside the region.”
For Bayat, “The Islamic Republic has never faced any essential challenges with Oman, geographically, religiously, or discourse-wise.”
Therefore, he believes, “For many reasons, the Iran-Oman relationship is stronger than being destroyed by challenges created by this war. Of course, if the current conflict does not get out of control, (in the long term) Iran’s military activities in the Strait of Hormuz could benefit Oman, too.”
“Oman has some (legitimate) concerns regarding its neighbors such as the UAE and other countries. Muscat’s alliance with Tehran reduces those concerns, as well,” he concludes.
The space for mediation, however, is narrowing. A channel once managed through quiet coordination between Tehran and Muscat is now exposed to direct confrontation, with decisions driven by events on the ground rather than negotiated understandings.
The Strait of Hormuz has shifted from a controlled passage to a pressure point, where each escalation risks pushing the confrontation further.
The question now unfolds at sea, in ports, and in exchanges between officials trying to manage a crisis that has moved beyond diplomacy.
On 12 July, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz until further notice, amid rising tensions with the US and what Tehran describes as repeated violations of a ceasefire reached on 8 April 2026, after 40 days of war imposed by the US and Israel.
The decision to close the strategic waterway was presented as a direct response to Washington’s violation of the Pakistani-mediated memorandum of understanding (MoU) that followed the ceasefire, which Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump separately signed on 18 June.
Tehran’s grievances were laid out in detail. Contrary to Article 1 of the 10-point MoU, the US failed to halt Israeli attacks on Lebanon. At the same time, Washington opened what Iranian officials described as an “illegal route” in the southern belt of the Strait of Hormuz, in Omani waters – contradicting Article 5, which granted Iran authority to “make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels through the waterway.”
A corridor and a dilemma
Iran’s complaints over what it calls an illegal corridor, reportedly made operational under US pressure on Oman – pressure the Iranian Foreign Ministry says has hindered efforts to establish a joint mechanism – have created a dilemma between Tehran and Muscat, whose relations have long been defined by trust, mutual respect, and good neighborliness.
On 11 July, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Muscat to discuss “Article 5 of the MoU, coordination between the two Persian Gulf coastal states and administrative measures regarding the passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.”
The talks, attended by Qatar, did not yield the outcome Tehran had expected, with Oman proposing a third passage through the strait, toll-free, which Araghchi rejected and referred back to Tehran for review.
That hesitation soon gave way to escalation, as US and Iranian forces resumed attacks on each other’s positions, with Tehran targeting vessels escorted by the US Navy through the so-called Omani corridor.
Strikes extended beyond the strait, as Iran targeted US military facilities in the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan.
A day after Araghchi returned from Muscat, Iran said it had struck US aircraft carrier support and refueling platforms at the port of Duqm, prompting Oman to summon the Iranian ambassador and deliver a formal note of protest over drone attacks targeting sites in the governorates of Musandam and Al-Wusta.
It is worth noting that Musandam is an Omani exclave overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, and is a strategically vital territory that has drawn interest from both the UAE and Israel.
In the early phase of the 40-day war and the subsequent closure of Hormuz, Oman maintained a position of neutrality, neither endorsing nor opposing Iran’s plans to impose transit fees on vessels.
That position shifted by late May, as US pressure intensified, including threats from Trump that Washington would “blow up Oman” if it became involved in disputes over transit fees.
Muscat tried to find a middle way, stating, “Although it is not in favor of transit fees, prohibited under international law,” it backs “Environmental dues and navigational services” if Iran levies on ships entering or leaving the Persian Gulf.
In his early June visit to Muscat, lead Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf announced that “Tehran reached an agreement with the Omanis to manage the traffic at the Strait of Hormuz.”
Iranian doubts resurface
Iran did not expect Oman to allow the US to open a rival corridor in its waters. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said:
“In the last round of talks in Muscat, we tried to reach a mechanism to guarantee the safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, in consultation with Oman. Unfortunately, we did not reach that objective due to hidden and clear pressures from the US on Oman.”
Former diplomat Mohammad Javad Larijani, in a state TV interview, criticized the negotiating team for bringing Oman into the talks. He implied that, “Oman is not a powerful player in this region and Americans would never allow it to have a say about the critical waterway, which one-fifth of oil energy consumption passes through.”
West Asian affairs expert, Seyyid Reza Sadr al-Husseini, told Fars News:
“Americans put immense pressure on Oman and activated one of its inactive military bases in Duqm. That military installation had no activity against Iran before, but was recently used by the American army in strikes against Iran.”
Husseini adds, “Iran had spared Oman from attacks for months, but now makes no exception anymore, it will strike back at any military base used as a platform for attacks, and Duqm was one of them.”
The Iranian expert went on to say, “As a friendly and neighboring country whose relationship with Iran was always based on trust, Oman was expected to resist coercions by the United States or some regional countries and refuse to allow its soil to be used for creating insecurity in the region.”
Oman under pressure
Not all assessments in Iran align with that view. Javad Mir Galvi Bayat, an expert specialized in Iran–Oman relations, argues that Muscat faced limited options under the scale of pressure exerted by the US, western states, and regional actors:
“Nobody can imagine that Muscat could resist Donald Trump who was threatening to blow up Oman or the treasury secretary who was bullying Oman with sanctions. Oman does not have military capacity nor a prosperous economy to withstand sanctions, neither its citizens can resist economic sanctions.”
Bayat even hails Oman for going beyond its military and political limits, noting that “up until now Muscat has refused to allow Israelis and Americans to use its airspace or land bases for attacks on Yemen or Iran. It cannot hold out more than that.”
Tehran’s next steps
Iranians have seemingly decided not to expect much from Oman.
Member of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee at the Iranian Parliament Ali Khedhrian said:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran with or without Oman, will not step back from this strategic waterway. It will exert its power. The Sultanate of Oman can cooperate with Iran in this matter but if it decides not to cooperate or (even worse) help the enemy behind the scene, it would be not spared from Iranian missiles.”
Bayat agrees that Oman has so far managed to stay away from this (regional) war:
“They know the bigger the conflict becomes, the more it would drag them into. So, they seek to resolve this regional conflict through their usual approach, which is diplomacy. Though diplomacy has failed and is unacceptable for the time being.”
He suggests “Iran must use soft military power, including strikes on the American base in Musandam or depositing naval mines in the Omani side of the strait. That would eventually rescue Omanis from Washington’s pressures.”
Iran has already adopted this strategy. In addition to targeting the port of Duqm, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has destroyed America’s long-range air surveillance radar and maritime detection radar sites in Oman.
War pressure and durable ties
Despite the escalation, some Iranian assessments continue to view the relationship as resilient.
Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi, writing in Le Monde, said, “It is time to shift from assigning the blame of conflict (on Iran) to building mechanisms to prevent future conflicts.”
Busaidi noted, “The post-1979 (Persian) Gulf security architecture that was based on containing Iran has failed and needs re-assessment.” He added, “Recent events showed many of the region’s security challenges stem from decisions made outside this region rather than inside the region.”
For Bayat, “The Islamic Republic has never faced any essential challenges with Oman, geographically, religiously, or discourse-wise.”
Therefore, he believes, “For many reasons, the Iran-Oman relationship is stronger than being destroyed by challenges created by this war. Of course, if the current conflict does not get out of control, (in the long term) Iran’s military activities in the Strait of Hormuz could benefit Oman, too.”
“Oman has some (legitimate) concerns regarding its neighbors such as the UAE and other countries. Muscat’s alliance with Tehran reduces those concerns, as well,” he concludes.
The space for mediation, however, is narrowing. A channel once managed through quiet coordination between Tehran and Muscat is now exposed to direct confrontation, with decisions driven by events on the ground rather than negotiated understandings.
The Strait of Hormuz has shifted from a controlled passage to a pressure point, where each escalation risks pushing the confrontation further.
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