July 25, 2026
Andrea B. Rugh
Washington, D.C. (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – It has become increasingly clear that effective international communication is impossible without basic knowledge of world cultures. US officials say as much when they admit that failures in Afghanistan and Iraq were due in large part to ignorance of culture and pushing too many programs that conflicted with local values. In Afghanistan, for example, the US pushed tribal leaders to adopt a centralized form of government, when decentralization was a more familiar pattern of the past. It left the Afghan government only controlling Kabul in the end. The US also insisted that USAID-funded projects be staffed by 25 percent Afghan women. But in practice, few Afghan women had the requisite skills or the willingness to join their projects. Even when they did, social norms required that they be accompanied and transported everywhere—costly provisions that forced the cancellation of projects.
Andrea B. Rugh
Washington, D.C. (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – It has become increasingly clear that effective international communication is impossible without basic knowledge of world cultures. US officials say as much when they admit that failures in Afghanistan and Iraq were due in large part to ignorance of culture and pushing too many programs that conflicted with local values. In Afghanistan, for example, the US pushed tribal leaders to adopt a centralized form of government, when decentralization was a more familiar pattern of the past. It left the Afghan government only controlling Kabul in the end. The US also insisted that USAID-funded projects be staffed by 25 percent Afghan women. But in practice, few Afghan women had the requisite skills or the willingness to join their projects. Even when they did, social norms required that they be accompanied and transported everywhere—costly provisions that forced the cancellation of projects.
In a book Iran and
the United States (2017) that shows how little has changed, the author
Seyed Mousavian attributes the problems of negotiators from both sides to their
misreading of the other’s thinking. Americans believe Iranians will surrender
with coercive diplomacy while the Iranians mistrust American motives and
believe their intention is to dominate the country. In Mousavian’s view the US
would be more effective if it used the language of respect and equality. But
Americans instead talk down to the Iranians, seeming unaware of the extent to
which this irritated Iranians who feel proud of their glorious civilization and
past.
The US, he says, focuses its negotiating strategies almost entirely on economic and political issues while entirely ignoring the importance of psychological and cultural issues that are important to Iranians, such as its “culture of resistance to foreign domination and humiliation.” Another important misunderstanding is the West’s failure to differentiate Shia from Sunni Islam, assuming they are both the same, while in fact Shia Islam plays a different role in society and has a much greater ability to mobilize the masses.
The time Mousavian spent as a student in the US prepared him to see more clearly where US negotiators were coming from. He says they believe their culture is universal, acceptable anywhere, with a cold war mentality that finds enemies in anyone who disagrees. Islam for them has simply taken the place of the Soviet Union as the new enemy. And then President George W. Bush accentuated the polarity when he included Iran as part of the Axis of Evil in a conflict where the US felt called upon to heroically confront the evil. Mousavian concludes that the language of threat and intimidation is a major obstacle in negotiations between the US and Iran. Does this sound familiar?
Intensifying this paranoia of Islam as the enemy is that our wars of late have predominantly involved Muslim-majority countries. In the effort to make our wars seem virtuous, we have created a villainous antagonist in Arabs and a white knight on horse image of us coming to the rescue: saving women from their male oppressors (as in Afghanistan), or citizens of tyrannical governments (as in Iran) and offering the gift of our own “superior” forms of government.
If a major problem of conflicts is cultural, where will we who want to know find reliable cultural knowledge? In the past, anthropologists like Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict wrote about cultures in a way that was easily understood by the public. Today it’s hard to find such studies. Anthropologists have pretty much withdrawn into academia where they neither address pressing problems of the day nor use language the public can understand.
The Greater Middle East, unfortunately, is an area where this cultural knowledge is not only lacking but has been distorted by the Western perceptions described above. It’s my view that anthropology with its tools of participant observation and holism is still the best data-driven way to gather this kind of cultural information. By culture I am talking about those shared beliefs, values and views that help societies make sense of their world and people’s behavior in it. Some of the questions anthropologists might usefully answer include: what are the conventions for conducting interpersonal relations; why is it so difficult to establish democracy in societies that have century-long experience with participatory governance? What are local patterns for settling disputes or negotiating differences? Why is Islam expanding when other major religions are declining? Is it really plausible that white men like Pete Hegseth are about saving Muslim women? How do families create such cohesive, loyal groups? Howow do communal societies work in the Middle East?
Anthropology had a sinister history as a tool of colonial rule, and no one wants to see those mistakes repeated. The discipline nevertheless remains vital if the American public is to understand the roots of American failures in the region. If we understood other cultures better, might we not avoid getting involved in these conflicts in the first place?
The US, he says, focuses its negotiating strategies almost entirely on economic and political issues while entirely ignoring the importance of psychological and cultural issues that are important to Iranians, such as its “culture of resistance to foreign domination and humiliation.” Another important misunderstanding is the West’s failure to differentiate Shia from Sunni Islam, assuming they are both the same, while in fact Shia Islam plays a different role in society and has a much greater ability to mobilize the masses.
The time Mousavian spent as a student in the US prepared him to see more clearly where US negotiators were coming from. He says they believe their culture is universal, acceptable anywhere, with a cold war mentality that finds enemies in anyone who disagrees. Islam for them has simply taken the place of the Soviet Union as the new enemy. And then President George W. Bush accentuated the polarity when he included Iran as part of the Axis of Evil in a conflict where the US felt called upon to heroically confront the evil. Mousavian concludes that the language of threat and intimidation is a major obstacle in negotiations between the US and Iran. Does this sound familiar?
Intensifying this paranoia of Islam as the enemy is that our wars of late have predominantly involved Muslim-majority countries. In the effort to make our wars seem virtuous, we have created a villainous antagonist in Arabs and a white knight on horse image of us coming to the rescue: saving women from their male oppressors (as in Afghanistan), or citizens of tyrannical governments (as in Iran) and offering the gift of our own “superior” forms of government.
If a major problem of conflicts is cultural, where will we who want to know find reliable cultural knowledge? In the past, anthropologists like Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict wrote about cultures in a way that was easily understood by the public. Today it’s hard to find such studies. Anthropologists have pretty much withdrawn into academia where they neither address pressing problems of the day nor use language the public can understand.
The Greater Middle East, unfortunately, is an area where this cultural knowledge is not only lacking but has been distorted by the Western perceptions described above. It’s my view that anthropology with its tools of participant observation and holism is still the best data-driven way to gather this kind of cultural information. By culture I am talking about those shared beliefs, values and views that help societies make sense of their world and people’s behavior in it. Some of the questions anthropologists might usefully answer include: what are the conventions for conducting interpersonal relations; why is it so difficult to establish democracy in societies that have century-long experience with participatory governance? What are local patterns for settling disputes or negotiating differences? Why is Islam expanding when other major religions are declining? Is it really plausible that white men like Pete Hegseth are about saving Muslim women? How do families create such cohesive, loyal groups? Howow do communal societies work in the Middle East?
Anthropology had a sinister history as a tool of colonial rule, and no one wants to see those mistakes repeated. The discipline nevertheless remains vital if the American public is to understand the roots of American failures in the region. If we understood other cultures better, might we not avoid getting involved in these conflicts in the first place?
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